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AGAINST NOTICE AND CHOICE: THE MANIFEST
FAILURE OF THE PROCEDURALIST PARADIGM
TO PROTECT PRIVACY ONLINE
(OR ANYWHERE ELSE)
JOHN A. ROTHCHILD*
ABSTRACT
Notice and choice are the foundational principles underlying the regulation of
privacy in online transactions and in most other situations in which individuals interact
with the government and commercial interests. These principles mean that before
collecting personally identifiable information (“PII”) from an individual, the collector
must provide the individual with a disclosure (notice) of what PII it proposes to collect
and how it proposes to use that information. That knowledge enables the individual to
make a rational decision (choice) about whether to allow that collection of
information, generally by declining to enter into the transaction or, in some situations,
by denying consent to collect the PII.
This Article argues that the notice-and-choice paradigm is fundamentally flawed,
cannot be fixed, and should be replaced with a system that places substantive
limitations on the collection and use of PII for commercial purposes.
Each of us who engages with commercial websites, mobile computing devices, or
everyday devices that are connected to the Internet receives these notices many times
every day. The notices are typically conveyed in the text of a privacy policy that can
be accessed by clicking on a hyperlink at the bottom of a web page, tapping on a link
of a mobile app’s page on a distribution platform, or paying close attention when
installing an Internet of Things device. And the great majority of us, just as many times
each day, ignore these privacy notices and submit to whatever collection of PII may
result.
Why do presumably rational users of the Internet fail to take advantage of this
wealth of disclosure information, which is only a click away? Our behavior is easily
explained by the concept of “rational inattention.” The human condition of bounded
rationality makes it infeasible for us to take in and process all the information that is
contained in the privacy notices that surround us. Even if we were able to process these
notices, it would do us no good because, as demonstrated by an empirical study
included in this Article, the uniformity among these privacy policies means that we
cannot choose among more- and less-protective policies: we can only choose to
engage with the online world, making our PII available for uses that we cannot
understand or evaluate, or become hermits in self-exile from the online world.
The alternative this Article proposes is to discard our faith in the proceduralist
approach of notice-and-choice and develop substantive rules that will truly protect the
privacy of individuals in their online interactions, rather than settling for the
simulacrum of privacy protection that the present system offers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Notice” and “choice” are foundational elements of the reigning paradigm for
reconciling individual interests in information privacy with the interests of
commercial and government entities in processing personally identifiable information
(“PII”).1 The paradigm requires an information collector to disclose to an individual
what personal information it proposes to collect from her and how it proposes to use
that information (“notice”), thereby affording the individual an opportunity to prevent
the collection of her PII by denying consent or by declining to enter into the transaction

1 “Personally identifiable information” (“PII”) is the standard term used in discussions of
privacy in legal contexts. Definitions of the term vary somewhat. The Government
Accountability Office has defined PII as:

(1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such
as name, Social Security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or
biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an
individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-536, ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR ENHANCING
PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2008). This definition will
suffice for present purposes.
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(“choice”).2 In this Article, I argue that notice-and-choice is a fatally flawed approach
to protecting the private information that is generated through the use of the various
communications facilities that depend on the Internet. It is time to recognize the failure
of the proceduralist paradigm and move to a new approach that includes substantive
rules regulating the conduct of would-be users of our private information.
The Internet-dependent communications facilities include commercial websites,
mobile computing devices, and the Internet of Things (“IoT”). (I will sometimes refer
to the information transmitted using these communications facilities as Internetenabled data flows.) Notice-and-choice did not work well starting with the earliest
commercial interactions making use of the Internet, namely through sites on the World
Wide Web. It has worked progressively less well with the rise of social media
platforms, which has brought about a dramatic leap in the amount of private
information our online activity exposes,3 and as we have left our desktop computers
behind in preference for mobile devices.4 The coming age of the IoT5 offers an
occasion to assess the suitability of notice-and-choice in that context as well.
Criticisms of notice-and-choice in the online context abound. The critics generally
do not reject the paradigm,6 but only its implementations, calling for shorter and more

2 Thomas B. Norton, Note, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a New
Critique of the Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 181, 184 (2016).
3

According to one tabulation, on average people spend nearly two hours a day using social
media, representing thirty percent of their online time. Evan Asano, How Much Time Do People
Spend on Social Media? [Infographic], SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.socialmediatoday.com/marketing/how-much-time-do-people-spend-social-mediainfographic. This is up from fifteen minutes a day in 2012. See Jason Mander, Social Media
GLOBALWEBINDEX
(June
8,
2016),
Captures
30%
of
Online
Time,
http://blog.globalwebindex.net/chart-of-the-day/social-media-captures-30-of-online-time/.
4 Starting in 2014, with the gap continuing to increase since then, mobile devices surpassed
desktop computers in terms of number of users globally and hours of usage each day. Dave
Chaffey, Mobile Marketing Statistics Compilation, SMART INSIGHTS (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-marketing-analytics/mobilemarketing-statistics/.
5

According to one report, in 2017 the IoT consisted of 20 billion devices. Peter Brown,
20 Billion Connected Internet of Things Devices in 2017, IHS Markit Says, ELECTRONICS360
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://electronics360.globalspec.com/article/8032/20-billion-connectedinternet-of-things-devices-in-2017-ihs-markit-says. Projections of growth in the number of
connected devices vary widely, but all expect dramatic increases. IoT Market Forecasts,
POSTSCAPES, https://www.postscapes.com/internet-of-things-market-size/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
6 An exception is Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 341 (Jane K. Winn ed.,
2006) (proposing a set of “Consumer Privacy Protection Principles” as an alternative to the Fair
Information Practice Principles).
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readable privacy policies,7 notice that is more prominently presented to the data
subject8 or is rethought,9 and other refinements.10
These prescriptions are inadequate because the diagnosis is wrong. The problems
with notice-and-choice are not fixable because they are inherent to its fundamental
structure. As I explain in what follows: First, the notice-and-choice paradigm assumes
that data subjects behave rationally, and yet requires them to devote an irrational
amount of effort to reading and evaluating privacy policies in order to determine
whether to engage with a particular entity or product. Second, the “notice” element of
notice-and-choice, as presently implemented, is plainly inadequate under accepted
standards that apply in the related contexts of contracting and consumer protection;
any effort to bring about adequate presentation of privacy notices is doomed to failure
due to the limits of human cognition. Third, the uniformity of privacy policies means
that the “choice” element of notice-and-choice is illusory. Fourth, notice-and-choice
amounts to blanket consent, which is generally disfavored in privacy contexts. Fifth,
the commanding role that third parties play in the dissemination and use of private
information collected from Internet-enabled data flows makes it impossible for a
privacy notice to specify what an individual needs to know to make an informed choice
about the disposition of her private information. And sixth, notice-and-choice cannot
be implemented with respect to IoT devices that collect personal information from
persons other than the owner or deployer of the device.
If notice-and-choice is broken and cannot be fixed, what is the alternative? I argue
that it is necessary to jettison the proceduralist approach of notice-and-choice and
adopt substantive limitations on the collection and use of PII through Internet-enabled
data flows. Notice-and-choice is a procedural rule in that, as long as it follows the
prescribed procedures, tendering notice and obtaining consent, a data processor may
collect any private information and use it for any purpose. A substantive privacy rule,
on the other hand, deems certain conduct impermissible even with notice and consent.
7 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE
64
(2012)
[hereinafter
FTC,
PROTECTING
CONSUMER
PRIVACY],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
(“Privacy notices should be clearer, shorter, and more standardized to enable better
comprehension and comparison of privacy practices.”); Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition
Label” for Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY 4 (2009) (proposing redesign of privacy notices along the lines of nutrition labeling);
Marcus Moretti & Michael Naughton, Why Privacy Policies Are So Inscrutable, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/why-privacy-policiesare-so-inscrutable/379615/ (advocating a switch to “plain language privacy policies that make
consumers want to read”).
8 See, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR
PRIVACY
POLICIES
PUBLIC
9
(2014),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_pu
blic.pdf (“Use a conspicuous link on your homepage containing the word ‘privacy.’”).
9 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2012) (advocating use of “visceral notice”).
10 See Paula J. Bruening & Heather M. Patterson, A Context-Driven Rethink of the Fair
Information Practice Principles (Sept. 23, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2843315
(advocating injection of contextual considerations into the fair information practice principles).
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Doctrinally, substantive privacy rules can be premised on theories of unfairness
and unconscionability. In multiple cases, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has
found privacy-invading practices to be “unfair” acts in violation of the FTC Act. 11 In
the closely related context of information security, the FTC routinely finds the failure
to maintain reasonable security practices to be unfair.12 Common law and statutory
concepts of unconscionability also are applicable.13
What sorts of substantive privacy rules should we apply to consumer-facing,
Internet-enabled commercial data flows? That is a subject for another inquiry, but I
suggest one: A company should be forbidden to condition provision of a good or
service to a consumer on the consumer’s consent to collection or use of private
information that is not required for provision of the good or service.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I discuss the four waves of
computing technology that have given rise to different contexts relevant to the
principles of notice and choice. In Section III, I analyze the role that notice-and-choice
plays in several of the more influential formulations of a widely recognized set of
privacy principles, illuminating their similarities and differences. I then do the same
with implementations of the principles in positive law and in self-regulatory schemes.
In Section IV, I explain why notice-and-choice has always been, and in the future
promises more and more to be, a failure if the goal is to give consumers the ability to
control the collection and use of their PII. In Section V, I sketch out a way forward:
eschew sole reliance on the procedural paradigm of notice-and-choice and develop
substantive rules that will actually promote the privacy interests of real people
functioning in the real world rather than merely providing a soothing but ultimately
ineffectual system of notice-and-choice. In Section VI, I briefly conclude.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COLLECTING AND USING PRIVATE
INFORMATION EXPOSED THROUGH INTERNET-ENABLED DATA FLOWS
To understand the information privacy issues that arise from Internet-enabled data
flows, we need to understand the technology used to gather and process the private
information contained in these data flows. For purposes of this analysis, the
technology can be classified into four phases. These phases have arisen at successive
points in time, but they are cumulative rather than consecutive. That is, technologies
introduced in the earlier phases have never entirely died out, but continue to be used
in the later phases.
A. Collection and Storage of Private Data
1. Databases on Mainframe Computers (Early 1950s to Present)
The earliest computing technology that gave rise to privacy issues was automated
data processing using mainframe computers. 14 The use of computers to process
commercial data first arose in the late 1940s and early 1950s as demobilization after
11

Infra Section V.B.1.a.

12

Infra Section V.B.1.b.

13

Infra Section V.B.2.

14

The meaning of the term “mainframe” has evolved over the years with developments in
computing technology. For present purposes, it may be defined as a “large computer used for
commercial data processing and other large-scale operations.” THE HUTCHINSON DICTIONARY
OF COMPUTING AND THE INTERNET 344 (2005).
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World War II resulted in a tremendous boom in commercial transactions. The federal
government was an early adopter and thereby helped to spread the use of electronic
data processing.15 The first few UNIVAC computers were sold in the early 1950s to
the United States Census Bureau, the military, and the Atomic Energy Commission.16
Starting in 1954, these machines were sold to large corporations such as General
Electric, Metropolitan Life, and Consolidated Edison.17 Some of the applications of
these machines, such as General Electric’s use of them to produce payroll checks for
its employees,18 began to implicate privacy interests.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, commentators drew public attention to the
looming risks to privacy that they perceived from the growing use of computers to
store and manipulate personal information.19 One particular catalyst was a 1965
proposal that the federal government create a “national data center” that would
consolidate computerized records then scattered among twenty federal agencies.20 The
proposal gave rise to congressional hearings and outrage in the popular press over the
privacy implications of such a centralized database. Ultimately, the privacy issues
scuttled the proposal and led to the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974.21
Alarm over the privacy implications of automated data processing on a large scale
persuaded the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to convene an advisory
committee charged with producing a report on the subject.22 At the time, the
government was seen as posing the principal threat to privacy, and not much concern
existed about the role of private companies as a source of privacy invasions. 23 For
15 See SHANE GREENSTEIN, HOW THE INTERNET BECAME COMMERCIAL 70 (2015)
(describing early purchases of computer technology by NASA, the Department of Defense, and
other federal government agencies).
16 UNIVAC:
UNIVersal Automatic Computer, HIST. COMPUTING
https://www.thocp.net/hardware/univac.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013).
17

See PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 28 (2d ed. 2003).

18

Id. at 32–33.

PROJECT,

19 See MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 14 (1964) (noting privacy challenges
resulting from “the growing use of giant computer systems to house all the file information”);
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 30
(1971) (warning of the risk that “an ingenious wiretapper” might gain unauthorized access to
computerized information in transit); VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 35 (Pocket
Cardinal ed. 1965) (“Americans should be uneasy about the amount of information the federal
government is starting to file on its citizens in its blinking memory banks.”). For a canvass of
the concerns raised about the privacy implications of computers beginning in the early 1960s,
see ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 298–321 (1st ed. 1967).
20 Rebecca S. Kraus, Statistical Déjà Vu: The National Data Center Proposal of 1965 and
Its Descendants, 5 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 1 (2013).
21

Id.

22

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS 7–8 (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT].
23 See WILLIS H. WARE, RAND AND THE INFORMATION EVOLUTION 155 (2008),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP537.html (“[T]he government was seen as ‘the
privacy problem’ in the 1970s. . . .”). Ware served as the chair of the committee that produced
the 1973 HEW Report. Id. at 154.
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example, the report expressed concern that the National Driver Register, a computer
database maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
Washington, D.C., could be mined in a “dragnet” operation, that is, a “systematic
screening of all members of a population in order to discover a few members with
specified characteristics.”24 The report also discusses the “social control capabilities”
of a federally managed health information system that maintained medical records on
14,000 Native Americans living on a particular reservation in the southwest United
States.25 On the immediate horizon, another matter for concern was the FBI’s National
Crime Information Center, “a computerized clearinghouse of information about
wanted persons, stolen property, and criminal history records.” 26
In this pre-Internet era, information about us was collected from tabulation of our
everyday activities and was assembled into ever-more-comprehensive databases.
Personal information continues to be collected from offline sources. 27 Credit card
companies compile information about every transaction in which a consumer uses the
card. Consumer credit bureaus record information about payment of our debts and
other information that is used to determine our credit-worthiness.28 Stores keep
information about their walk-in and telephone customers.29 Magazine publishers retain
information about their subscribers.30 Other offline sources of PII include telephone
companies, automobile dealers, warranty registrations, and contest entries. 31 In a

24

HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 15 n.2. The National Driver Register, established by
federal law in 1961, was a centralized database of persons whose application for a driver’s
license had been denied or whose license had been revoked. Id. at 15. Its ostensible purpose was
to prevent such persons from evading the denial of a license in one state by applying for one in
another state; without a centralized registry, the second state would not know about the first
state’s action. Id. The data-management technology was primitive by today’s standards: a state
DMV would update the database by using postal mail to send magnetic tape, computer punch
cards, or typewritten forms to the maintainer of the database in Washington, D.C., and queries
of the system by DMVs would likewise be answered by postal mail. Id. at 202–21. The NDR
still exists and continues to operate, with upgraded technology. NHTSA, National Driver
Register, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/national-driver-registerndr (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
25

HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 24–27.

26

Id. at 17.

27

See Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK (May 30,
2016), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789.
28

Id.

29 FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (2014) [hereinafter FTC, DATA BROKERS], https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-tradecommission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
30

Id. at 13.

31

Id. at 13–14.
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process sometimes called “onboarding,” data brokers combine offline with online
information,32 as do online platforms like Google and Facebook. 33
2. Enter the Internet (1995 to Present)
The collection of PII entered a new phase with the inception of the commercial
Internet in 1995.34 Interactions between consumers and businesses via the World Wide
Web generated new types of PII that were available to be harvested using new
technologies. As retail commerce increasingly shifts from brick-and-mortar outlets to
online shopping, more and more of the PII generated from our commercial interactions
can be acquired and centralized through these techniques.35
Some of the information collection is transparent to the user. For example, every
time you make an online purchase, you transmit the information that is needed to
complete the transaction: at a minimum, your identity and the products or services that
you have purchased. If the item purchased is a physical one that must be delivered,
you will also hand over your mailing address. Even if no physical delivery is involved
(such as music or books in electronic formats), you usually will pay with a credit card,
revealing your identity.
Other information is swept up from online activity in ways that are not transparent
to the typical user. When you access a website, the site owner may collect information
such as each web page that you view, how much time you spend on each page,
32

Id. at 27.

33

See Heather Kelly, Google Expands Ad Tracking in the Real World, CNN (May 23,
2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/23/technology/google-ads-real-world/index.html (“A
new Google [] feature can tell when someone who clicked on an ad in search results made a
credit or debit card purchase at a corresponding physical store.”). For a discussion of how
onboarding is accomplished, see Michelle Geronimo, Note, Online Browsing: Can, Should, and
May Companies Combine Online and Offline Data to Learn About You?, 9 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 211, 212–19 (2017).
34 Although limited commercial activity was conducted on the Internet before 1995, that
year is a plausible one for the start of the commercial Internet because it was when the National
Science Foundation decommissioned the NSFNet and relinquished its role in governance of the
network, thereby eliminating the NSFNet’s Acceptable Use Policy, which had prohibited
commercial use. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 199 (1999) (discussing how
privatization of the Internet in 1995 allowed it to be used for commercial purposes); Janet
Abbate, Privatizing the Internet: Competing Visions and Chaotic Events, 1987–1995, IEEE
ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2010, at 14–15 (discussing the NSF’s Acceptable Use
Policy); see also A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/cyber/internet.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). The
year 1995 was also when Netscape first released its browser commercially and when both
Amazon.com and eBay began their operations. See GREENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 116
(explaining that commercial versions of Netscape first became available in 1995); id. at 220
(noting that Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, and other online businesses started in 1994–95).
35

The proportion of all retail activity that is conducted through ecommerce, according to
the Census Bureau’s definition of the term, has risen from 0.6% in the fourth quarter of 1999 to
9.1% in the fourth quarter of 2017. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE
SALES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf
(Fourth Quarter of 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES FOR THE
FOURTH QUARTER 1999 REACH $5.3 BILLION, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Mar. 2, 2000),
https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/99q4.pdf (Fourth Quarter of 1999).
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products that you examine but do not buy, and the web page that you were viewing
before arriving at the website.36 Google, through its search engine and other online
offerings, “logs personal identifying information, browsing habits, search queries,
responsiveness to ads, demographic information, declared preferences and other
information about each consumer that uses its products.”37
Online businesses have deployed a variety of technologies for collecting and
manipulating PII. The most basic of these is the cookie: an identifying tag that is
placed on the user’s computer through an interaction between her browser and the
website’s server, which allows the site visitor to be recognized on subsequent visits. 38
Cookies and other identification techniques39 allow much of a user’s clickstream data,
generated through visits to many websites, to be assembled into a single dossier that
is associated with that individual.40 Online advertising networks, which place cookies
on a consumer’s computer through their arrangements with millions of websites, allow
information from a user’s visits to multiple websites to be assembled into a single
dossier.41
Consolidation within the industry offers additional avenues for aggregating data.
In 2007, Google acquired DoubleClick, a leading advertising network, but pledged to
keep the personal information it obtained through DoubleClick cookies separate from
36

See Abdelmounaam Rezgui et al., Privacy on the Web: Facts, Challenges, and Solutions,
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 43.
37 In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 5:12-CV-001382-PSG, 2015 WL 4317479,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
38 Erica M. Scott, Comment, Protecting Consumer Data While Allowing the Web to
Develop Self-Sustaining Architecture: Is a Trans-Atlantic Browser-Based Opt-In for Behavioral
Tracking the Right Solution?, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 285, 289–91
(2013).
39

Other techniques include “web bugs” (generally referred to by their deployers using the
less-sinister-sounding terms “web beacons” or “pixel tags”), which transmit information when
a user accesses a tagged web page or opens an email message; flash cookies, which can be used
to regenerate deleted cookies; spyware, software that is surreptitiously downloaded to a
consumer’s computer and secretly gathers and transmits information derived from the
consumer’s use of the computer; and unique device identifiers, which can reside in either
hardware or software. Means and Methods of Web Tracking: Its Effects on Privacy and Ways
(July
23,
2013),
to
Avoid
Getting
Tracked,
INFOSEC
INST.
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/means-and-methods-of-web-tracking-its-effects-onprivacy-and-ways-to-avoid-getting-tracked/#gref. Thus, a user cannot thwart tracking by the
simple expedient of blocking or deleting cookies. See id.
40

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING 4, 12 (2000) [hereinafter FTC, ONLINE
PROFILING], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/online-profiling-federaltrade-commission-report-congress-part-2/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf (describing how
previously anonymous information can become personally identified); Scott, supra note 38, at
291–92 (describing how non-PII clickstream data may become identified with an individual by
aggregating multiple sources of information); Jessica Su et al., De-anonymizing Web Browsing
Data with Social Networks, PROC. 26TH INT’L CONF. WORLD WIDE WEB 1261 (2017) (showing
that anonymous browsing history can be de-anonymized and linked to the user’s social media
accounts).
41

FTC, ONLINE PROFILING, supra note 40, at 2–8 (discussing the role of network
advertising companies).
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that which it got through its other online properties. In 2016, it abandoned that pledge
and began combining the two sets of information, allowing it to better identify users
of the Web and track them as they engage in various online activities.42
In addition to these interactions with online sellers of goods and services, we
generate information about ourselves through our activity on social media. We post
information about our likes and dislikes, enter into discussions with other social media
users through postings and comments, state political positions, and more. Facebook
keeps track of everything we do on its site and uses what it gathers to enable marketers
to target advertisements at us.43 While some social media sites place restrictions on the
ability of data aggregators to collect information from their sites using automated
methods, others do not.44 This information, though not generated through commercial
activity, is commercially valuable because it reveals preferences that can be used as
an input into targeted marketing. Most Facebook users probably are unaware that by
clicking on “Like” buttons they may be providing Facebook with a more accurate
assessment of their personality than those made by their (real-life) friends and even
family members.45
3. Mobile Apps (2007 to Date)
Computers that are small enough to be carried in a pocket, capable of connecting
to the Internet wirelessly, and able to determine their geographical location first
became widely available in 2007 as the Apple iPhone. 46 Tablet computers first gained
widespread popularity with the introduction of Apple’s iPad in 2010.47 From 2011 to
2018, the percentage of adults in the United States who own a smartphone increased
from 35% to 77%.48 Software applications that run on mobile devices, called apps,

42

Julia Angwin, Google Has Quietly Dropped Ban on Personally Identifiable Web
Tracking, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/google-has-quietlydropped-ban-on-personally-identifiable-web-tracking.
43 See Adrienne LaFrance, Facebook Is Expanding the Way It Tracks You and Your Data,
ATLANTIC (June 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/facebookis-expanding-the-way-it-tracks-you-and-your-data/372641/; Olivia Solon, How Much Data Did
Facebook Have on One Man? 1,200 Pages of Data in 57 Categories, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/privacy-versus-facebook.
44

FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 29, at 13.

45

Wu Youyou et al., Computer-Based Personality Judgments Are More Accurate Than
Those Made by Humans, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1036 (2015) (reporting results of a study
showing that a computer model needed 70 Likes to judge personality more accurately than a
friend and 150 Likes to judge more accurately than a family member).
46 The evolution of the smartphone from IBM’s Simon Personal Computer, introduced in
1992, to the iPhone in 2007 is discussed in ANINDYA GHOSE, TAP: UNLOCKING THE MOBILE
ECONOMY 21–22 (2017).
47

Earlier offerings of tablet computers were less successful. See David Nield, 15
5,
2016),
Memorable
Milestones
in
Tablet
History,
TECHRADAR (July
http://www.techradar.com/news/mobile-computing/10-memorable-milestones-in-tablethistory-924916.
48

Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/.
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have been available from the Apple App Store and Google Play Store (for Android)
since 2008.49
Paralleling the rise in smartphone ownership is a rise in the proportion of electronic
commerce resulting from the use of smartphones. In 2014, mobile commerce was
11.6% of total ecommerce, and one analysis expects the proportion to rise to 45% in
2020.50
Users of mobile phones can be tracked in several ways. Each smartphone has a
unique identifier associated with it. Data analytics companies are able to link the
phone’s identifier with the owner’s identity and then combine data that the user
generates by using the phone with data about him from other sources.51
In addition to the clickstream information, mobile devices can determine and make
available the user’s ever-changing geographical location. The user’s location at the
time she accesses a website or uses an app can reveal highly sensitive information.
When does she arrive at and leave her workplace? How much time does she spend in
bars? Did she visit an adult novelty shop?52 Advertising platforms are able to target
advertisements at the user of a mobile phone based on the user’s current or historical
location.53

49

John Markoff & Laura M. Holson, Apple’s Latest Opens a Developers’ Playground,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/technology/personaltech/
10apps.html. Google Play was originally called Android Market. Melissa Perenson, Google
Launches Android Market, PCWORLD (Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
152613/google_android_ships.html.
50 Andrew Meola, The Rise of M-Commerce: Mobile Shopping Stats & Trends, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/mobile-commerce-shopping-trendsstats-2016-10.
51

Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing an
analytics company that can “link an Android ID to a particular person by compiling information
about that individual from other websites, applications, and sources”).
52

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”). In that concurrence, Justice Sotomayor quotes from People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (2009) as follows:
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes
little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the bythe-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and
on and on.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
53

See United States v. InMobi Pte Ltd., No. 3:16-cv-3474 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016)
(describing the technology behind “geo-targeting” of advertisements to mobile phones in a case
where the FTC charged that the advertising company misrepresented that it would geo-target
only if the user had location services turned on, when in fact it also did so by using Wi-Fi
location information even when location services was turned off).
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Internet connectivity on mobile devices allows an advertising technique known as
“geofencing” or “geo-targeting.”54 The advertiser monitors a person’s location using
the device’s geolocation technology (using GPS, proximity of Wi-Fi access points,
and other techniques) and then sends an advertisement to the device based on the
location. A digital advertising company allegedly used geofencing to send antiabortion messages to the smartphones of users who it determined were located at a
reproductive health facility.55 The Massachusetts Attorney General considered this an
unfair or deceptive act in violation of the state consumer protection law and obtained
the company’s agreement not to engage in geofencing of medical facilities in
Massachusetts.56
4. The Internet of Things (201157 to Date)
As I use the term, the Internet of Things (“IoT”) consists of consumer-facing
devices that are connected to the Internet but historically were not so connected.58 This
definition excludes computers of all sorts, which have commonly been connected to
the Internet for the past decade or two, a wide range of connected sensors with
industrial applications,59 and perhaps smartphones as well. The term itself is said to
derive from a presentation that Kevin Ashton, a British technology entrepreneur, made

54

See Kathleen Kusek, 5 Ways Facebook Geo-Targeting Will Change Your Life, FORBES
(Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenkusek/2014/10/11/5-ways-facebookgeo-targeting-will-change-your-life/#6a77e92b17c4.
55

Hiawatha Bray, Sending Anti-Abortion Ads by Phone Is Creepy, but Not Illegal, BOS.
GLOBE (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/05/sending-antiabortion-ads-phone-creepy-but-not-illegal/Aa5wZeYCd4NUOO65n8CgIL/story.html.
56 Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to G.L. 93A, § 5, In re Copley Advert., LLC, No.
1784CV01033 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2017); Press Release, AG Reaches Settlement with
Advertising Company Prohibiting “Geofencing” Around Massachusetts Healthcare Facilities
(Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2017/2017-04-04copley-advertising-geofencing.html.
57 I use 2011 as the starting date to reflect the fact that Nest Labs introduced its Nest
Learning Thermostat, the first widely popular IoT device, in that year. Nest Labs Introduces
World’s First Learning Thermostat, NEST (Oct. 25, 2011), https://nest.com/press/nest-labsintroduces-worlds-first-learning-thermostat/. In 2014, Google purchased Nest Labs for $3.2
billion. Nathan Ingraham, Google Purchases Nest for $3.2 Billion, VERGE (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.theverge.com/2014/1/13/5305282/google-purchases-nest-for-3-2-billion.
58

There is no generally accepted definition of the term. For a bewildering array of
definitions, see Best Internet of Things Definition, POSTSCAPES (Nov. 14, 2015),
http://postscapes.com/internet-of-things-definition.
59

Industrial applications include “[j]et engines and delivery trucks [that] can now be
outfitted with sensors that monitor hundreds of data points and send automatic alerts when
maintenance is needed.” EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 5–6 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf.
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in 1999.60 The first devices that are now acknowledged to have belonged to the protoIoT are dated to the 1980s and 1990s.61
The past few years have seen a remarkable proliferation of IoT devices. At the
2015 Consumer Electronics Show, some 900 exhibitors showed off new IoT devices.62
Many of these, like an in-refrigerator egg counter or a connected diaper, may never
find a wide market.63 Yet others will doubtless gain traction in the marketplace.
Many IoT devices are designed to be placed in the home, some of them in close
proximity to our most intimate activities. These include light bulbs,64 kitchen and
laundry appliances,65 kitchen scales,66 water leak sensors,67 smoke and carbon
monoxide detectors,68 doorbells with video,69 baby monitors,70 home thermostats,71

60 See Kevin Ashton, That “Internet of Things” Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009),
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986. Other terms that have been used for the same
or similar concepts include ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, the web of things, the
physical web, home automation, smart-X (e.g., smart homes, smart cities, smart grid), and
connected-X (e.g., connected cars). See Maria R. Ebling, Pervasive Computing and the Internet
of Things, 15 IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING 2 (2016).
61 Candidates for the “first” IoT device include: a Coca-Cola vending machine at the
Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science Department that, in 1982, was connected to the
university’s network so that users of the machine could check from their desks whether it was
empty and whether the bottles were cold, The “Only” Coke Machine on the Internet, CARNEGIE
MELLON U., http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~coke/history_long.txt (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); a toaster
that could be controlled via the Internet in 1990, Peter Waterhouse, Internet of Everything:
Connecting Things Is Just Step One, INFORMATIONWEEK (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/executive-insights-and-innovation/internet-ofeverything-connecting-things-is-just-step-one/d/d-id/1112958; and a coffee pot at a computer
research laboratory at Cambridge University in 1991 that could be viewed via a webcam, see
Quentin Stafford-Fraser, The Story of the Trojan Room Coffee Pot, U. CAMBRIDGE,
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/coffee/qsf/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
62

Andrea Chang, At CES, “Internet of Things” Showcases the Connected Life, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ces-internet-things-20150106-story.html.
63 David Pogue, The Good, the Bad and the Weirdest “Internet of Things” Things, SCI. AM.
(July 1, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pogue-the-good-the-bad-and-theweirdest-internet-of-things-things/.
64

Hue Personal Wireless Lighting, PHILIPS, http://www2.meethue.com/en-us/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
65
GE APPLIANCES, http://www.geappliances.com/ge/connected-appliances/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
66

DROP, https://getdrop.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

67 LA CROSSE TECHNOLOGY, http://www.lacrossetechnology.com/remote-water-leakdetector/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
68

ONELINK, https://onelink.firstalert.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

69

RING, https://ring.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

70

IBABY, https://ibabylabs.com/

71

NEST THERMOSTAT, https://nest.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
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bathroom scales,72 home security systems,73 home security cameras,74 door locks,75
toothbrushes,76 window shades and blinds,77 garage door openers,78 and many other
items. Adoption of these devices is likely to receive a boost due to the popularity of
the Amazon Echo and Google Home, which one can use to control many of these
devices by speaking voice commands.79
Many of these devices (such as home security cameras and baby monitors) are
always on—taking in data from the environment continuously and handling it in ways
that will be largely unknown to most who invite the technology into their homes. For
example, voice-operated assistants for the home, dominated by the Amazon Echo
(powered by the Alexa voice assistant) and Google Home, are always listening for the
keyword that “wakes” them.80 One’s commands to the device are transmitted to a
server somewhere in the cloud, where they are stored and processed, thereby enabling
the device to respond.81 One can subsequently delete the recordings by accessing his
account on the Web, but “it’s unclear whether the data survives on servers after you
delete it from the queue in [his] account.”82
The quantity of data collected by IoT devices is astounding, far outstripping the
amount of data that people create volitionally through emails, online postings,

72

GARMIN INDEX SMART SCALE, https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/p/530464 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
73

ADT, https://www.adt.com/wireless-security (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

74

D-LINK, http://us.dlink.com/home-solutions/wifi-camera/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

75

AUGUST, http://august.com/products/august-smart-lock/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

76

ORAL-B,
https://oralb.com/en-us/products/genius-8000-electric-toothbrush-withbluetooth (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
77 SERENA, https://www.serenashades.com/serenaadvantage/connected-home (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
78 LIFTMASTER, https://www.liftmaster.com/for-homes/myq-connected-home (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
79

Hiawatha Bray, Do Alexa and Other Such Devices Mean the End of Privacy?, BOS.
GLOBE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/11/alexa-and-otherinternet-things-devices-mean-end-privacy/ry8wyKTY48KVOSvqoZSe6M/story.html
(discussing the privacy implications of using the voice-controlled Echo “to switch on your
lights, unlock the front door, or warm up the car”). Amazon sold over ten million Echo devices
in the two years after it was introduced. Google has sold about a third as many Google Home
devices. Brian Deagon, Amazon Echo Keeps Big Lead over Google Home in Digital Assistants,
INV. BUS. DAILY (May 8, 2017), http://www.investors.com/news/technology/amazon-echomaintains-big-lead-over-google-home-in-digital-assistants/.
80

Stephen Harrison, Don’t Call It “Siri”: Why the Wake Word Should Be “Computer”,
SALON (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/11/26/dont-call-it-siri-why-the-wakeword-should-be-computer/.
81 Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens to
That Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-recordyour-voice/.
82

Id.
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photographs, videos, music, and all other media.83 Yet, because IoT devices are, by
(my) definition, ones that have traditionally not been connected to a network, the fact
that these devices are siphoning up personal information may be less obvious than is
the case with computers.
Data collected by IoT devices travels via the public Internet, opening an avenue
for privacy invasions through unauthorized access to the data. There have been several
well-publicized incidents of privacy invasions tied to Internet-connected cameras. In
2014, the FTC brought an enforcement action against TRENDnet, Inc., a manufacturer
of IP-connected cameras intended for use in homes and by small businesses. In its
complaint, the FTC alleged that from 2010 to 2012, the respondent’s software
contained a flaw that caused the camera user’s security settings to be ignored, allowing
hackers to gain access to the video feed of users who had selected a setting that was
supposed to make the feed private and accessible only by entering login credentials. 84
As a result, hackers posted links online that allowed anyone to monitor the live feeds
from nearly 700 of the cameras.85
Another webcam privacy issue involves surreptitious, remote activation of a
connected camera. A malicious hacker can activate the camera incorporated into a
laptop computer by tricking the computer user into downloading software called a
“remote access Trojan,” using techniques that are standard in the hacking
community.86 Once installed, the software allows the hacker to activate the camera
remotely—in some cases while preventing the light that indicates the camera is active
from switching on.87 In one widely reported incident, a hacker gained access to an
Internet-connected baby monitor and used that access both to speak to the baby and to
activate the included camera.88
In a variation on this theme, the owner of a laptop computer installs remote-control
software on it and uses the camera to spy on a person who is using the computer. This
has given rise to lawsuits in several situations. Aaron’s, a chain of rent-to-own stores,
installed software called PC Rental Agent on laptop computers that it rented to
individuals. The purpose of the software, which allowed the person who controlled it
83

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 2.

84

Complaint, In re TRENDnet Inc., No. C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014).

85

The complaint charged TRENDnet with deception, by falsely representing that its
cameras were secure, and unfairness, by failing to provide reasonable security, both in violation
of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Id. The case settled, with TRENDnet agreeing to implement a
comprehensive security program. Decision and Order, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426
(F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014).
86 LORI ANDREWS ET AL., DIGITAL PEEPHOLES 8 (2015) (discussing use of fake media, spear
phishing, ad spamming, and fake video games to install the software).
87

Id. at 7.

88 Babak D. Beheshti, Smart Devices Undone by Dumb Security, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2016,
at A13. For other similar incidents, see Nate Anderson, Webcam Spying Goes Mainstream as
Miss Teen USA Describes Hack, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 16, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/08/webcam-spying-goes-mainstream-as-miss-teen-usa-describes-hack/
(explaining that a hacker took pictures of Miss Teen USA through her webcam and tried to
extort her to perform specified acts); Craig Silverman, 7 Creepy Baby Monitor Stories That Will
Terrify All Parents, BUZZFEED (July 24, 2015), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/
creeps-hack-baby-monitors-and-say-terrifying-thing (describing several incidents).
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both to disable the computer and to turn on the camera remotely, was to help in
recovering the computer if the renter did not make the required payments or if it was
stolen.89 When Brian and Crystal Byrd learned that the Aaron’s franchise that sold one
of these computers to them had activated the camera hundreds of times in a one-month
period with no disclosure to them (including while Crystal was using it dressed only
in her underwear), they asserted federal and state law claims in a class-action lawsuit
against Aaron’s, many of its franchisees, and the maker of the PC Rental Agent
software.90 Aaron’s agreed to pay $28.4 million to settle claims asserted by the State
of California91 and also settled an FTC action.92
In another incident, employees of a school district in Pennsylvania secretly took
photographs of high school students by remotely activating the webcams in their
school-issued laptop computers.93 The cameras captured images of the students while
they were at home, including in their bedrooms. The students filed a class action
lawsuit against the school district, alleging violations of the Wiretap Act, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Fourth
Amendment, and related state laws.94 The school district settled, agreeing to pay
$610,000.95
In 2010, a college student used the webcam on his laptop computer to spy on his
roommate, discovering him kissing another man. The student publicized the
information on Twitter, and his roommate responded by committing suicide. 96 The
student who activated the camera, Dharun Ravi, was convicted on multiple counts,
including invasion of privacy and bias intimidation, and was sentenced to thirty days
in jail.97
89 Lawsuit: PC Rental Agent Spies on Users, CBS NEWS (May 3, 2011),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lawsuit-pc-rental-agent-spies-on-users/.
90

Complaint, Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00101 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2011); Corrected
Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00101 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 2, 2013). The litigation is ongoing.
91 Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney Gen. Kamala D. Harris Reaches $28.4
Million Settlement with Rental Business over Spyware, Unfair Business Practices (Oct. 13,
2014), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-reaches-284million-settlement-rental-business.
92 Complaint, In re Aaron’s, Inc., No. C–4442 (F.T.C. Mar. 10, 2014). This case is
discussed infra, text accompanying notes 505–13.
93

Daniel Nasaw, US School District Spied on Students Through Webcams, Court Told,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/19/schools-spiedon-students-webcams.
94 Complaint, Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 2:10-cv-00665-JD (E.D. Pa. Feb.
16, 2010).
95

Lower Merion School District Settles Webcam Spying Lawsuits for $610,000,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/11/lower-merionschool-distr_n_758882.html. The settlement also applied to another lawsuit based on the same
conduct. Id.
96 Ian
Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/06/the-story-of-a-suicide.

(Feb.

6,

2012),

97 The convictions on the counts charging Ravi with bias intimidation were overturned on
due process grounds. State v. Ravi, 147 A.3d 455, 458–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018

17

576

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:559

Privacy issues also arise from IoT devices with audio capture capabilities. In 2015,
Mattel released Hello Barbie, a Barbie doll that incorporates both a microphone and a
speaker.98 When a child (or anyone else) speaks to the doll, her voice is picked up by
the microphone and sent via the Internet to ToyTalk, a company in San Francisco that
uses speech recognition technology to convert the speech to text and artificial
intelligence to devise an appropriate response. The captured speech is retained for
possible additional use; the doll’s privacy policy states that it may be used by third
parties for “research and development purposes.” A feature that child psychologists
may find alarming allows parents to access the child’s recorded conversations with
the doll.99 A class action lawsuit filed against Mattel and ToyTalk alleged violations
of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), common law intrusion
upon seclusion, and a state law requiring consent before recording confidential
communications.100 German authorities have banned a doll called My Friend Cayla,
which has similar capabilities, on privacy grounds. 101
People may invite IoT devices into their home without realizing that they are
connected to the Internet. For example, digital video recorders are likely to be
connected to the Internet and to collect information about our television viewing
activities: which shows we watch and record, how long we watch them, and more. 102

Ravi subsequently accepted a plea deal and was sentenced to time served. Nate Schweber &
Lisa W. Foderaro, Roommate in Tyler Clementi Case Pleads Guilty to Attempted Invasion of
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/nyregion/dharunravi-tyler-clementi-case-guilty-plea.html.
98 Lauren Walker, Hello Barbie, Your Child’s Chattiest and Riskiest Christmas Present,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/25/hello-barbie-your-childschattiest-and-riskiest-christmas-present-404897.html.
99

Id.

100

First Amended Class Action Complaint, Archer-Hayes v. ToyTalk, Inc., No. BC603467
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016). The case was later removed to federal court and dismissed after
a settlement on undisclosed terms.
101

Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, The Bright-Eyed Talking Doll That Just Might Be a Spy,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/technology/cayla-talkingdoll-hackers.html. The Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a complaint against the
manufacturer of the doll with the FTC, alleging that the doll’s operation violates COPPA.
Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, In re Genesis Toys (filed
with F.T.C. Dec. 6, 2016). Alarmed by reports of data breaches related to connected toys, a
congressional committee gathered information from manufacturers of the toys and issued a
report recommending stronger efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of PII collected from
children using these toys. OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, MINORITY STAFF REPORT,
S. COMM. ON COM., SCI., & TRANSP., CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS: DATA SECURITY AND
PRIVACY CONCERNS (2016), https://www.billnelson.senate.gov/sites/default/files/12.14.16_
Ranking_Member_Nelson_Report_on_Connected_Toys.pdf.
102 TiVo’s privacy policy discloses that it collects various types of information from users
of its DVR:

We collect information (both automatically and when we ask you to provide it) when
you use TiVo products . . . . Information we automatically collect may include, for
example, data about your viewing behavior (such as how you use, watch, record, rate
and interact with content accessed on or through TiVo products), device (such as model
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VCRs, the predecessor of DVRs, were typically only connected to the television set
and collected no information about us.
The current generation of smart television sets is another example of a stealth IoT
device. These devices may collect an astounding range of information about their users
by tracking their viewing habits and by capturing data using their built-in microphones
and cameras.103 According to the privacy policy accompanying a Samsung television:
It logs where, when, how and for how long you use the TV. It sets tracking
cookies and beacons designed to detect “when you have viewed particular
content or a particular email message.” It records “the apps you use, the
websites you visit, and how you interact with content.” It ignores “do-nottrack” requests as a considered matter of policy.
It also has a built-in camera—with facial recognition. The purpose is to
provide “gesture control” for the TV and enable you to log in to a
personalized account using your face. . . . The TV boasts a “voice
recognition” feature that allows viewers to control the screen with voice
commands. But the service comes with a rather ominous warning: “Please
be aware that if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive
information, that information will be among the data captured and
transmitted to a third party.”104
Most people probably do not expect that their television sets, like the “telescreens” in
George Orwell’s novel 1984, will be spying on them.105 The voice capture and
transmission feature of the Samsung television set prompted the California legislature
to enact a statute that regulates the use of these technologies.106 VIZIO, the world’s
number, software versions, and unique device identifiers), location (such as GPS data,
zip code, and time zone), and cable service (such as cable provider and cable channels).
Privacy Policy, TIVO, https://www.tivo.com/legal/privacy (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). The
policy also explains how that data may be used: “[W]e may use information we collect to:
analyze your viewing habits (which lets us do things like suggest a particular TV show or movie
that you may enjoy); [and] show you more relevant ads (both on TiVo products and on thirdparty websites).” Id. Digital media streaming devices may do likewise. See Locklear v. Dow
Jones & Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (describing content provider’s transmission
of the user’s unique identification to third parties to facilitate targeted advertising).
103 Michael Price, I’m Terrified of My New TV: Why I’m Scared to Turn This Thing On—
and You’d Be, Too, SALON (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/10/30/im_terrified_
of_my_new_tv_why_im_scared_to_turn_this_thing_on_and_youd_be_too/.
104

Id.

105 Former Ontario privacy commissioner Ann Cavoukian put it this way: “People expect to
guide channels on TV with their voice. What they don’t expect is a stupid device that can
potentially capture all their conversations. Really, who would even think that?” Matt Kwong,
Samsung SmartTV an “Absurd” Privacy Intruder, Ann Cavoukian Says, CBC NEWS (Feb. 10,
2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/samsung-smarttv-an-absurd-privacy-intruder-anncavoukian-says-1.2950982.
106 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20–.25 (West 2016). The statute requires prominent
notice to the user (but does not require her consent) before operating the voice recognition
feature of a connected television set. Id. § 22948.20(a). It also prohibits using “[a]ny actual
recordings of spoken word collected through the operation of a voice recognition feature” for
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second-largest manufacturer of connected televisions, has also gotten into hot water
over the feature of its televisions that tracks what is being watched and sends that
information to third parties both to use for targeted marketing and to link the
consumer’s television viewing with his accessing of websites.107 The FTC charged
VIZIO with deception and unfairness,108 and a class action against VIZIO is
pending.109
Another category of IoT devices that raises serious privacy issues is wearables.
These include fitness trackers,110 connected watches,111 action cameras,112 blood
pressure monitors,113 fertility trackers,114 running data trackers,115 caloric intake
trackers,116 and sports concussion monitors.117 The ultimate wearables are implantable
medical devices: pacemakers118 and insulin pumps.119
Some of these devices collect data that can reflect the user’s health condition. This
information may have substantial commercial value to entities such as health
insurance companies and the individual’s employer. Like smartphones and mobile
computing devices, wearable devices often are capable of sensing their location
through GPS and other geolocation technologies.120 As noted above,121 one’s location
at a given time can be highly revealing. These devices tend to be used by a single
advertising purposes (but does not prohibit such use of the data that may be extracted from the
recordings). Id. § 22948.20(b)–(c); see also Michael Silvestro & John Black, “Who Am I
Talking To?”—The Regulation of Voice Data Collected by Connected Consumer Products,
BUS. L. TODAY (May 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/06_
black.html.
107

FTC v. VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017).

108

Id. The case is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 499–504.

109

In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2017).

110

FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

111

APPLE WATCH, https://www.apple.com/watch/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

112

GOPRO, https://gopro.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

113 Premium
Wireless
Blood
Pressure
Monitor,
A&D
MEDICAL,
http://www.andonline.com/medical/products/details.php?catname=Blood_Pressure&product_
num=UA-651BLE (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
114

TEMPDROP, http://www.temp-drop.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

115

RUNSCRIBE, http://www.runscribe.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

116

HEALBE, http://healbe.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

117

LINX IAS, http://linxias.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

118

Our Pacing Systems: Bradyarrhythmia Management, MEDTROINC, http://www.
medtronic.com/us-en/healthcare-professionals/products/cardiac-rhythm/pacemakers.html (last
visited Mar. 7. 2018).
119

TANDEM, https://www.tandemdiabetes.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).

120 Lisa Eadicicco, A New Wave of Gadgets Can Collect Your Personal Information Like
Never Before, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/privacy-fitnesstrackers-smartwatches-2014-10.
121

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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individual rather than a household, so the data they collect may be more easily
identified to an individual.
An example of an IoT device that collects data that may not be recognized as
potentially privacy-invading is smart electricity meters in the home. Smart meters are
a key component of the Smart Grid, the term for a modernized national electricity
transmission system that uses information and other technologies to improve the
system’s performance.122 Two features of a smart meter distinguish it from a
traditional electrical meter. First, a smart meter records an electricity consumer’s
usage data over more-or-less brief intervals, which may range from an hour down to
as little as a second or two; by contrast, ordinary meters record usage data no more
frequently than the duration of a billing period, typically a month for residential
users.123 Second, a smart meter transmits the data it collects to the utility automatically,
usually via wireless transmission; traditional meters rely on a meter-reader to visit the
premises and to read and record the meter’s display. 124 In addition to helping enable
better management of the grid, smart meters and the smart grid can help consumers
by enabling them to shift consumption to lower-priced off-peak times and to switch
off appliances remotely via the Internet. 125
The rollout of smart residential meters is proceeding apace. The number of smart
meters installed in the United States has risen from 6.7 million in 2007 to 58.5 million
in 2014; as a percentage of all meters, the corresponding figures are 4.7% and
40.6%.126 The decision to replace a traditional meter with a smart meter is made by the
utility, and the residential customer generally is given no choice.127
122 See Samuel J. Harvey, Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and
Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2068, 2072 (2014) (“Generally, the smart
grid involves computerizing and automating the existing system by introducing two-way digital
communication between grid operators and sites throughout the grid.”). The Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386), established a federal policy of fostering development of the Smart
Grid. The statute includes a list of ten features that characterize the Smart Grid, including
“[i]ncreased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security,
and efficiency of the electric grid” and “[d]eployment of ‘smart’ technologies . . . for metering,
communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 17381(1), (5).
123 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, No. 11 C 9299, 2013 WL
1196580, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2013).
124

Id. (“A smart meter is a device that has the ability to collect aggregate, as well as detailed,
measurements of a customer’s electrical power usage and to communicate those measurements
via wireless radio frequency (‘RF’) to the electric utility provider.”).
125

Harvey, supra note 122, at 2073.

126 See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ADVANCED METERING 3 (2016), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2016/DR-AMReport2016.pdf. These figures reflect combined residential, industrial, and commercial
installations. Id. at 4.
127

Some utilities will allow a customer to keep the traditional meter, but will charge an
additional monthly fee to reflect the additional costs of sending out a meter-reader. See Report
of the Demand-Side Resources & Smart Grid Committee, 34 ENERGY L.J. 373, 381–85 (2013).
New Hampshire is unusual in that a smart meter may not be installed at a residence or business
unless the customer opts in by submitting a written consent form. Id. at 383.
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The granularity of data collected by smart meters gives rise to potential privacy
issues. Electrical appliances exhibit particular usage profiles, and these can be
identified from the data that smart meters send to the utility. For example, a
refrigerator cycles on and off, generating a recognizable pattern. An oven also cycles
during use, but at a higher level of usage and with a different pattern. Other usage
patterns can be associated with washing machines, tea kettles, and television sets.128
Data collected from a residential smart electricity meter can reveal when the occupants
eat, shower, and watch television; the residents’ work schedule, sleeping patterns, and
other lifestyle habits; how many people are living at the house; whether anybody is
home; and where they are located in the house. 129 An employee of Siemens Energy
has noted that data collected from smart meters can be used to “infer how many people
are in the house, what they do, whether they’re upstairs, downstairs, do you have a
dog, when do you habitually get up, when did you get up this morning, when do you
have a shower: masses of private data.”130
Newer technologies will reveal even more information about appliance usage
occurring within a residence. When appliances are connected into a Home Area
Network (“HAN”), they will communicate very detailed information about their
functioning:
[A] HAN-enabled appliance transmits specific information related to the
use of that individual appliance. A HAN-enabled clothes washing machine
can transmit the time of day a consumer washes his or her clothes as well
as the wash cycle and water temperature settings. While utility companies
or third party energy manage service providers can collect this information
under the guise of energy efficiency management, this information can also
reveal very private, personal consumer habits.131
Inferences drawn from data that smart meters collect may be of interest to a wide range
of parties. Consider the following:
x

Insurance companies might be interested in a policyholder’s behavior
patterns, like trouble sleeping or lack of physical activity, which could
indicate possible health problems, in order to price premiums or decide
whether to insure.132

128 NAT’L INSTIT. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 2 GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY
13 (2010).
129

Id.

130 Gerard Wynn, Privacy Concerns Challenge Smart Grid Rollout, REUTERS (June 25,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/25/energy-smart-idUSLDE65N2CI20100625.
131

Resolution on Privacy and Security Related to Smart Meters, TRANS ATLANTIC
CONSUMER DIALOGUE (June 2011), https://epic.org/privacy/smartgrid/Smart_Meter_TACD_
Resolution_FINAL.pdf.
132 NAT’L INSTIT. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 128, at 30. Lee Tien, New “Smart
Meters” for Energy Use Put Privacy at Risk, EFF (Mar. 10, 2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/new-smart-meters-energy-use-put-privacy-risk.
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Law enforcement authorities can analyze electricity usage patterns to
determine whether residents are present and make inferences about
activities occurring inside the home.133
It may be helpful in civil litigation for a party to be able to demonstrate
that residents were at home at a particular time or the number of people
present.134
The press can always use more data to gratify the public’s interest in
the activities of celebrities.135
Creditors might be interested in knowing details about a borrower’s
behavior that may have a bearing on creditworthiness.136
Burglars could use information from electricity usage or the feed from
in-home security cameras to determine whether residents are
present.137
B. Use of the Data

The most common use of the data that is collected in these ways is to fuel interestbased advertising.138 The data is subjected to analysis, yielding inferences about an
individual’s likes and interests.139 Automated systems then select an advertisement to
show to that individual based on the premise that she is more likely to respond
favorably to an advertisement selected in this way than to one selected without regard
to her interests.140 Advertising via older media, such as television and print, can be
roughly targeted by selecting an advertising vehicle based on the demographics of the

133

NAT’L INSTIT. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 128, at 30.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id. at 31.

137

Id.

138 “Interest-based advertising” is a more recent term for what has previously been called
“online behavioral advertising” and “online profiling.” See FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF, SELFREGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 46 (2009) [hereinafter FTC
STAFF, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioraladvertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf (defining “online behavioral advertising” as “the
tracking of a consumer’s online activities over time—including the searches the consumer has
conducted, the web pages visited, and the content viewed—in order to deliver advertising
targeted to the individual consumer’s interests”); FTC, ONLINE PROFILING, supra note 40, at 2–
6 (explaining how online profiling works). “Interest-based advertising” is sometimes used more
broadly than the other terms to reference targeting based on both online and offline activity.
139 Understanding
Online
Advertising,
NETWORK
ADVERT.
INITIATIVE,
https://www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018).
140

See FTC STAFF, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 2–3.
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medium’s audience.141 Interest-based advertising allows the targeting to be much more
granular, down to the level of a particular individual.
The most sophisticated targeted advertising is based on the application of analytics
to PII that has been centralized in the hands of data brokers. Data brokers obtain their
information from multiple sources.142 Typically, very little of that information comes
directly from the data subjects. Most comes from government sources (both federal
and state),143 other public sources (such as telephone books and news reports), and
commercial sources (such as retailers and magazine publishers).144 Information also
comes from individuals’ own public postings on social media sites, blogs, and other
online venues.145 The amount of information that data brokers hold is massive:
hundreds of billions of data points covering nearly all consumers in the United States,
with up to 3,000 data points for each individual.146 As early as 1996, data brokers held
data “on almost all households in the United States.”147
Data brokers analyze all this information and draw inferences about an individual’s
preferences. They then sell this “derived data” to their clients—typically companies
that wish to identify potential customers for their products.148 The companies may then
target their marketing efforts based on this information. 149
III. PROTECTING PRIVACY THROUGH LEGAL RULES AND VOLUNTARY PRACTICES
In the United States, the rules protecting information privacy are frequently
described as “sectoral.”150 What this term signifies is that, unlike in other legal
systems,151 the United States does not have any scheme of legally enforceable rules
141 3 Stats About Traditional Media Audiences to Keep in Mind This Coming Year,
MARKETING CHARTS (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.marketingcharts.com/industries/media-andentertainment-73322.
142

FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 29, at 11.

143

The federal government supplies data brokers with information such as the demographics
of residents at the city-block level, postal change-of-address information, and bankruptcy
filings. State governments can provide information from records pertaining to real estate, voter
registration, motor vehicles, courts, birth, marriage, divorce, and death. Id. at 11–12.
144

Id. at 13.

145

Id.

146

Id. at 46–47.

147

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 20 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON] (citing ARTHUR M.
HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 354 (2d ed. 1996)).
148

FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 29, at 19.

149 Id. at 25 (“The client identifies the attributes that it would like to find in a consumer
audience, and the data broker provides a list of consumers with those attributes.”).
150

Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908–16 (2009) (tracing
the development of the United States’ sectoral approach and contrasting it with the European
Union’s omnibus approach).
151 The most prominent example is the European Union. See Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive], discussed infra text accompanying notes
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that protect privacy generally. Instead, the United States has laws that apply to
particular contexts, or “sectors,” that legislators have thought warranted special
treatment. The sectors that have qualified for this treatment under federal law include
finance,152 health,153 education,154 video rentals,155 driver’s licenses,156 and aspects of
online privacy.157 Privacy law at the state level protects against intrusion into one’s
private sphere, public disclosure of private facts, publication of facts that place one in
a false light, and unauthorized use of a person’s likeness for commercial purposes, as
well as some of the sectors addressed by federal law.158
Alongside these legally enforceable rules sit various sets of principles that have
been constructed to encapsulate a normative view of how information privacy should
be protected. Generally referred to as the Fair Information Principles or Fair
Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”), these statements have served as a source of
inspiration for legislation and as recommended best practices for voluntary
implementation.159
The core ideology underlying the FIPPs, as well as nearly all of the laws governing
information privacy, is that privacy protection is a matter for the informed choice of
the data subject.160 This is structured laissez-faire, which places no substantive

248–56; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR], discussed infra text accompanying notes
257–63.
152

E.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2018), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 268–77; Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3408
(2018).
153 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (2018).
154

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018).

155

Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018).

156

Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2018).

157 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2018); Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018).
158 These are usually classed together as the privacy torts, which developed through common
law and have been codified in the law of many states. Privacy and Business: The Privacy Torts,
PRIVACILLA (Dec. 19, 2000), http://www.privacilla.org/business/privacytorts.html.
159 Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM
(Jan. 4, 2008), https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-tofair-information-practices/.
160

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE 7 (1998) [hereinafter FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv23a.pdf (“The most fundamental principle is notice. Consumers should be given notice of an
entity’s information practices before any personal information is collected from them. Without
notice, a consumer cannot make an informed decision as to whether and to what extent to
disclose personal information. Moreover, three of the other principles discussed below—
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shackles on the hands of entities that seek to collect and use PII. Decisions affecting
information privacy are to be made under the usual rules of the marketplace, where
two parties engage in a negotiation and arrive at a bargain. The only imposed structure
is the insistence that the prospective data collector must supply the prospective data
subject with information that is deemed relevant to the latter’s decision.
This is a deviation from the usual market slogan of caveat emptor: a seller is
generally under no obligation to supply the buyer with information about products it
offers.161 It is the buyer’s burden to seek out information he deems relevant to his
purchase decision, or else assume the risk that he will regret the purchase. The FIPPs,
by contrast, include a notice requirement: the information collector must disclose to
the data subject relevant facts about its collection and use of PII. A rule requiring a
company to disclose its privacy practices fits comfortably within a recognized
exception to the no-required-disclosure rule, namely the “special facts” doctrine,
which “places a duty to disclose on one with specialized knowledge not available to
the other party.”162 What PII the collector will use, and the uses to which the PII will
be put, are facts that are quintessentially in the hands of one party and (in the absence
of disclosure) not available to the other.163
The notice-and-choice paradigm is thus situated squarely within the intellectual
construct of market exchange. The seller offers a product or service for sale in the
marketplace. Because the seller has special access to information about the transaction
that may be material to the prospective purchaser—what PII the seller will collect in
the course of the transaction and how it will use that PII—the seller must disclose this
information to the purchaser. Based on that information, and whatever other
information about the product that the purchaser has acquired by his own efforts in
line with the doctrine of caveat emptor, the purchaser makes an informed decision
whether to engage in the transaction and thereby allow collection of his PII.

choice/consent, access/participation, and enforcement/redress—are only meaningful when a
consumer has notice of an entity’s policies, and his or her rights with respect thereto.”).
161 See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 109–12 (1993) (describing the origins of caveat
emptor in legal doctrine).
162

Id. at 132.

163

Disclosure requirements have been enacted in a variety of contexts exhibiting
information asymmetries. For example, many states have enacted mandatory disclosure laws
that require sellers of real estate to disclose known defects to the buyer. See Alan M.
Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?—Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55
MD. L. REV. 387, 415–16 (1996). Advertisers must disclose information that is needed to
prevent a claim from being misleading. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO
MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING 5 (2013) [hereinafter FTC, .COM
DISCLOSURES],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-staffrevises-online-advertising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf. The Securities
Act requires issuers of securities to make prescribed disclosures in a registration statement that
is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and made publicly available. Registration
Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html. Most prepared foods must be
labeled with ingredients and nutrition information. Food Labeling Guide, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/ LabelingNutrition/ucm2006828.htm.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/7

26

2018]

AGAINST NOTICE AND CHOICE

585

In what follows in Section III(A), I first set out the notice-and-choice principles as
they have appeared in different formulations starting with their initial statement in
1973. In Section III(B), I then show how those principles have been applied in positive
law and, in Section III(C), in self-regulatory schemes.
A. Statements of Fair Information Practice Principles
The notice-and-choice paradigm originated forty-five years ago as a
recommendation to Congress in a report that was the product of a committee
constituted to examine the new issues raised by automated data processing. Notice and
choice are also present in numerous other formulations of the FIPPs that have appeared
in the succeeding decades.
1. The 1973 HEW Report
The first influential statement of the principles that should govern the collection
and use of PII is contained in a 1973 report entitled Records, Computers, and the
Rights of Citizens.164 In the early 1970s, there was widespread public concern “that
automated personal data systems present a serious potential for harmful consequences,
including infringement of basic liberties,” specifically “privacy and due process.”165
This concern motivated the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Elliot L. Richardson, to establish a committee tasked with making
recommendations about how to ameliorate these risks. 166 This report is frequently cited
as the original source of the concept of fair information practices, including noticeand-choice.167
The report sets out what it calls the five “fundamental principles of fair information
practice”168 and recommends that rules based on these principles be enacted into law

164

HEW REPORT, supra note 22. On the influence of the report, see Suzanne M. Thompson,
The Digital Explosion Comes with a Cost: The Loss of Privacy, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 33
(1999) (stating that the proposed Code of Fair Information Practices “has been very influential
in setting the tone and content of laws that limit access to and use of personal information” and
was embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974).
165 HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at viii (quoting a determination by Elliot L. Richardson,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare).
166

Id. (describing establishment of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems); see Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records,
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1164–65 (2002) (citing expressions of
concern about the privacy implications of computerized databases from the 1960s and 1970s).
167

See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 9 n.9
(2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (stating that
the report’s proposed Code of Fair Information Practices “established the framework on which
much privacy policy would be built”); SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION 7 (1st ed. 2000)
(describing the Code as “the most significant American thinking on the topic of computers and
privacy to this day”); FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 160, at 48 n.27 (stating that the Fair
Information Practice Principles “were first articulated in a comprehensive manner” in the HEW
Report).
168 HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 41. This report is evidently the source of the term “fair
information practices,” modeled on the term “fair labor practices.” See Willis H. Ware, RAND
and the Information Evolution 157 (2008), quoted in Robert Gellman, Fair Information
Practices: A Basic History (ver. 2.16 June 17, 2016). The term “unfair labor practices” was a
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as a Code of Fair Information Practice (“Code”)169—a recommendation that was not
followed.
The principles include a rather limited statement of notice-and-choice. The
relevant principle states what would later be referred to as “purpose specification.” 170
It reads: “There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without
his consent.”171 The provisions of the proposed (but not enacted) Code implement a
somewhat broader notice-and-choice rule. First, the Code says that a collector of PII
must (1) inform the data subject whether he has any choice about whether to supply
the requested information, and (2) if choice is available, inform the data subject what
will be the consequences to him of declining to provide the requested information.172
Second, the Code says that if the collector wishes to use the PII in a manner that is
inconsistent with the purpose for its collection, it must first obtain the data subject’s
informed consent.173 The requirement of “informed” consent implies that the data
subject must receive notice of the intended use. The proposed code does not, however,
specify what would constitute consent: is a failure to object (opt-out) sufficient, or
does consent require some affirmative manifestation of consent (opt-in)?
2. The 1977 Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission
The Privacy Act of 1974 established the Privacy Protection Study Commission,
which Congress charged with studying the privacy issues that arise in the context of
automated data processing and making legislative recommendations.174 The
commission’s report finds that individuals should receive better notice of an
organization’s information-collection practices so that they may exercise informed
choice about whether to consent to that collection.175
Among the numerous recommendations in the 600-page report is one calling for
voluntary implementation of a notice-and-choice procedure by entities that rent data
from their mailing lists to other companies for use in direct-mail solicitations.176
familiar one at the time the report was written, used extensively in the National Labor Relations
Act (1935).
169

HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 50.

170 See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA ¶ 9 (1980) [hereinafter OECD, GUIDELINES].
171

HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 41.

172

Id. at 59. The text refers to “legally required” submissions of data and thus seems to
envision that the data collector will be a government agency, but the report’s recommendations
apply equally to the private sector. Id. at 50 (urging both government agencies and “private
organizations” to voluntarily comply with the report’s recommendations).
173

Id. at 61.

174

Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018). The Commission was set up as a means of
addressing issues that were not resolved in the Privacy Act. See Alex Kardon, Damages Under
the Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 705, 751–52 (2011).
175 PRIVACY P ROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
16 (1977).
176

Id. at 34.
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Persons whose names appear on the list, as the list owner’s “customers, members, or
donors,” are to be “informed” of the entity’s list-rental practices, and each such person
is to be “given an opportunity to indicate to the organization that he does not wish to
have his address, or name and address, made available for such purposes.”177 This
recommendation seems to envision opt-out choice: the individual need act only if he
does not want his information disclosed.
3. The 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
of Personal Data
In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) released its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, which it characterizes as “the first internationally agreedupon set of privacy principles.”178 The Guidelines prescribe notice-and-choice at two
points in a transaction. First, at the time the information is initially collected, the data
subject should receive notice of “[t]he purposes for which personal data are
collected.”179 Although not clearly expressed, the general rule is that the collection
should be done only with the consent of the data subject. 180 Second, subsequent uses
of the data for purposes other than those for which it was collected are allowable
without further notice to the data subject as long as those uses “are not incompatible
with” the original purpose. 181 However, data are to be disclosed or used for
incompatible purposes only “with the consent of the data subject” (or as provided by
law).182
4. The 1995 Clinton Administration Internet Privacy Reports
In 1995, at the dawn of the commercial Internet, 183 two federal government
agencies released reports that set out the position of President Bill Clinton’s
administration on how to address the new privacy issues that the new technology
raised. In a white paper titled Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding TelecommunicationsRelated Personal Information,184 the National Telecommunications and Information
177

Id. at 151.

178

OECD, THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 19 (2013) [hereinafter OECD, PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK].
179

OECD, GUIDELINES, supra note 170, ¶ 9.

180 The relevant principle states that data collection should be, “where appropriate, with the
knowledge or consent of the data subject.” Id. ¶ 7. The Explanatory Memorandum
accompanying the Guidelines suggests that obtaining the data subject’s consent will almost
always be “appropriate,” offering as examples of exceptions “[c]riminal investigation activities
and the routine up-dating of mailing lists.” OECD, PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 178, at
56.
181

OECD, GUIDELINES, supra note 170, ¶ 9.

182

Id. ¶ 10.

183

The beginning of Internet commerce can be dated to the dropping of the NSF’s
Acceptable Use Policy. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
184 NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995) [hereinafter NTIA,
PRIVACY], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
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Administration (“NTIA”), a unit of the Department of Commerce, set out the
administration’s position on use of “telecommunications-related personal
information” (“TRPI”), defined as “personal information that is created in the course
of an individual’s subscription to a telecommunications or information service or as a
result of his or her use of that service.”185 This is metadata—information derived from
a subscriber’s use of telecommunications, such as a telephone call, an email message,
or browsing the Web, that does not include the communicative content of the
transaction. For a phone call, the TRPI would include the number called, the time of
the call, and its duration, but not the content of the conversation.
The white paper states that its approach has “two fundamental elements—provider
notice and customer consent.”186 No explicit notice or consent is required if the
provider merely uses the TRPI for its intended purpose—to deliver the requested
telecommunications service by connecting a call or transmitting an email or even to
analyze the subscriber’s usage to offer a service that the subscriber may prefer. The
subscriber is assumed to be on notice of, and to have implicitly consented to, such
expected uses.187 But if the provider intends to use the TRPI for some other purpose,
the white paper calls for the subscriber to be notified of that use188 and given a choice
whether to permit it.189
The data subject must receive notice at the initiation of the provider-subscriber
relationship. The form in which the subscriber must convey his consent depends on
the nature of the information that the provider proposes to use. If the information is
“non-sensitive,” then opt-out consent will suffice; but for unexpected uses of
“sensitive” information, only opt-in consent will do.190 The white paper does not
propose a definition of “sensitive,” but offers some examples: “information relating to
health care (e.g., medical diagnoses and treatments), political persuasion, sexual
matters and orientation, and personal finances (e.g., credit card numbers) should be
considered ‘sensitive.’”191
A working group of the Information Infrastructure Task Force, which Vice
President Gore established to study a range of policy issues connected to
cyberspace,192 drafted the second of the two Clinton Administration policy papers on
185

Id. at 5.

186

Id. at 8.

187 Id. at 22 (“When personal information is collected and used only to render a service,
explicit notice may not be required because the individual is already aware of the extent of that
information’s collection and use.”).
188 Id. (“[T]elecommunications and information service providers should give their
customers plain and conspicuous notice of any unrelated or ancillary use of their TRPI.”).
189 Id. at 23 (“[I]ndividuals should have the right to limit or prohibit ancillary or unrelated
uses of personal information, such as disclosing information to third party marketers.”).
190

Id. at 25.

191

Id. at 25 n.98.

192

See INFO. POL’Y COMM., NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR
PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Draft for Public
Comment 1997), at text accompanying n.8, https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/options-promotingprivacy-national-information-infrastructure; Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1205 n.40 (1998).
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Internet privacy, titled Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure:
Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information. The Principles call for an
information collector to provide the data subject with notice consisting of “sufficient
information to make an informed decision about his or her privacy,” including the
purpose for collecting the information, its expected use, and “[t]he consequences of
providing or withholding information.” 193 Once the data subject has exercised his
choice and tendered the requested information, the collector is free to use it for
purposes specified in the notice.194 If the collector wants to use it in a manner that is
incompatible with “the individual’s objectively reasonable contemplation and scope
of consent when the information was collected,” then the collector must first obtain
the data subject’s consent.195 As with the NTIA white paper, whether opt-out consent
is sufficient or whether opt-in is required depends on the sensitivity of the information
in question.196
5. The FTC’s 1998, 1999, and 2000 Reports to Congress
In 1998, the FTC released a report on the current status of online privacy, with
recommendations to Congress.197 The report starts by asserting that privacy in online
transactions should be governed by a set of “widely-accepted principles concerning
fair information practices”—the FIPPs.198 Those principles include what it calls
“Notice/Awareness” and “Choice/Consent.”199 The notice principle calls for the
information collector to disclose its “information practices” before collecting personal
information, as “[w]ithout notice, a consumer cannot make an informed decision as to
whether and to what extent to disclose personal information.”200 The “information
practices” requiring disclosure include the identity of the data collector, the anticipated
uses and disclosures, the nature of the information collected, and the consequences of
refusing to provide the information.201
The report states that choice does not apply to the initial collection of information,
but rather that “choice relates to secondary uses of information—i.e., uses beyond
those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction.”202 The consumer is

193 NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
6
(1995),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/privacy-and-national-informationinfrastructure-principles-providing-and-using-personal-information.
194

Id.

195

Id. at 7.

196 Id. (“In some cases, the consequences to an individual may be so significant that the
prospective data user should proceed only after the individual has specifically opted into the use
by explicitly agreeing.”).
197

FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 160.

198 Id. at 7. The report cites the 1973 HEW Report as the original source of these principles.
Id. at 48 n.27.
199

Id. at 7–9.

200

Id. at 7.

201

Id. at 7–8.

202

Id. at 8.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018

31

590

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:559

assumed to have exercised choice as to the initial collection by engaging in the
transaction after receiving notice of the organization’s information practices.
The report discusses the two main variations in choice procedure, opt-in and optout, but after offering a rather impractical suggestion of how the need for either might
be avoided in online transactions does not express a preference for one over the
other.203
The report castigates online businesses for failing to meaningfully implement the
FIPPs; but the report also recommends that Congress take no action to require
implementation of fair information practices via legislation, instead allowing the
industry more time to self-regulate and promising to consider whether additional
incentives to self-regulate might be called for.204 In a follow-up report in 1999, the
FTC noted that self-regulation had made some halting progress and recommended that
industry be given more time to self-regulate.205 But in 2000, the FTC, exasperated by
the limited progress in implementation of the FIPPs that had come about via selfregulation, recommended that Congress step in and enact legislation that “would set
forth a basic level of privacy protection for all visitors to consumer-oriented
commercial Web sites.”206 The recommendation called for implementation of noticeand-choice along the lines of the discussion contained in the 1998 report. However,
the election of President George W. Bush in 2000 brought a change of leadership to
the FTC, which disavowed the recommendation for legislation and suggested the need
for further study.207
6. The Obama Administration’s 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
The Obama Administration offered its take on protecting online privacy in a 2012
White House report titled Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World.208 The report
sets forth a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, which applies the FIPPs to commercial
activity on the Internet. Notice and choice remain the foundational principles
203 Id. at 9 (“The online environment also presents new possibilities to move beyond the optin/opt-out paradigm. For example, consumers could be required to specify their preferences
regarding information use before entering a Web site, thus effectively eliminating any need for
default rules.”).
204

Id. at 41–42. However, as to children’s online privacy, the FTC did recommend
legislation, and Congress responded by enacting the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018). Id. at 42.
205 FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE 12 (1999),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/self-regulation-privacy-onlinea-federaltrade-commission-report-congress/1999self-regulationreport.pdf.
206 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 36 (2000) [hereinafter FTC, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-informationpractices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf.
207
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy 2001
Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm (stating that the
agency no longer supported federal legislation to protect online privacy, having concluded there
was a need “to develop better information about how such legislation would work and the costs
and benefits it would generate”).
208

WHITE HOUSE, supra note 167. The report acknowledged that it was building on
recommendations contained in a 2010 Department of Commerce green paper. Id. at 7.
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governing the relationship between entities that collect and use private information
and the data subjects to which that information pertains. 209 Some novelties are present
in the terminology: notice is called “Transparency,” choice is called “Individual
Control” (or sometimes “Individual Choice”), and both principles undergo
modification by application of the “Respect for Context” principle.210 The idea that the
rules for notice and choice should vary depending on context is one that appears in a
limited way in some earlier formulations, such as by treating “sensitive” information
differently from other personal information,211 but the role of context is more pervasive
in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.
Still, it’s all about notice-and-choice. Consumers should receive notice that
enables them to make informed choices about their private information: “companies
should provide clear descriptions of what personal data they collect, why they need
the data, how they will use it, when they will delete the data or de-identify it from
consumers, and whether and for what purposes they may share personal data with third
parties.”212 Context determines how prominent the notice must be. For example,
because ordering an item to be shipped requires providing a name and address to the
shipper, the retailer need not give “prominent notice of the practice”—but the retailer
still should describe the practice in its full privacy notice. 213 The choices that the
company should offer are those “that are appropriate for the scale, scope, and
sensitivity of personal data in question.”214 Thus, “companies that have access to
significant portions of individuals’ Internet usage histories, such as search engines, ad
networks, and online social networks,” should offer “fine-grained control of personal
data use and disclosure”; but companies that collect data for statistical purposes only
need not offer choice.215 Even third-party users of PII that have no direct contact with
the data subjects, such as data brokers, “should seek innovative ways to provide
consumers with Individual Control.”216
Whereas ordinary notice is required at the time the personal information is
collected and choice must be offered if it cannot be inferred from the circumstances,
a “heightened” form of notice-and-choice must be provided if subsequent uses of the
data are inconsistent with the data subject’s expectations. 217 The report does not say
209

Id. at 1.

210

Id. at 15.

211 See supra text accompanying note 190 (noting that the NTIA white paper proposes
differentiating between treatment of sensitive and non-sensitive information).
212

WHITE HOUSE, supra note 167, at 14.

213

Id. at 17. Likewise, the report considers that consumers will be aware that the retailer
will use the data to market new products to the consumer as well as for “analyzing how
consumers use a service in order to improve it, preventing fraud, complying with law
enforcement orders and other legal obligations, and protecting intellectual property.” Consent
as to these uses may therefore be inferred. Id.
214

Id. at 11.

215

Id. at 11–12.

216

Id. at 13.

217

Id. at 15 (stating that if companies wish to use PII for purposes that are not “consistent
with both the relationship that they have with consumers and the context in which consumers
originally disclosed the data,” they should “provide heightened Transparency and Individual
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what would constitute “heightened” notice and choice, other than to observe that the
requirements “may be more stringent than was necessary at the time of collection.”218
A discussion draft of a bill that would enact the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
fleshes out the concept only modestly, in the process revealing its hollowness:
heightened notice means notice that is provided “at times and in a manner reasonably
designed to enable individuals to decide whether to reduce their exposure to the
associated privacy risk,” while heightened choice requires “a mechanism for control
that is reasonably designed to permit individuals to exercise choice to reduce such
privacy risk.”219 This is no more than to say that “heightened” notice and choice is that
which provides data subjects with effective notice and choice—what one could be
forgiven for thinking is inherent in the concept of non-heightened notice and choice.
7. The FTC’s 2012 Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change
As discussed above, during the late 1990s, the FTC issued a series of reports that
promoted notice-and-choice as the preferred framework for handling online privacy.
That era came to an end when Congress failed to act on the FTC’s 2000
recommendation for legislation implementing notice-and-choice, and the FTC’s new
chairman disavowed the recommendation.220 The FTC’s online privacy efforts then
shifted to bringing enforcement actions under its existing statutory authorities 221 and
to promoting various schemes of self-regulation.222
The FTC resumed its policy-oriented work on online privacy by convening a series
of roundtable discussions starting December 2009, culminating in the issuance of a
2012 report titled Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.223 The
report sets forth a “privacy framework” that is based on notice-and-choice.224 But the
report contains some striking divergences from the FTC’s previous expositions of
Choice by disclosing these other purposes in a manner that is prominent and easily actionable
by consumers at the time of data collection”).
218

Id. at 16.

219 Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act § 103(b)(1) (Feb.
27, 2015). An analysis of the bill by the Center for Democracy and Technology says that
“heightened” consent means opt-in, but the inference is a weak one because the bill does not
mention either opt-in or opt-out. Analysis of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://cdt.org/insight/analysis-of-the-consumer-privacybill-of-rights-act/. For criticism of the heightened notice and choice framework, see James P.
Nehf, Protecting Privacy with “Heightened” Notice and Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 475 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016).
220

Muris, supra note 207.

221

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 8–
9 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionbureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protectingconsumer/101201privacyreport.pdf (explaining that “the Commission’s privacy approach
evolved to include a focus on specific consumer harms as the primary means of addressing
consumer privacy issues”).
222 See FTC STAFF, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 6–12 (describing the
FTC’s efforts to promote self-regulation for online privacy during the 2000s).
223

FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 7.

224

Id. at vii–viii.
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notice-and-choice and some commonalities with the Obama administration’s 2012
policy paper. For one thing, the report recognizes that it may be counterproductive to
offer consumers notice and choice at every opportunity; instead, the FTC proposes the
principle that “[c]ompanies should simplify consumer choice.”225 Doing so, the report
explains, “increases consumers’ control over the collection and use of their data”226—
that is, less (notice and choice) is sometimes more (beneficial to individual privacy
interests). Notice and choice, therefore, are not required—and by the logic of the
report’s discussion, are discouraged—“before collecting and using consumer data for
practices that are consistent with the context of the transaction or the company’s
relationship with the consumer.”227 The test is an objective one based on “the
consumer’s relationship with a business,” rather than “the inherently subjective test of
consumer expectations.”228 The examples the report offers where notice-and-choice
would not be required are similar to those in the Obama Administration policy paper:
“[order] fulfilment, fraud prevention, internal operations, legal compliance and public
purpose, and most first-party marketing.”229
If the information is to be used in ways that are inconsistent with the consumer’s
reasonable expectations, then the FTC wants the company to provide notice, generally
prior to collecting the information, and choice about whether it may be collected.230 In
two circumstances, the choice must be opt-in: where the information a company has
collected is to be used “in a manner materially different than claimed at the time of
collection” and where the information is “sensitive.”231 While offering no general
definition of “sensitive,” the report adopts the “consensus” view that “information
about children, financial and health information, Social Security numbers, and precise
geolocation data” falls into this category. 232
B. FIPPs in Positive Law
Like many statements of principles, the statements of fair information practice
principles discussed above might have remained merely theoretical, little affecting the
world. But in fact, the principles have been translated into positive law as well as selfregulatory codes of conduct. The following reviews some of the more prominent
implementations of FIPPs in positive law, demonstrating that the theoretical
problematics of notice-and-choice appear also in the real-world implementations.

225

Id. at 35.

226

Id. at 36. The report notes that simplifying choice also helps information collectors: it
“preserves the ability of companies to innovate new products and services.” Id.
227

Id. at 48.

228

Id. at 38.

229

Id. at 39.

230

Id. at 48–50. The report acknowledges that there are circumstances where it would be
impractical to provide notice before collection.
231

Id. at 57.

232

Id. at 59.
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1. The Privacy Act of 1974
Congress took heed of the recommendations presented in the 1973 HEW Report
and enacted some of them as the Privacy Act of 1974.233 The Act requires federal
government agencies234 to supply three types of notices of their practices that implicate
information privacy. The first is a description of any “system of records” that the
agency maintains, which the agency must publish in the Federal Register at the time
the agency establishes or revises it.235 This notice implements one of the principles of
the HEW Report,236 but, lacking specifics and being confined to the pages of the
Federal Register, does little to facilitate an individual’s decision whether to supply his
PII.
The second is a notice that an agency must provide to an individual when the
agency asks the individual to supply it with information.237 The notice must state
whether the individual’s provision of the requested information is “mandatory or
voluntary”; the purpose of the information collection; the “routine uses” that may be
made of the information; and the effects on the individual of his failure to provide the
information.238 The Act specifies where the notice must appear—it must be “on the
form which [the agency] uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can
be retained by the individual”—but does not require any particular level of
prominence.239 These provisions embody several of the principles of the HEW
Report.240
The third type of notice is only implied in the statute,241 in a provision that forbids
an agency to disclose information about an individual without obtaining his “prior
233 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1988)). Although the HEW report recommended legislation that would apply to both
the government and the private sector, the Privacy Act applies only to certain agencies of the
federal government. See infra note 234. This limitation of its scope resulted from lobbying by
industry groups. See Thompson, supra note 164, at 35. Nevertheless, “the Privacy Act embodies
all five principles upon which the Code was based.” Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the
Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the Routine Use
Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 969 n.89 (1991).
234 The Act applies principally to agencies of the federal government’s executive branch and
independent agencies. It does not apply to agencies of state or local governments, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(1) (referencing definition in 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)), except for one provision dealing with
use of Social Security numbers, id. § 552a note.
235 Id. § 552a(e)(4). An agency maintains a “system of records” if it holds information about
individuals that it is able to retrieve by using the individual’s name or some identifying number.
Id. § 552a(a)(5).
236 See HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 41 (“There must be no personal-data record-keeping
systems whose very existence is secret.”).
237

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3).

238 Id. § 552a(e)(3). A “routine use” is defined in the statute as any use “for a purpose which
is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.” Id. § 552a(a)(7).
239

Id. § 552a(e)(3).

240

See supra text accompanying notes 170–73.

241 An OMB guidance anticipates that a request for consent will at least state “the general
purposes for, or types of recipients, to which disclosure may be made.” Responsibilities for the
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written consent.”242 The law does not indicate whether opt-out consent is sufficient.243
While the OMB has stated that “a blanket or open-ended consent” is not adequate,244
there does not seem to be any determination by a court as to whether opt-out consent
suffices. The consent requirement in any event has limited applicability because the
statute includes a number of exceptions allowing disclosure without consent. 245 The
most capacious of these exceptions is one for a “routine use” of the information.246
The data collector need not offer any choice about whether to submit the requested
data—the submission requirement may be “mandatory.”247 But this rule effectively is
irrelevant because the collector is the ultimate monopoly supplier of services, an
agency of the United States government. The agency might just as well declare that
the provision of information is “voluntary,” adding that if an individual chooses not
to supply the information, he will not receive Social Security benefits, a permit
allowing him to begin construction of a factory, or various other benefits.
2. The EU Data Protection Directive (1995) and General Data Protection Regulation
(2016)
The European Union’s Data Protection Directive has comprehensively regulated a
wide swathe of information practices in the EU since its 1998 effective date. 248 The
goal of the legislation was to create a harmonized set of national rules that would
protect individual privacy while not unduly interfering with the free flow of
information needed for international commerce. 249 Notice and choice are foundational
principles. The data collector must notify the data subject of “the purposes of the
processing for which the data are intended.”250 Where required for “fair processing”
of the data, the collector must also identify “the recipients or categories of recipients
of the data” and must disclose “whether replies to the questions are obligatory or
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure to reply.”251 As a general
rule, the data collector is required to obtain the data subject’s “unambiguous[]”

Maintenance of Records About Individuals by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. 28948, 28954
(July 9, 1975).
242 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Disclosure is also allowed upon the individual’s “written request.”
Id. Such a request, originating from the individual, does not assume any provision of notice by
the agency. See id.
243

See id.

244

Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records, 40 Fed. Reg. at 28954.

245

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12).

246

Id. § 552a(b)(3).

247

Id. § 552a(e)(3)(A).

248

Data Protection Directive, supra note 151.

249

Id. at Recitals 10, 56 (“the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data
is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,” but “cross-border
flows of personal data are necessary to the expansion of international trade”).
250

Id. art. 10(b).

251

Id. art. 10(c).
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consent before engaging in any “processing” 252 of the data,253 and “explicit” consent
is required before processing specified categories of sensitive data. 254 However, the
consent provision is subject to several exceptions that narrow its scope. An inevitable
exception exists for uses necessary to complete the transaction, where the individual’s
consent may be inferred from his act of entering into the transaction.255 There is also
a vague and all-purpose exception where “processing is necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to
whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.”256
National implementations of the Data Protection Directive (“Directive”) turned out
not to be uniform; the Directive requires only a minimum level of privacy protection,
allowing member states to implement a higher level of protection, and some member
states did just that. Driven largely by the desire to create a uniform, Community-wide
set of privacy rules, the EU promulgated the General Data Protection Regulation 257
(“GDPR”), which will go into effect on May 25, 2018.258 As a regulation, and unlike
a directive, the GDPR applies directly throughout the EU, preventing the development
of non-uniform versions in different member states. The GDPR differs from the
Directive in a variety of respects, but retains the principles of notice and choice. The
GDPR specifies additional items of information of which the data subject must be
notified before data collection259 and exhibits some concern that the notice should
actually be available to the data subject.260 Where consent is required, the GDPR
requires opt-in consent: consent must be tendered through “a clear affirmative
action,”261 and “[s]ilence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not . . . constitute

252 Id. art. 7(a). “Processing” is broadly defined to include any collection, use, or disclosure
of data. Id. art. 2(b).
253 An opinion of the Directive’s Article 29 Working Party states that this consent must be
opt-in, since consent delivered through an opt-out mechanism is not “unambiguous.” Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent, 01197/11/EN,
WP187 (July 13, 2011), at 21–25.
254

Data Protection Directive, supra note 151, art. 8(2)(a).

255

Id. art. 7(b).

256 Id. art. 7(f). For discussion of these exceptions, see Steven R. Salbu, The European Union
Data Privacy Directive and International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 670–71
(2002).
257

GDPR, supra note 151.

258

Id. art. 84(2).

259

The notice must include contact information of the data collector, state the period of time
during which the data will be retained, describe access and withdrawal rights, and (in all
circumstances) identify the recipients or categories of recipients of the data. Id. art. 13(1), (2).
260 Notice must be “in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form.” Id. art.
12(1). If the notice is in a format that also deals with other matters, it must be “clearly
distinguishable from the other matters.” Id. art. 7(2).
261

Id. art. 6(1).
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consent.”262 As with the Directive, the consent requirement is limited by substantial
exceptions.263
3. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (1998)
In 1998, prompted by a recommendation from the FTC, Congress enacted
legislation aimed at protecting children’s privacy online and charged the FTC with
promulgating implementing regulations.264 Mirroring the requirements of the statute,
the FTC’s rule requires the operator of a website that is directed to children to post a
notice of its privacy practices and to obtain “verifiable parental consent” before
collecting personal information from children.265 The rule is unusually specific in
requiring that the notice be presented in a manner that is likely to come to the attention
of the child’s parent: the notice must be “clearly and understandably written, complete,
and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials,” and the
collector “must make reasonable efforts . . . to ensure that [the] parent . . . receives
direct notice.”266 The consent must be tendered through an opt-in mechanism.267
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999)
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”)268 requires financial institutions
to provide privacy notices and (in some circumstances) opt-out choice to their
customers.269 “Clear and conspicuous” notices are required at the time the institution
initially establishes a relationship with the customer and annually thereafter. 270 The
notices must describe the categories of nonpublic personal information that the
institution collects and discloses as well as the categories of third parties (whether
affiliated or nonaffiliated) to which it discloses such information. 271 If the institution

262

Id. at Recital 32.

263

Id. art. 6(b)–(f).

264

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018).

265

16 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2018).

266

Id. § 312.4(a), (b). The notice must also be posted on the website. Id. § 312.4(d).

267

Id. § 312.5(b). Because children are involved, the consent procedures are unusually
stringent and require much more from the parent than clicking a website button. Acceptable
methods for a parent to tender consent include sending in a signed consent form by mail or fax;
using a credit card to pay for a transaction at the website; calling a telephone number to provide
verbal consent; having a videoconference with trained personnel; and providing a governmentissued identification. Id. § 312.5(b)(2)(i)–(v).
268 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2018). Regulations issued by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau implement GLB with respect to most categories of
covered financial institutions. The regulations appear at 12 C.F.R. Part 1016, also known as
Regulation P.
269

The regulation makes a distinction between “customer” and “consumers,” but for
simplicity, I elide that distinction here. 12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(e), (i) (2018).
270

Id. § 1016.4(a), .5(a)(1).

271

Id. § 1016.6(a). “Nonpublic personal information” is defined in the regulation through a
complex set of interlocking definitions. Id. § 1016.3(p)(1)–(3). Simplified a bit, it consists of
information relating to a consumer that the institution obtains in connection with providing
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wishes to disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party, it must
include in the notice a disclosure to this effect as well as a reasonable means for the
customer to opt out of the disclosure. 272 The institution may make the disclosure only
if, after a reasonable opportunity, the customer does not opt out. 273
GLB notices usually appear as pieces of paper included in a bill or some other
mailing from the financial institution.274 In 2009, the federal agencies that administer
GLB published a model disclosure form that financial institutions may use for their
GLB notices.275 Use of the model form acts as a safe harbor, constituting compliance
with the disclosure requirements.276 Probably every reader of this Article is familiar
with them—and has seen so many of them that she tosses them into the trash without
reading them as she would any form of junk mail. The development of a model form,
which is widely used by the financial institutions subject to GLB, makes the notices
unusually consumer-friendly.
GLB implements the notice principle more seriously than most implementations.
GLB requires “clear and conspicuous” notice, defined as notice that is “reasonably
understandable and designed to call attention to the nature and significance of the
information in the notice.”277
5. California Online Privacy Protection Act (2003)
As explained above,278 in 2000, the FTC announced that self-regulation had failed
and recommended that Congress enact legislation requiring all consumer-oriented
commercial websites that collect PII “to comply with the four widely-accepted fair

financial services, unless the institution has a reasonable basis for believing that the information
is publicly available. Id.
272

There are certain exceptions to the opt-out requirement, such as when the disclosure is
made so that the third party can provide services for the institution; to carry out a consumer
transaction; or at the customer’s request. Id. § 1016.13–.15. A “nonaffiliated third party” is,
roughly, an entity that is not under common control with the financial institution. Id.
§ 1016.3(a)(1), (o)(1)–(2).
273 Id. § 1016.10. Reasonable means for opting out include via a check-off box, a reply form,
an email, a website, or a toll-free telephone number. The customer generally must be allowed
thirty days to exercise the opt-out right. Id. § 1016.10.
274 The regulation requires that notices be delivered in such a way that “each consumer can
reasonably be expected to receive actual notice in writing.” Id. § 1016.9(a). Delivery by postal
mail is specifically deemed reasonable. Id. § 1016.9(b)(ii). Notices may be delivered
electronically if the customer agrees. Id. § 1016.9(a). A 2014 amendment to Regulation P allows
institutions whose practices do not trigger the opt-out requirement to dispense with the annual
paper notices and instead inform the consumer on the billing statement that the notice is
available on the institution’s website. Id. § 1016.9(c)(2).
275 Development of a model form was mandated by a 2006 amendment to GLB, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 6803(e). Fillable model forms are linked from a document titled Instructions for
Using the Privacy Notice Online Form Builder, FED. RES. (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/privacy_notice_instructions.pdf.
276

16 U.S.C. § 6803(e)(4) (2018).

277

12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(b)(1).

278

See supra text accompanying note 206.
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information practices,” including notice and choice. 279 Congress did not enact the
recommended legislation, but the California legislature heard the call.280 The
California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (“CalOPPA”) requires operators of
commercial websites that collect PII from California residents to post a privacy
policy.281 The policy must identify the categories of PII that the website collects and
the categories of third parties to which it may disclose the PII.282 The policy also must
describe the procedure the website uses to notify website visitors of changes to its
privacy policy.283 The website must post the policy “conspicuously,” which may be
through placing a link labeled “Privacy” on the website’s home page. 284
In 2010, the Wall Street Journal published the results of its examination of 101
popular smartphone apps running on the Android and iPhone platforms.285 It found
that about half of them transmitted the phone’s unique identifier to a third party
without the user’s knowledge or consent, about half transmitted location information,
and five transmitted the user’s age, gender, and other personal information. Only about
half of the apps posted a privacy policy, either within the app or on an associated
website.
In 2012, referencing the Wall Street Journal report, as well as another study
finding that only five percent of mobile apps had a privacy policy,286 California’s
Attorney General, Kamala Harris, issued an interpretation of CalOPPA.287 Harris
found that the statute’s requirement to post a privacy policy applied not only to
websites, but also to mobile apps.288 At the same time, she announced that she had
279

See FTC, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 206, at 36.

280

Stats. 2003, c. 829 (A.B. 68), § 3 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a), (b)).
A 2013 amendment to the statute requires some additional categories of disclosure: how the
website responds to a do-not-track request conveyed via a browser setting and whether the
website allows third parties to collect PII across multiple websites. Stats. 2013, c. 390 (A.B.
370), § 1 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(5)–(7)).
281

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (2018).

282

Id. § 22575(b)(1).

283

Id. § 22575(b)(3).

284

Id. § 22577(b)(3).

285

Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal
Investigation: Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2010, at C1.
286 Kamala D. Harris, Mobile Applications and Mobile Privacy Fact Sheet,
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/n2630_updated_mobile_apps
_info.pdf.
287 Kamala D. Harris, Joint Statement of Principles (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Harris, Joint
Statement of Principles], https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/
n2630_signed_agreement.pdf.
288

Id. The relevant language of the statute makes it applicable to “[a]n operator of a
commercial Web site or online service that collects personally identifiable information through
the Internet.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (2018). A 2015 Delaware law that generally
tracks the language of the California statute is more explicitly expansive in its coverage,
applying to “[a]n operator of a commercial internet website, online or cloud computing service,
online application, or mobile application that collects personally identifiable information
through the Internet.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205C(a) (2018).
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entered into an agreement with Apple, Google, Amazon.com, and other operators of
mobile app platforms under which they agreed to require the apps they host to post a
privacy policy.289 The agreement requires the companies to post privacy notices
“conspicuously,” which may be via clicking on a link from somewhere within the
app.290 Shortly after the agreement was implemented, the percentage of apps posting
privacy policies substantially increased.291 In a staff report, the FTC applauded the
California effort and recommended that app platforms require, and app developers
include, a privacy notice.292 Since California residents can access every commercial
website and mobile app, this statute effectively has national reach. However, the
California law implements the principle of notice, but not that of choice.
6. Federal Communications Commission’s Privacy Rules for Internet Service
Providers (2016)
The Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) 2015 network neutrality
rule reclassified broadband Internet access service as a “telecommunications service”
subject to common-carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.293
That action removed Internet service providers (“ISPs”) from the jurisdiction of the
FTC and made the ISPs subject to the FCC’s statutory authority to protect the privacy
of telecommunications data.294 The FCC thereafter commenced a rulemaking to
establish appropriate protections for “individually identifiable CPNI, personally
identifiable information (PII), and content of communications.” 295 The FCC issued a
289

Harris, Joint Statement of Principles, supra note 287, ¶ 1. Facebook later signed on to
the agreement, bringing its App Center within the agreement’s scope. Press Release, State of
Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Expansion of California’s
Consumer Privacy Protections to Social Apps as Facebook Signs Apps Agreement (June 22,
2012),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announcesexpansion-california%E2%80%99s-consumer.
290

Harris, Joint Statement of Principles, supra note 287, ¶ 2.

291 KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATTORNEY GEN. OF CAL., PRIVACY ON THE GO 4 (2013),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf. In December
2012, the state of California brought its first enforcement action under CalOPPA, charging that
Delta Airlines violated the Act by failing to post a privacy policy in its Fly Delta mobile app.
The California Court of Appeal dismissed the action, finding it preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act. People ex rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 247 Cal. App. 4th 884 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016).
292

FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY i–iii, 12 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commissionstaff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf.
293 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015), abrogated by
Restoring Internet Freedom, 2018 WL 305638 (F.C.C. 2018). For an explanation of the tortuous
path leading to issuance of this order, see John A. Rothchild, Understanding Network
Neutrality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, supra note 219, at 419.
294 Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 31 FCC Rcd. 13911 (2016), ¶¶ 24, 26 [hereinafter FCC, ISP Privacy Rules].
295 Id. ¶ 46. CPNI stands for “customer proprietary network information” and consists of
telecommunications metadata, analogous to what the 1995 NTIA white paper refers to as
“TRPI.” See supra text accompanying note 185.
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final rule on October 27, 2016.296 On the heels of the national elections of November
2016, which gave Republicans control of both branches of Congress as well as the
presidency, Congress nullified this rule before it became effective by exercising its
powers under the Congressional Review Act. 297
The FCC’s rules on notice and choice closely track those in the 2012 FTC report
and the 2015 discussion draft of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act.298 An ISP
must provide its customers with notice of the types of personal information it collects,
how it uses that information, how it discloses the information to third parties, and what
privacy choices the customer has.299 The notice must be made available by a “clear
and conspicuous” link that appears both on the home page of the carrier’s website and
on any mobile app that the carrier provides consumers for account management
purposes.300 Additionally, the notice must “provide information in language that is
comprehensible and not misleading.”301
Customers must be given choice, which may be via an opt-out mechanism, as to
whether their personal information may be used or disclosed for purposes other than
providing telecommunications service.302 As in the FTC’s recommendation, opt-in
consent is required before the ISP may use or share sensitive information 303 or use PII
in a manner inconsistent with the privacy policy in effect at the time it was collected.304
Opt-out consent is adequate in other situations.305
C. FIPPs in Voluntary Implementations
Several self-regulatory schemes addressing online privacy are based on the FIPPs.
The resulting rules are, unsurprisingly, founded upon notice-and-choice.

296

FCC, ISP Privacy Rules, supra note 294.

297 S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong., 131 Stat. 88 (2017). Cecilia Kang, Congress Moves to
Overturn Obama-Era Online Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/technology/congress-votes-to-overturn-obama-eraonline-privacy-rules.html. On May 18, 2017, Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) introduced a bill
that would reinstate by statute the principal provisions of the FCC’s rules. Balancing the Rights
of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2017, H.R. 2520, 115th Cong. (2017).
298 FCC, ISP Privacy Rules, supra note 294, ¶ 9 (“In adopting rules governing customer
choice, we look to the best practices framework recommended by the FTC in its 2012 Privacy
Report as well as the choice framework in the Administration’s CPBR . . . .”).
299

Id. ¶ 126.

300

Id. ¶¶ 140–41.

301

Id. ¶ 144.

302

Id. ¶¶ 132, 196.

303

Id. ¶ 172. The FCC’s list of what counts as “sensitive” information is slightly broader
than the FTC’s. Id. ¶ 177.
304

Id. ¶ 195 (requiring opt-in consent to “material retroactive changes to privacy policies”).

305

Id. ¶ 196 (requiring “opt-out approval to use, disclose, or permit access to non-sensitive
customer PI”).
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1. Website Privacy Policies (Ca. 1995 to Date)
During its first foray into online privacy, the FTC used its bully pulpit to urge
online sellers to post a privacy policy on their website. The FTC’s efforts commenced
with a public hearing in June 1996.306 The December 1996 staff report on the meeting
noted that workshop participants generally were in agreement that the principles of
notice and choice—whose origins it traced to the 1973 HEW Report—should govern
online privacy.307 However, at the time the report was written, “few Web sites [had]
privacy policies or display[ed] their information practices to consumers.” 308 Industry
members “recogniz[ed] the need to address this issue,” but industry members and
privacy advocates disagreed on how to implement the fair information practice
principles.309 Industry members were in favor of allowing self-regulation to flower,
while privacy advocates called for some level of regulatory engagement by the
government.310 The report took no position on whether the online industry should be
allowed more time to regulate itself by implementing the principles of notice and
choice.311
Despite the report’s inconclusive outcome, the workshop had the effect of
galvanizing industry participants into self-regulatory action. Two industry
associations, the Interactive Services Association and the Direct Marketing
Association, announced at the workshop itself that they were releasing self-regulatory
guidelines for protecting online privacy. The guidelines say that commercial websites
should post a privacy policy and honor a narrow category of opt-out requests.312 The
following month, a nonprofit organization called TRUSTe announced the launch of
its online privacy seal program, which allowed a website that met TRUSTe’s
requirements to display the TRUSTe seal.313

306 FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF, PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (1996), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/staff-report-publicworkshop-consumer-privacy-global-information-infrastructure.
307 Id. The FTC had held some earlier hearings and workshops addressing online privacy in
1995. Id. at 1–2, nn.1–2.
308

Id. at 8.

309

Id. at 8–11.

310

Id. at 26–29.

311

Id. at 51 (noting opposing views but not taking a position).

312 Press Release, Interactive Services Association, Interactive Services Association Issues
Positions on Privacy and Online Marketing (June 4, 1996). The two associations’ appended
Joint Statement on Online Notice and Opt-Out called for “[a]ll marketers operating online sites”
to post a notice describing their collection and use of personal information from site visitors,
and to furnish them “with the opportunity to request that their e-mail addresses not be rented,
sold, or exchanged for online solicitation purposes.” Id.
313 eTRUST Launches Pilot Program, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 20, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/effector/9/15. The organization was originally named eTRUST but was
rechristened TRUSTe due to a trademark conflict. In June 2017, its name was changed to
TrustArc. Chris Babel, TRUSTe Transforms to TrustArc, TRUSTARC (June 6, 2017),
http://www.trustarc.com/blog/2017/06/06/truste-transforms-to-trustarc/. As of this writing, the
privacy seals continue to be branded as TRUSTe.
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In 2009, a group of advertising and marketing trade associations (later dubbed the
Digital Advertising Alliance (“DAA”)) responded to an FTC staff report by issuing a
self-regulatory framework applying to online behavioral advertising (“OBA”). 314 The
framework includes elements of notice and choice that place obligations on operators
of websites through which information is collected for the purpose of OBA as well as
on companies that engage in OBA or facilitate it (including advertising networks).
OBA is defined as collecting data from multiple websites to enable companies (other
than the collecting website itself) to target advertising based on predicted user
preferences derived from the data.315 A website that allows information to be collected
for OBA purposes must deploy a link (separate from the “Privacy” link) that goes
directly to a website maintained by the DAA. 316 The website provides information
about OBA and allows the user to opt out of the collection and use of her information
for OBA. The link may be labeled with text such as “Interest-Based Ads” or consist
of an icon ( ) designed for this purpose.317 The DAA website includes a “partial list”
of a few hundred companies that participate in the framework.318 The Advertising SelfRegulatory Council enforces compliance with the framework through its Online
Interest-Based Advertising Accountability Program (“Accountability Program”). 319
The Accountability Program has rendered decisions in more than seventy enforcement
actions since 2011.320 As a result of some recent challenges, Budweiser added an icon
link to the DAA opt-out page on its website,321 and Wayfair added a link labeled
“Interest-Based Ads” on its website.322
At present, finding a consumer-oriented commercial website of any substantial
size that does not post a privacy policy would be challenging. These policies generally
314 See AM. ASS’N OF ADVERT. AGENCIES ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 29 (2009), http://www.aboutads.info/obaprinciples (noting that the
principles “are informed by” the FTC staff document of the same name); FTC STAFF, SELFREGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 45–47 (FTC staff’s version of the principles).
315 AM. ASS’N OF ADVERT. AGENCIES ET AL., supra note 314, at 10–11 (defining “online
behavioral advertising”); id. at 23–24 (elucidating that definition).
316

Webchoices: Digital Advertising Alliance’s Consumer Choice Tool for Web (Beta),
DIGITAL ADVERT. ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
317 This description simplifies a fairly complex regulatory scheme, which also involves
notices by the third parties that actually do the collecting and by service providers, alternative
means of complying with the requirements, and other features.
318

DAA Participating Companies & Organizations, DIGITAL ADVERT. ALLIANCE,
http://digitaladvertisingalliance.org/participating (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
319 The Advertising Self-Regulatory Council is a unit of the Council of Better Business
Bureaus, one of the founding members of the DAA. ASRC Snapshot, ASRC,
http://www.asrcreviews.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
320

The decisions are available at Accountability Program Decisions, Dispositions,
Closures, and Guidance, ASRC, http://www.asrcreviews.org/accountability-programdecisions/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
321 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Case No. 70-2017 (Online Interest-Based Advertising
Accountability Program Jan. 25, 2017).
322

Wayfair Inc., Case No. 71-2017 (Online Interest-Based Advertising Accountability
Program Jan. 25, 2017).
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implement the principles of notice and choice in some manner. Those relatively few323
websites that display a TRUSTe privacy seal must conform to TRUSTe’s rules. These
rules currently require (1) notice that discloses fifteen specified categories of
information and (2) opt-in choice before sharing PII in a manner not consistent with
the privacy notice, before sharing any of a defined set of “sensitive information,” and
before using PII that is collected from a source other than the data subject for a purpose
beyond that for which it was collected.324 The vast majority of websites, which post a
privacy policy but do not participate in TRUSTe’s program, are subject only to the
minimal notice requirements of CalOPPA.325
2. Mobile App Privacy Policies and Permissions (Ca. 2008 to Date)
As discussed above, in 2012 California’s Attorney General found that the 2003
CalOPPA requires mobile apps to post a privacy policy. Both the Apple App Store
and the Google Play Store, agreeing to abide by that interpretation, implement the
California rules in developer guidelines, with some variations. 326 Both require apps
that collect PII to post a privacy policy—the minimum required by California law as
interpreted by the Attorney General. Both also require user consent under certain
circumstances before collection and disclosure.327 Apple goes beyond these procedural
rules and includes a few substantive ones: apps may not require submission of personal
data except where needed for “core functionality” of the app; data may not be shared
with third parties except to improve user experience and for approved advertising; data
acquired via the HomeKit API may not be used for advertising; data from Apple Pay
may not be shared with third parties except to facilitate delivery of goods or services;
and there are limitations on the sharing of health information. 328
Privacy in mobile apps is also controlled through the use of permissions. Once
downloaded to a user’s mobile device, an app may request permission to access
various types of personal information that resides on or may be acquired through the
device, as well as to access certain hardware functions. On the Android 6.0 platform,
323 TrustArc itself claims to have “more than 1,000” clients. Why TrustArc, TRUSTARC,
https://www.trustarc.com/why-trustarc/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). There are over a billion
websites out there. Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS,
http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
324 Enterprise Privacy Certification Standards, TRUSTE, https://www.truste.com/privacycertification-standards/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
325

See supra text accompanying notes 281–84.

326

App
Store
Review
Guidelines,
APPLE,
https://developer.apple.com/appstore/review/guidelines/ (last visited May 2, 2017); Let’s Build the World’s Most Trusted Source
for Apps and Games, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/about/developer-content-policy-print/
(last visited May 17, 2017).
327

Apple states: “Apps that collect user or usage data must have a privacy policy and secure
user consent for the collection. . . . [Apps cannot] use or transmit someone’s personal data
without first obtaining their permission and providing access to information about how and
where the data will be used.” APPLE, supra note 326, at 5.1.1(i), 5.1.2(i). Google states: “If your
app collects and transmits personal or sensitive user data unrelated to functionality . . . then prior
to the collection and transmission, it must prominently highlight how the user data will be used
and have the user provide affirmative consent for such use.” GOOGLE, supra note 326.
328

APPLE, supra note 326, at 5.1.1(ii), 5.1.2(ii)–(iv), 5.1.3(i).
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apps may request permission to access body sensors, calendar, camera, contacts,
location, microphone, phone, SMS, and storage.329 Granting any of these permissions
can give access to highly personal information.330 Permission is not granted by default,
but only via an opt-in mechanism. Under Android 6.0 (but not under earlier versions),
the user may grant some but not all of the requested permissions and may later revoke
the grant of a permission.331 Nevertheless, some of the choices made available via
setting permissions are actually required; if the user denies permission, the app will
not function correctly. A phone app, for example, will not function if permission to
access the microphone is denied.
In addition, the DAA has extended its self-regulatory framework so that it applies
to mobile apps.332 The publisher of an app that allows third parties to collect “crossapp data” (that is, data from multiple apps on a particular device) must post a link to
a disclosure that the user will see either before downloading it from the app supplier
platform, when the app is opened for the first time, or when cross-app data is
collected.333 The link must also be available in the app’s settings. 334 The disclosure
must offer the user the ability to opt out of the collection of such data.335 If the app
allows third parties to collect “precise location data,” then similar notice rules apply
and the app must seek prior opt-in consent from the user.336

329 Google Play Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/6270602
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018). Each of these permissions is actually the name of a “permission
group” that may contain one or more individual permissions. Chris Hoffman, How to Manage
App Permissions on Android, HOW TO GEEK (June 8, 2017), https://www.howtogeek.com/
230683/how-to-manage-app-permissions-on-android-6.0/. The user cannot control the
individual permissions within a permission group. Id.
330
However, it is often difficult to know how personal the disclosed information will be.
For example, if you grant an app the Location permission group, the app may use the “access
approximate location” function to determine your location to within a few thousand meters, or
it may use the “access precise location” function, which uses GPS to determine your location
within a few meters. Google Maps Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/maps/answer/
2839911?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). You might not
mind if an app knows what neighborhood you are in, but might mind very much if it knows
what building you are in.
331

Under versions of Android earlier than 6.0, permission had to be granted on an all-ornone basis. KENNETH OLMSTEAD & MICHELLE ATKINSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., APP
PERMISSIONS IN THE GOOGLE PLAY STORE 9 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/11/
PI_2015-11-10_apps-permissions_FINAL.pdf. The Apple iOS has long allowed individualized
grant or denial of permissions. Chris Hoffman, iOS Has App Permissions, Too: And They’re
Arguably Better Than Android’s, HOW TO GEEK (Dec. 15, 2013), https://www.howtogeek.
com/177711/ios-has-app-permissions-too-and-theyre-arguably-better-than-androids/.
332 DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, APPLICATION OF SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES TO THE
MOBILE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2013), http://www.aboutads.info/DAA_Mobile_Guidance.pdf.
333

Id. at 15.

334

Id.

335

Id. at 17.

336

Id. at 21–28.
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The framework bans the collection and use of information for certain purposes—
eligibility for employment, credit, health care treatment, and insurance 337—and
restricts the collection and use of “sensitive data,” including “financial account
numbers, Social Security numbers, pharmaceutical prescriptions, [and] medical
records.”338 In some recent enforcement actions, SEGA solved its problem by
removing third-party collection of data for OBA from its Sonic Runners app,339 and
iTriage agreed to add links to its disclosures in its pages in the app download platforms
and to stop authorizing the collection of precise location data.340
Thus, in the mobile app ecosystem, an unusual amalgam of rules governs privacy:
California state law, which has been effectively federalized due to the infeasibility and
undesirability of blocking users located in California; an industry-devised selfregulatory framework; and platform operators going beyond legal requirements by
incorporating an element of choice.
3. IoT Privacy Policies (Ca. 2011 to Date)
Currently, no established voluntary regime of privacy notices exists for IoT
devices. An unscientific sampling of the websites that manufacturers use to showcase
their IoT devices reveals that the great majority of them do not offer any information
about how private information acquired by the device is handled, even while
expatiating on the device’s other functions.
Application of the notice-and-choice paradigm to IoT devices has an obstacle to
overcome beyond those that plague websites and mobile apps. Unlike the large visual
displays attached to computers, the medium-sized ones built into tablets, and the small
but usable displays of smartphones, most IoT devices lack a visual interface that is
capable of displaying the quantity of information contained in a privacy policy.
Therefore, conveying notice, and receiving consent, are problematic. There are
workarounds. For example, privacy notice-and-choice could be part of a setup routine
that the user must follow using one of his other connected devices. The privacy policy
could be printed on a piece of paper in the device’s box along with a statement
explaining that, by using the device, the consumer is deemed to have consented to the
described privacy practices—by analogy with the “shrinkwrap” licenses and “money
now, terms later”341 approaches that were heavily debated in the early days of
electronic commerce—or a practice of including the device’s privacy policy on the
manufacturer’s website could take hold. However, the workarounds all suffer from
various weaknesses.342
337

Id. at 31–32.

338 Id. at 32. As with the discussion of the DAA’s Online Behavioral Advertising Principles,
supra note 317, this discussion simplifies a complex scheme.
339 SEGA, Case No. 65-2016 (Online Interest-Based Advertising Accountability Program
July 14, 2016).
340 iTriage LLC, Case No. 64-2016 (Online Interest-Based Advertising Accountability
Program July 14, 2016).
341

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).

342 See Sara Shahmiri, Wearing Your Data on Your Sleeve: Wearables, the FTC, and the
Privacy Implications of This New Technology, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 25, 29–30
(2016).
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Such IoT privacy policies as are available pre-purchase indicate that IoT privacy
policies may closely resemble website privacy policies. For example, if you install a
Wi-Fi-connected refrigerator, oven, or dishwasher from GE Appliances, the company
will collect information including “[r]eal-time usage information for your connected
Appliances, such as the number of times a door of a connected Appliance is opened,
the type and/or number of cycles run by a connected Appliance and the date your
connected Appliance was installed” as well as “[l]ocation data of your connected
Appliance based upon your connected Appliance’s IP address, MAC address, RFID
and/or WiFi connection.”343 With your “prior consent”—the notice does not specify
whether the choice mechanism is opt-in or opt-out—the company will also track the
location of the mobile phone that you use to control the appliance. 344 GE Appliances
may use the collected information for its own marketing purposes and may share the
information “with third parties that may offer you products or services for purposes
related to your purchase and use of a GE Appliances WiFi Connect Appliance (e.g.,
certified service providers).”345
Another example comes from Philips, a manufacturer of connected light bulbs. If
you install the bulbs, the manufacturer will learn the geolocation of the bulbs, the
names you assign to each room in your house in which a bulb is located, and
information about your movements within the house as collected by a motion
sensor.346
If you go to Amazon’s website to purchase an Echo and want to know the device’s
privacy policy before you buy, you will be disappointed. The policy is not easy to find.
Starting from the Echo product page,347 you have to scroll down to the section titled
“Technical details,” spot the sentence that reads “Use of the Amazon Echo is subject
to the terms found here,” click on the word “here,” which links to a page titled “Alexa
and Alexa Device Terms,” click on a link labeled “Alexa Terms of Use,” and scroll
down to paragraph “3.1 Information.”348 There you learn that Alexa collects
information from you that Amazon will handle “in accordance with the Amazon.com

343 Connected
Data Privacy Policy, GE APPLIANCES
http://www.geappliances.com/privacy/privacy_policy_connected.htm.
344

(June

6,

2016),

Id.

345 Id.; see Transcript of Hearing, Federal Trade Commission: Internet of Things Workshop
(Nov. 19, 2013), at 59 (statement of Michael Beyerle, Marketing Manager for Innovation at GE
Appliances) (“The wi-fi router system is feeding into the GE servers, the GE server allowing
you to connect into your smart phone, your tablet, whatever device you may have, as well as
some data storage.”).
346 Privacy Notice for Hue, PHILIPS (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www2.meethue.com/enus/privacy-policy/. Some users may find solace in the privacy policy’s assurance that “[w]e do
not use this data to monitor you and make sure third parties with access to this data agree not to
either.” Id.
347 Echo (2nd Generation), AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/all-new-amazon-echospeaker-with-wifi-alexa-dark-charcoal/dp/B06XCM9LJ4/ref=sr_tr_sr_1 (last visited Mar. 7,
2018).
348

Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=201809740 (last updated Dec. 6, 2017).
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Privacy Notice.”349 That privacy notice says nothing specific to Alexa.350 The general
statement about sharing information with third parties suggests that Amazon may send
whatever information it captures from your use of Alexa to third parties if you fail to
respond to an opt-out notice: “Other than as set out above, you will receive notice
when information about you might go to third parties, and you will have an
opportunity to choose not to share the information.” 351 The Google Home website
likewise offers no privacy policy for the device itself. 352
IV. WHY THE NOTICE-AND-CHOICE PARADIGM CANNOT EFFECTIVELY REGULATE
THE COLLECTION AND USE OF PII IN THE ONLINE ECOSYSTEM
Notice-and-choice, as set out in the leading formulations of fair information
practice principles and as implemented in positive law and in voluntary systems of
self-regulation, has failed as a paradigm for regulating the collection and use of private
information in the online commercial ecosystem. It has failed because it does not, and
cannot, accomplish the fundamental goal of a privacy regime, namely that of
empowering individuals to exercise control over the use of their personal information.
In this Section, I begin by explaining how we should judge whether a system for
regulating online privacy is successful. I go on to discuss reasons why notice-andchoice is for fundamental reasons incapable of achieving this goal.
First, the notice-and-choice paradigm is internally inconsistent because it requires
data subjects, who it assumes are rational economic beings, to behave irrationally.
Second, the notice element of notice-and-choice, as it appears in both statements and
implementations of FIPPs, fails to meet accepted standards for adequacy that apply in
the related contexts of contracting and consumer protection and cannot feasibly be
reformed to meet those standards. Third, notice-and-choice amounts to blanket
consent due to the non-transactional nature of privacy interactions. Blanket consent is
not appropriately applied to privacy connected with Internet-enabled data flows
because consumers cannot anticipate the uses that will be made of their private data.
Fourth, notice-and-choice cannot work when PII is transferred to a third party for uses
that are not disclosed and could not be disclosed because not known to the transferor.
A data collector cannot provide notice of, or seek consent for, third-party uses of the
data that the collector itself is unable to anticipate. Fifth, notice-and-choice cannot
work with some types of IoT devices because third parties are not in a position to
consent to the collection of data about them.
A. Criteria for Evaluating a Regime that Regulates Online Privacy
Determining whether notice-and-choice is an appropriate framework for
protecting privacy in the context of websites, mobile apps, and the IoT first requires
that we have a criterion for success. I posit that a privacy framework can be deemed
successful only if, in practice, it allows consumers a meaningful opportunity to decide
whether to share their personal information. Stated negatively, a framework is a
349

Id.

350

See Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=468496 (last updated Sept. 30, 2016).
351

Id.

352

See Google Home, GOOGLE STORE, https://store.google.com/product/google_home (last
visited Jan. 27, 2018).
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failure if it presents consumers with merely formal choices that are not choices in
reality. I will not devote much effort to justifying this position, as it simply restates
the essence of what we mean when we speak of information privacy, inherent in the
accepted understanding of the term.353
It is one thing to be offered a choice. It is another to have a meaningful opportunity
to exercise a choice that one is offered. Whether a meaningful choice is available in a
given situation is harder to determine than might initially appear. Systems of noticeand-choice generally do not grapple with this problem, assuming instead that choice
is a bivalent property of a situation—one is either presented with a choice or not. A
simple example illustrates the difficulty. If a person points a gun at you and says,
“Your money or your life,” you may in one sense be said to have exercised choice
when you select the former, but the maker of the offer could not successfully defend
her right to keep the money on the ground that, after all, you chose to tender it as the
best of the available options. If we apply a more realistic concept of “choice,” one that
recognizes that the availability of choice is a matter of degree, it becomes clear that in
most situations involving Internet-enabled data flows, the consumer is not presented
with anything that could rightly be considered a choice.
In such contexts, a choice about the disposition of one’s private information may
be merely formal, and therefore not actual, for several reasons. First, a choice is not
actually available if the chooser is not aware of it. Each of the statements of the FIPPs
discussed above calls for the data collector to provide notice of its practices concerning
collection and use of personal information. Yet, none of them states the basic principle
that notice should be so designed as to reach the attention of a reasonable data subject.
A few of these statements evince some awareness of the issue in recognizing that
complex or unneeded notices may be counterproductive, 354 but fail to call for
conspicuous placement of the notice.
Implementations of the notice principle in positive law and voluntary practices fare
little better on this score. The Privacy Act allows notice of routine uses to be supplied
separately from the form used to solicit the data355 and does not specify how notice of
353 Consider some of the leading definitions of the term “information privacy”: (1) “Privacy
is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” WESTIN, supra note 19, at
7; (2) One of the “core principles” of privacy is “to ensure to the greatest possible extent
individual awareness, participation and control” over personal data. OECD, PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK, supra note 178, at 41 (quotation is from the Explanatory Memorandum that
accompanies the Guidelines); (3) Several “noteworthy” formulations of the concept of privacy
include “that the data subject should decide the nature and extent” of disclosure of data
concerning him. HEW REPORT, supra note 22, at 39–40.
354

See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 167, at 16–17 (no need for “prominent notice” of data
practices that will be obvious to the data subject); FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra
note 7, at 64 (“Privacy notices should be clearer, shorter, and more standardized to enable better
comprehension and comparison of privacy practices.”).
355

See supra text accompanying note 239. Allowing the notice to be separated from the
collecting instrument can severely interfere with the conveyance of actual notice. For example,
the Privacy Act notice for the familiar IRS Form 1040, the U.S Individual Income Tax Return,
appears not on the form itself but on page 100 of the 107-page instruction booklet that may be
consulted when filling out the form. Form 1040 itself vaguely references this notice with a line
at the bottom of its first page: “For Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act
Notice, see separate instructions.” IRS, FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN
(2017). Anecdotal evidence suggests that few users of the form spot the reference or the Privacy
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disclosure is to be conveyed.356 The EU Data Protection Directive does not specify
how entities should convey notice.357 The EU GDPR states some requirements for the
notice that sound good—notice must be “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily
accessible”358—but that would seem to be satisfied by a notice that is clearly written
and available via a single click but unlikely to come to the data subject’s attention.
The FCC’s ISP rules allow notice to be banished to a location that is accessible
only if the customer clicks on a link on the ISP’s website.359 CalOPPA requires privacy
notices to be posted “conspicuously,” but defines this term to include an inconspicuous
placement accessed by clicking on a “Privacy” hyperlink on the website’s home page
(or, in the case of a mobile app, from somewhere within the app).360 The DAA
mechanism that allows a consumer to opt out from collection and use of her personal
information for online behavioral advertising is visible only if one clicks on another
such link.361
GLB notices are probably the best of the bunch. They usually follow a
standardized, consumer-friendly format and are delivered to consumers on a piece of
paper included with a bill or other mailing once a year.362 Nevertheless, some evidence
suggests that consumers rarely read the notices. 363 This probably corresponds to the
experience of most readers of this Article, despite their being unusually skilled in
comprehending legal texts.
The absence of notice that is likely to come to the attention of the data subject
vitiates the possibility of real choice. An individual’s decision to participate in a
transaction that results in the collection of her PII cannot with any semblance of reality
be construed as an exercise of her consent to that collection of information if she did
not receive notice that her participation in the transaction would result in the
information collection. The failure of the FIPPs and implementations of them to

Act notice on page 100 of the booklet. This renders effectively unavailable to users of Form
1040 a piece of information that the Act requires be conveyed: you, the filer, “do not have to
provide your daytime phone number” in the box that requests it. IRS, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS
(2017).
356

See supra text accompanying note 242.

357 Article 10 of the Directive simply states that the controller “must provide a data subject”
with specified information. Data Protection Directive, supra note 151, art. 10.
358

GDPR, supra note 151, art. 12(1).

359

See supra text accompanying note 300.

360

See supra text accompanying notes 284, 290.

361

See supra text accompanying note 316.

362

See supra text accompanying note 274.

363 See Eric Poggemiller, Note, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in GrammLeach-Bliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 632 (2002) (reporting
assessments that “many people had not ‘looked twice’ at their privacy notices and were not even
sure what they were” and “consumers are ‘sick of them . . . . They think it’s junk mail and it
goes straight to the circular file.’”); Amendment to the Annual Privacy Notice Requirement
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Regulation P), 79 Fed. Reg. 64057, 64059 (Oct. 28, 2014)
(noting financial industry commenters’ statement that “most customers ignore annual privacy
notices”).
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require conveyance of actual notice means that individuals are not exercising choice
over the disposition of their personal information.
Second, gun-to-the-head choice is not actual choice. Several of the FIPPs
formulations discussed above, and two of the implementations of notice-and-choice
in positive law, recognize that the chooser in the gun-to-the-head scenario mentioned
above is not exercising real choice and identify scenarios involving Internet-enabled
data flows that present an analogous, if lesser, degree of coercion.
x

x

Although the point did not make its way into the report itself, the
discussions of the committee that produced the 1973 HEW Report did
raise it. One speaker at a committee meeting focused on inequalities in
bargaining power.364 A person who applies for a job, for which he has
a great need, is in no position to exercise a choice about whether to
hand over whatever personal information the prospective employer
demands: “The individual is anxious to get the job and the employer
says, well now . . . I have to know about this, this, this, and that. The
individual is really in an imperfect bargaining situation. He is in no
position to counter the claims of his prospective employer.”365 Similar
points were made repeatedly during the committee’s discussion.366
In its 1977 report, the Privacy Protection Study Commission (“PPSC”)
similarly noted: “When an individual must choose between signing an
authorization form and foregoing employment or insurance or public
assistance, one cannot realistically speak of his signing voluntarily.”367

364

Transcript of Proceedings, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems 43 (May 19, 1972) (Kenneth A. McLean, Professional Staff Member, Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate). Transcripts of meetings of the Advisory
Committee are available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/research/privacy-atbclt/archive-of-the-meetings-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-automated-personaldata-systems-sacapds/.
365

Id.

366

See id. at 194–95 (a person applying for a benefit from the government experiences
“coercion” to supply the required personal information) (Frances Grommers, Visiting Lecturer,
Harvard School of Public Health); Transcript of Proceedings, Secretary’s Advisory Committee
on Automated Personal Data Systems 52–53 (June 15, 1972) (a person applying for Social
Security benefits is not in a position to perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide whether to
surrender the required personal information) (Joseph Weizenbaum, Professor of Computer
Science, MIT); id. at 138 (“There is virtually no information that the university obtains that
can’t be forced out of the students somehow as a condition of registering for the
institution . . . .”) (Michael A. Lithen, Legal Counsel, University of Wisconsin); Transcript of
Proceedings, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems 25 (July
24, 1972) (“If you condition receiving of black lung benefits on the release of this information,
then for all intents and purposes the individual doesn’t really have a choice about exchange of
data.”) (J. Taylor DeWeese).
367

PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, supra note 175, at 291; see also id. at 14 (“[I]n a
society in which time is often at a premium, in which organizations performing similar functions
tend to ask similar questions, and in which organizational record-keeping practices and the
differences among them are poorly perceived or understood, the individual often has little real
opportunity to pick and choose.”).
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The 1995 NTIA white paper discusses an example of merely formal
choice in the context of telecommunications metadata. It explains that
when a data collector collects PII (such as a subscriber’s telephone
number) to provide a particular service (to connect the call) and seeks
consent to use that PII for purposes other than providing the service,
the data collector may be tempted to condition delivery of the service
on the data subject’s consent to the ancillary use. An example is a
privacy policy that states: “You must consent to our sharing your
personal information with our business partners for marketing
purposes, or we will not connect your calls.” The white paper observes
that this proposition deprives consumers of “a meaningful opportunity
to accept or reject the terms offered.” This is especially the case “in
those service markets dominated by a single supplier.”368
The FTC’s rule implementing the 1998 COPPA says that the operator
of a website “is prohibited from conditioning a child’s participation in
a game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on the child’s
disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to
participate in such activity.”369 In other words, it prohibits conditioning
the provision of a service upon the disclosure of private information
that is not needed to complete the requested transaction.
In its 2012 report, the FTC identifies the characteristics of a situation
that offers merely formal choice—what it calls “take it or leave it”
choice.370 It references “the purchase of an important product that has
few substitutes, such as a patented medical device.”371 If the seller
“offered a limited warranty for the device only in exchange for the
consumer’s agreeing to disclose his or her income, religion, and other
highly-personal information,” this would be a violation of fair
information principles because “the consumer would not have been
offered a meaningful choice.”372 As another example, the FTC points
to broadband Internet access service: where there are few alternative
suppliers, “the service provider should not condition the provision of
broadband on the customer’s agreeing to, for example, allow the
service provider to track all of the customer’s online activity for
marketing purposes.”373 On the other hand, in the case of “less

368

NTIA, PRIVACY, supra note 184, at 23.

369

16 C.F.R. § 312.7 (2018).

370

FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 51. I find this terminology
misleading. In almost all mass-market transactions, the terms are “take-it-or-leave-it” in the
sense that there is no bargaining: if a prospective purchaser does not like one of the terms of the
product as offered (price, warranty, return policy, etc.), her only options are to accept the terms
or walk away from the offer. It is not surprising, or troubling, that no bargaining is permitted
over the privacy term. What is troubling, as I discuss in text, is when a (non-negotiable) privacy
term requires the purchaser to “consent” to collection or use of her private information for
purposes extraneous to provision of the purchased good or service.
371

Id. at 52.

372

Id.

373

Id.
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important products and services in markets with sufficient
alternatives,” the FTC considers it acceptable for the vendor to require
the consumer’s consent to use of her private information for purposes
extraneous to the transaction as long as it provides appropriate notice,
such as “we provide you with free content in exchange for collecting
information about the websites you visit and using it to market
products to you.”374
The FCC’s 2016 privacy rules prohibit broadband Internet access
service providers “from conditioning the provision of broadband
service on a customer surrendering his or her privacy rights” and “from
terminating service or otherwise refusing to provide [Internet access]
due to a customer’s refusal to waive any such privacy rights. By
design, such ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ practices offer no choice to
consumers.”375 The FCC has elsewhere recognized that consumers
have few options in selecting a broadband Internet access service; as
of 2013, forty-five percent of households had only a single option.376
Finally, the EU’s 2016 GDPR expresses disapproval of, without
actually prohibiting, the practice of requiring consent to a use of data
that is unrelated to the transaction in which the data is collected. The
applicable language is: “When assessing whether consent is freely
given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the
performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is
conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not
necessary for the performance of that contract.” 377

The upshot of these distinctions between real or meaningful choice and merely
formal choice may be formulated as: If a consumer is offered a good or service, but
only on condition that he give up private information that is not required for provision
of that good or service, and there are no close substitutes available to the consumer
that do not require the relinquishment of private information, then the purported
choice is in reality no choice at all. In my view, this states a reasonable criterion for
determining whether a particular situation presents a consumer with a meaningful
choice that could be deemed to satisfy the choice element of the notice-and-choice
principle.
B. Why Notice-and-Choice Cannot Satisfy These Criteria
For the following reasons, the notice-and-choice paradigm does not, and cannot,
meet these minimum requirements for an acceptable regulation of privacy in the
context of Internet-enabled data flows.

374

Id.

375

FCC, ISP Privacy Rules, supra note 294, ¶ 295.

376

Rothchild, supra note 293, at 438.

377

GDPR, supra note 151, art. 7(4).
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1. The Notice-and-Choice Paradigm Presumes that Consumers Are Rational but
Requires Them to Behave Irrationally
The premise of notice-and-choice is simple and familiar. Individuals value their
privacy, and therefore they have an interest in controlling the disposition of their
personal information, an interest that society recognizes as worthy of protection. The
notice-and-choice paradigm assumes that individuals act rationally to promote their
interests. The paradigm is premised on an application of rational choice theory,
according to which individuals can assess the costs and benefits of giving up control
over their personal information as well as make rational choices that best promote their
own interests and also “guide the marketplace to some acceptable balance between
consumer and business interests” with regard to the collection and use of personal
information.378
This is not to say that a rational individual seeks to minimize the disclosure of her
personal information, with the ultimate goal of preventing any such disclosure. To the
contrary, there are many situations in which it is rational to disclose personal
information in the expectation of receiving something more valuable in exchange. The
everyday experience of life in contemporary society makes this clear. To purchase a
good via the Internet and have it delivered to her home, a consumer must divulge her
name, address, and credit card number. To obtain access to a website, she may have
to provide an email address at which a retailer can contact her. To download an app
from the Google Play Store or the Apple App Store, she must divulge her mobile
telephone number.
a. The Information We Need to Rationally Regulate Disclosure of Our Private
Information
The individual, then, optimizes her utility by relinquishing her privacy just so far
as she expects a countervailing benefit of equal or greater value. To make this
calculation, she needs information of several types.
First, she needs to know what types of private information the company she is
considering doing business with will collect from her. She might be unperturbed if the
company gathers and retains her name, address, phone number, and credit card number
in the course of a transaction. But she might feel differently if she knows the company
is recording every click she makes on a website, keeping a close record of the
geographical location of her mobile device, or maintaining in perpetuity every word
she speaks into a voice-controlled device.
Second, she needs to know what the company intends to do with her data. A range
of possibilities exist. (1) The company might use her data for no other purpose than to
perform the transaction that she seeks, thereafter discarding it. (2) The company might
add her data to other information that it holds about her, draw inferences about her
interests, and use those inferences to target advertising at her. (3) The company might
share the information with its affiliated companies that are engaged in some other line
of business or (4) with unaffiliated companies, either directly or through advertising
networks, again for the purpose of targeted marketing. (5) The company might supply
the information to entities that will use it in ways that may constrain her options, such
as with health- or life-insurance companies, prospective employers, credit bureaus, the
lawyer for her estranged spouse, or government agencies. (6) The company might
378

CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW
(2016).
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share her private information with another entity that has poor security practices,
resulting in an intruder gaining access to the information.
Third, she must know the costs she will incur because of the particular uses that
the company or its transferees will make of her private information. Referring to the
types of sharing listed in the previous paragraph, she would certainly view type one
as imposing no costs. She might view type two as costless, but alternatively might
believe that it imposes significant costs (for example, if she ordered something
personal or embarrassing from a company and then received advertisements for
similar products that displayed on her computer monitor in a way that was visible to
co-workers or family members). She is more likely to experience costs from type three
sharing, and still more from type four. Types five and six will, by definition, impose
costs—higher insurance rates, loss of desired employment, paying more for credit, a
divorce with less satisfactory terms, being subject to additional screening at airport
security, or dealing with the aftermath of identity theft.
Fourth, on the benefit side of the equation, she must know the value to her of the
goods or services that she receives by engaging in interactions that result in disclosure
of her personal information. The benefits might involve the ability to purchase a good
or service, access to information made available via a website, use of an app to play a
game or receive turn-by-turn driving instructions, use of a search engine, the ability to
adjust her home thermostat while away from home—a list that may be extended
endlessly by anyone who makes use of digital networked communications.
b. What It Would Take to Acquire that Information
The notice-and-choice paradigm assumes that an individual will use the
information conveyed by the statement of an entity’s privacy practices (“notice”)
combined with information gained from other sources to decide rationally whether to
allow disclosure of her PII in a particular context (“choice”). The obstacles to
achieving this happy outcome are numerous and intractable.
i. Categories One and Two.
Consider the first two categories of information that are necessary for adequate
notice: what types of personal information the company will collect and what uses it
will make of the PII. Acquiring the information contained in a privacy policy is not a
cost-free endeavor. Reading a privacy policy takes time, and time is worth something
to a rational person. In economic terms, one incurs an opportunity cost 379 when he
spends time doing one thing and therefore forgoes spending the time doing something
else. That cost might be easily quantifiable if, for example, the alternative to reading
a privacy policy is to spend additional time working at a job for which one is paid an
hourly rate. More generally, the opportunity cost is difficult to quantify, as when the
alternative is to engage in some form of leisure activity that is more pleasant than
reading a privacy policy. Scholars have made attempts to quantify the cost of reading
privacy policies. According to one study, it would take the average person 244 hours
to read the privacy policies of each website she visits in a year, implying an average

379 An “opportunity cost” is “that value that is given up or sacrificed in order to secure the
higher value that selection of the chosen object embodies.” THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 719 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
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opportunity cost of $3,534 per person annually. 380 The more recent shift to mobile
devices can only increase these costs because for most people (over a certain age), the
need to read a lengthy text on the small screen of a smartphone makes the procedure
all the more time-consuming.
IoT devices present even greater difficulties. If you see a device in a store or on a
website and want to view the privacy policy before buying it, good luck. You could
try pulling up the privacy policy from the manufacturer’s website, but the chances of
finding the device’s privacy policy there are slim. 381 That means you will only see the
privacy policy once you purchase the device and set it up. Privacy policies typically
state that they may be updated from time to time and thus recommend checking back
periodically to see if something is new. So, reading the privacy policy associated with
an IoT device at the time you purchase or install it is not sufficient; to have up-to-date
notice of what the device’s manufacturer is doing with your personal information, you
need to keep checking back.
Regardless of how much time we spend poring over website privacy policies, we
likely will fail to understand them. One study found significant differences in the
interpretation of privacy policies within and between groups of expert and non-expert
study participants, concluding that the findings “cast doubt on whether website
notices, as they are typically worded today, can effectively convey privacy policies to
the general public.”382
The costs of assessing privacy practices do not end there. Before one can decide
whether to do business with a company that has a given set of privacy practices, she
must know what the alternatives are. If another supplier of the good or service offers
a more consumer-friendly privacy policy then, all else being equal, she should prefer
that supplier. The only way to learn about the alternative privacy policies is to read
them, incurring additional costs.
Despite the time and effort involved, a consumer might find reading and
understanding a particular privacy policy worthwhile if it governs a large swathe of
her PII. This might be the case if she makes frequent use of social media, such as
Facebook or Snapchat, and is concerned enough about what will happen to her private
information that she decides to learn about the site’s privacy policies (notice) and
settings (choice). Similarly, a consumer using an always-on IoT device, like the
Amazon Echo or a baby monitor, may also have enough concern about her private
information to read and understand the privacy policy.

380

See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563 (2008); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., BIG DATA AND PRIVACY xii (2014) (“The conceptual problem with
notice and consent is that it fundamentally places the burden of privacy protection on the
individual . . . . The provider offers a complex, take-it-or-leave-it set of terms, while the user,
in practice, can allocate only a few seconds to evaluating the offer.”); SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON, supra note 147, at 84 (“There are too many collectors of information for a right of optout to be effective. Without a centralized mechanism for individuals to opt-out, individuals
would have to spend much of their time guarding their privacy like a hawk.”).
381

See infra text following Table 2.

382

Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning
and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 83 (2015).
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ii. Category Three.
Once she is aware of the relevant privacy policies, the rational individual must
proceed to determine what costs she will incur if she agrees to allow access to her PII
in accordance with an information collector’s privacy policy. In the vast majority of
situations that online consumers are likely to face, this is an impossible task.
To make this calculation of costs, the rational consumer would have to be able to
answer at least the following questions.
First, who precisely will gain access to the PII? Except in the relatively rare
situations in which the information collector declares (credibly) that it will never
disclose PII to anyone else,383 privacy policies are vague about what other entities will
gain access to a user’s data. The policies may refer to “affiliates” or “third parties,”
but almost never specify the parties by name. Even if you knew who would receive
data from the information collector, you could not know to whom the recipients would
transfer it onward. Any data that leaves the confines of the collecting entity is liable
to end up in the hands of data brokers. At that point, you have no way of knowing how
your private information will be used and what impacts that use may have on you.384
Second, what conclusions about the user will the data yield up when tortured?
Modern data analytics techniques, when applied to large data sets, are capable of
drawing surprisingly accurate conclusions about individuals.
A few years ago, the Target chain of stores developed a method for identifying its
customers who were likely to be pregnant. The goal was to send these customers
special offers for baby-related products with the hope that the offers would condition
them to shop at Target for items that they would not otherwise associate with that store
once the baby arrived. To get a jump on the competition, Target wanted to identify
these future consumers of baby items before the information became public through a
birth announcement. Using its massive database of customer purchasing data, it
383

Even then, issues may arise if the company finds itself in bankruptcy proceedings and its
trove of PII becomes an asset of the estate that may be sold to the highest bidder. In several such
cases, consumer advocates have objected to the sale on the ground that it would violate the
company’s privacy policy. For example, when RadioShack was in bankruptcy proceedings, the
company proposed to sell its customer information, despite the fact that the company’s privacy
policy stated: “We will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to anyone at any
time.” An FTC official objected to the sale unless stringent conditions were attached. Letter
from Jessica Rich, Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Elise Frejka, Esq. (May 16,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/05/letter-jessica-rich-director-bureauconsumer-protection-bankruptcy-court. A group of state attorneys general likewise objected.
The sale went through anyway, with some limitations on what data was transferred: telephone
numbers were excluded, as were email addresses that had not been active within the previous
two years and multiple other categories of personal information. Laura Northrup, RadioShack
Will Not Be Selling Your Phone Number to New Owners, CONSUMERIST (May 20, 2015),
https://consumerist.com/2015/05/20/radioshack-will-not-be-selling-your-phone-number-tonew-owners/. The privacy policies of most of the most highly-trafficked commercial websites
now state that personal information may be transferred to a third party in case of sale or
bankruptcy. Natasha Singer & Jeremy B. Merrill, When a Company Is Put Up for Sale, in Many
Cases, Your Personal Data Is, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1C04MnG.
384 James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV.
1, 62 (2003) (“Since it is impossible to know where our information will end up and how it will
be used, it is difficult to assess the risks associated with giving out the information or failing to
monitor its use once we have released it.”).
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identified about twenty-five products (such as unscented hand lotion, vitamin
supplements, cotton balls, and hand sanitizers) that, when bought in combination,
tended to predict that the purchaser was pregnant. Following this method, it sent
coupons for baby clothes and cribs to one of its female customers, who happened to
be an unmarried high-school student. The girl’s father stormed into a Minneapolisarea Target store, demanded to speak with the manager, and expressed outrage. A few
days later the father, having learned that his daughter was in fact pregnant, offered his
apologies to the store manager.385
As discussed above, the set of postings that a Facebook user “Likes” is enormously
revealing,386 as is the home electricity usage that a smart meter captures.387 We simply
cannot know—cannot even imagine—what conclusions advanced data analytics will
draw from the mass of personal data that we generate through our online activity.
A third question the consumer must answer is, what impact will this revealed
information have on me? The result of all this disclosure might be no worse than
receiving coupons in the mail or advertisements in app banner ads for products in
which one has no interest. On the other hand, disclosure might lead to paying a higher
price for insurance or a denial of employment or credit.388 There is no way to estimate
the likelihood that consenting to a particular release of data may lead to such harms.
A fourth question is whether the recipients of the data will keep it safe from
intruders. Security breaches can lead to identity theft, in which the thief obtains a credit
card in the victim’s name or intercepts the victim’s income tax refund. An individual
simply cannot calculate the chances that the PII she allows a reputable business to
collect may end up in the hands of identity thieves.
iii. Category Four.
The last category of information that our would-be rational consumer needs is what
benefits she will receive from allowing access to her personal data. The nature of the
benefits will usually be known to her. She will get to purchase a product online, access
information made available via a website, download and use an app on her mobile
device, or remotely control a connected device. However, she also needs to place a
monetary value on the benefits. To do this, she needs to know not merely whether she
gains more benefit from the transaction than the monetary cost to her (which may be
zero, as when she is offered “free” access to a website or app and her payment consists
of the private information that she gives up in the process), but also how much more
benefit she will get, so she can compare that benefit with the privacy harms that she
expects to suffer.
385

Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html. For further discussion of
data analytics techniques, see Shaun B. Spencer, Predictive Analytics, Consumer Privacy, and
Ecommerce Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, supra note
219, at 492–517.
386

Youyou et al., supra note 45.

387

See supra text accompanying notes 128–31.

388

See GARFINKEL, supra note 167, at 22–23 (referencing discussions of the problem of data
inaccuracy from the 1960s). Congressional hearings into the problem led to the enactment of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1971. Id. at 23; see also SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra
note 147, at 46 (“Not only are our digital biographies reductive, but they are often inaccurate.”).
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c. It Would Be Irrational to Engage in this Much Rationality
Will a rational consumer engage in this four-stage inquiry to decide on a situationby-situation basis whether to allow access to her personal information? Analyzing the
matter from the standpoint of “rational inattention” theory strongly suggests that
attempting to do this would be irrational.
The theory of rational inattention results from an application of the common-sense
notion that “when information is costly to acquire, decision makers may sometimes
choose to act on incomplete information rather than incur the cost to become perfectly
informed”—and that the decision to forgo additional efforts to acquire better
information is a rational one.389 This notion is an implication of our “bounded
rationality”: the fact that humans face limitations in the time they have available to
gather information and in their cognitive abilities to process the information in order
to arrive at a utility-maximizing decision.390 Because of these limitations, humans must
often rely on heuristics—rules of thumb—when making decisions.391
Conversely, it would be irrational—that is, non-welfare-maximizing—for a person
to make a decision only after gathering all of the available information bearing on the
decision, regardless of the cost to acquire that information. More stringently,
rationality demands that one cease acquiring more information when the marginal cost
of obtaining the information exceeds the marginal benefit from having it. Any policy
that fails to recognize the constraints imposed by the fact of bounded rationality is a
misguided one.
Several factors determine how much information a rational person should acquire
before making a decision in a given situation.392 First, the greater the cost of acquiring
additional information in comparison with the potential gains that may accrue if the
additional information leads to a welfare-enhancing decision, the more likely that
forgoing the acquisition of that information will be rational. If it is expensive for the
consumer to acquire better information about what uses a data collector will make of
his PII, how those uses will impact him, and what he will gain by giving up the PII, in
relation to the harms that he might avoid if he makes a better-informed decision, then
forgoing the additional information is more likely to be rational. If, on the other hand,
acquiring additional information is relatively cheap, then the effort of acquiring the
information more likely will pay off.
Ordinary experience tells us that acquiring information about the privacy practices
of the companies we may choose to interact with via the Web, mobile apps, and IoT
389

James M. Sallee, Rational Inattention and Energy Efficiency, 57 J.L. & ECON. 781, 781
(2014).
390 “The term ‘bounded rationality’ is used to designate rational choice that takes into
account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker—limitations of both knowledge and
computational capacity.” THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 379, at
266.
391
Rational inattention is related to the concept of “satisficing”: “choos[ing] an alternative
that meets or exceeds specified criteria, but that is not guaranteed to be either unique or in any
sense the best.” Id. at 243. It is rational to be content with a satisfactory option, rather than
expending additional effort to find the best option, if the cost of obtaining the additional
information needed to optimize exceeds the expected gains therefrom.
392

The following discussion of these factors is adapted, with some significant modifications,
from Sallee, supra note 389, at 782–83.
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devices is expensive. Privacy policies are difficult to read and, for persons of ordinary
sensibilities, provide little or no amusement value. The study referenced above
indicates that the time one would need to spend reading the privacy policies that one
encounters in typical interactions with the Internet is large in comparison with other
major uses of time.393 The 244-hours-a-year estimate that appears in that study
amounts to the number of hours in six forty-hour work weeks, or about twelve percent
of a work year. But that time spent is only the start. The amount of time and effort that
would be required to determine what entities will receive your private information,
what uses they will make of that information through combining it with other data and
applying data analytics, and the expected value of the resulting harms to you is beyond
calculation. Solid information on these matters just is not available.
The second factor to consider is the extent to which the additional information will
reduce uncertainty. If the additional information available at a reasonable cost would
not do much to alleviate the uncertainty relative to the decision that must be made,
gathering the additional information is less likely to pay off. The potential benefit from
additional information comes from an enhanced ability to calculate the costs or
benefits associated with a particular option. If the new information does not reduce
the uncertainty much, the benefits of acquiring it will be correspondingly less.
Gathering additional information can reduce some elements of uncertainty relevant
to deciding whether to expose one’s personal information. In particular, reading
privacy policies can reduce uncertainty about what uses the information collector will
make of PII and what sorts of third parties might come into possession of it. But
reading privacy policies does little to reduce the amount of uncertainty about the
impact uses of PII by the information collector and any transferees will have on the
data subject. Reducing uncertainty requires predicting future conduct by a large
number of third parties whose identities can only be guessed at. A data analytics
company might take the PII the consumer released; combine it with private
information about him already in the hands of other information collectors and with
publically available information; perform state-of-the-art analytics on the entire
corpus of data; derive certain inferences that cast him in a negative light; and provide
those inferences to a prospective employer. 394 That employer may decide on the basis
of those inferences not to offer him a position, with the result that he is relegated to
less desirable employment.395 A data broker might sell his information to a scam artist
who will try to separate him from some of his cash396 or might handle his information
carelessly, leading to unauthorized access and identity theft or other harms.397 Because
393

See supra text accompanying note 380.

394

See PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, THE SCORING OF AMERICA 73–74 (2014),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_
April2014_fs.pdf.
395 Id. at 73–75 (describing a situation in which a marketing executive was denied a job
because his Klout score, created by applying a secret algorithm to his social media postings,
was too low).
396 Charles Duhigg, Firms Sell Elderly Americans’ Data to Telemarketing Con Artists, N.Y.
(May
21,
2007),
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/21/world/americas/21ihtTIMES
data.1.5803543.html (describing telemarketing scam aimed at elderly people whom data broker
identified as “gullible”).
397 Numerous lawsuits have been predicated on identity theft resulting from unauthorized
access to data collected through online interactions. See, e.g., Order Granting Preliminary
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the inferences that data brokers derive from the information may be erroneous, the
harms that the inferences create may be unjustified.398
On the other hand, the release of an individual’s PII might have no negative effects
on him at all, or might even have a positive effect, such as bringing him to the attention
of another prospective employer who otherwise would not have recruited him or
causing him to receive a well-targeted advertisement that leads to a desirable product
or discount.
Because of this wide spectrum of potential impacts, ranging from the very harmful
to the mildly beneficial, gathering additional information at the time when a consumer
is deciding whether to enter a transaction that involves exposure of some private
information can do little to sharpen his estimate of the expected impact of that
exposure on his welfare.
A third factor that the rational consumer must consider is the set of alternatives at
her disposal. A dearth of alternatives that one might select based on additional
information makes it less likely that gathering additional information will pay off. The
whole point of gathering the information is to be able to exercise a more informed
choice. If few alternatives are available, the extra information will not help much.
The question is whether, if we do not like a particular vendor’s privacy practices,
we can choose to obtain a reasonably close substitute from another source that offers
a more favorable privacy policy. A review of privacy policies applying to websites,
mobile apps, and IoT devices suggests that this condition is not met.
Table 1. Disclosure of Privacy Practices in Website Privacy Notices.399
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398 See Adam Tanner, Data Brokers Don’t Know You from a Naked Man Stumbling on the
Beach, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/08/06/databrokers-dont-know-you-from-a-naked-man-stumbling-on-the-beach/ (discussing errors in
information held by data brokers).
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Further information supporting the conclusions drawn in this Table is on file with the
author.
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See Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, supra note 350.
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See Walmart Privacy Policy, WALMART, https://corporate.walmart.com/privacysecurity/walmart-privacy-policy (last updated Nov. 2017).
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See Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last
updated Dec. 18, 2017).
403

See id.
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See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last updated Sept.
29, 2016); About Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/ads/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2018).
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See Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER (June 18, 2017), https://twitter.com/en/privacy;
Twitter’s Use of Cookies and Similar Technologies, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/twitter-cookies (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
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See Privacy Policy, EBAY (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.ebayinc.com/privacy-policy/.

407 See Privacy Policy, YAHOO!, https://policies.yahoo.com/in/en/yahoo/privacy/index.htm
(last updated June 13, 2017).
408

See
Reddit,
Inc.
Privacy
Policy,
REDDIT
(Dec.
12,
2017),
https://www.reddit.com/help/privacypolicy/; Reddit Privacy Policy, REDDIT (Apr. 10, 2015),
https://www.reddit.com/help/privacypolicy/?v=a9aa089a-dfb1-11e4-b70a-22000bc14708.
409 See Privacy Policy, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/tos/privacy_en_us_20160131 (last
updated Jan. 31, 2016).
410 See
Legal at BuzzFeed: Privacy
https://www.buzzfeed.com/about/privacy.

Policy,

BUZZFEED

(Feb.

16,

2017),

411 See Adobe Privacy Policy, ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/privacy/policy.html (last
updated May 29, 2017).
412 See Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, https://privacy.microsoft.com/enus/privacystatement (last updated Feb. 2018).
413

See Privacy Policy: Your Privacy
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy.
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Live.com414
Pinterest.com415
Netflix.com416
Wikia.com417
Craigslist.com418
Tumblr.com419
NYTimes.com420
UrbanDictionary.com421
ESPN.com422
TripAdvisor.com423
Apple.com424
Totals
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Table 1 summarizes the principal notice-and-choice elements of the privacy
policies posted on the twenty-five most-visited commercial websites.425 An “X”
414

See Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, supra note 412.

415

See Privacy Policy, PINTEREST (Nov. 1, 2016), https://policy.pinterest.com/en/privacypolicy.
416 See Privacy Statement, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy (last updated
Nov. 30, 2016).
417

See Privacy Policy, WIKIA, http://www.wikia.com/Privacy_Policy (last updated July

2017).
418

See Craigslist Privacy Policy, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/privacy.
policy (last updated July 9, 2015).
419 See Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/privacy (last updated
June 13, 2017).
420 See
Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/
115014892108-Privacy-policy (last updated Oct. 27, 2017).
421

See Privacy Policy, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://about.urbandictionary.com/privacy (last
updated Nov. 2008).
422 See Privacy Policy, WALT DISNEY CO., https://privacy.thewaltdisneycompany.com/en/
(last updated Oct. 16, 2017).
423
See Media Center: Privacy Policy, TRIPADVISOR, https://tripadvisor.mediaroom.com/usprivacy-policy (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
424

See Privacy Policy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/ (last updated
Jan. 19, 2018).
425 The selection of the twenty-five websites was based on a listing posted by Quantcast, in
August 2017, slightly modified to exclude sites that are not commercial (Wikipedia.org) or that
provide
only
a
platform
(Wordpress.com).
Top
Websites,
QUANTCAST,
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indicates that the indicated provision was present in the privacy policy. The policies
display remarkable uniformity:
x

x
x
x
x
x

All twenty-five of the websites use cookies and web bugs to collect
information from site visitors and store that information in a manner
that links it to the computer the visitor used and, generally, to the
individual who uses the computer.
Twenty-three of the twenty-five websites collect a unique identifier
attached to the user’s computing device, making it impossible to
maintain anonymity by refusing or deleting cookies.
Twenty-four of the twenty-five websites allow advertising networks to
collect the user’s information.
All twenty-five of the websites collect the user’s location.
Twenty-three of the twenty-five websites share user data with third
parties, generally to permit targeted advertising.
Twenty-four of the twenty-five websites use the individual’s data to
send her targeted ads for the site’s own products.

Some survey evidence reflects this uniformity. A consumer survey conducted in
2015 indicated that many consumers have felt compelled to deal with an online
supplier, even though they lacked confidence in the supplier’s privacy practices, due
to lack of any alternatives.426

https://www.quantcast.com/top-sites/US (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). Privacy policies are not
always written very clearly, so in some cases I had to guess at the meaning or make simplifying
assumptions.
The methodology of the survey is vulnerable to the criticism that what is really needed is a
comparison among the privacy policies of suppliers of goods that are substitutes for each other,
rather than those of the most popular websites, which generally occupy different market
segments. That sort of survey is not practical within this scope of this Article. For present
purposes, I think it is a reasonable assumption that other sellers within a market sector will tend
to emulate the market leaders with respect to privacy practices.
426 TRUSTe, Study Finds More Americans Concerned About Privacy Than Losing Their
Income, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/studyfinds-more-americans-concerned-about-data-privacy-than-losing-their-income300211216.html (“Interestingly 19 percent said they continued to use a website they didn’t trust
to handle their personal information responsibly, with 31 percent of those who reported doing
this saying it was because it was the only website that sold a particular product or service.”).
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Table 2. Disclosure of Privacy Practices in Mobile App Privacy Notices. 427

Messenger428
Facebook429
Instagram430
Snapchat431
Netflix432
Spotify433
WhatsApp434
Uber435
YouTube436
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Maps437
Totals
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Ads
X
X
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X
X
X
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to Send
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X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

9
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Table 2 summarizes the findings of a review of the top ten mobile apps.438 An “X”
indicates that the indicated provision was present in the privacy policy. One can find
the privacy policies for these apps by going to the app’s page in the Google Play Store
or Apple App Store and tapping on “Privacy Policy.” For all of these apps, tapping on
427 Further information supporting the conclusions drawn in this Table is on file with the
author.
428

See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, supra note 404.

429

See id.

430 See Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/155833707900388 (last
updated Jan. 19, 2013).
431

See Privacy Policy, SNAP INC., https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/privacy-policy/
(last updated Apr. 19, 2018).
432

See Privacy Statement, NETFLIX, supra note 416.

433

See Privacy Policy, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/privacy-policy/ (last
updated Sept. 9, 2015).
434 See WhatsApp Privacy Policy, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/#privacypolicy/ (last updated Aug. 25, 2016).
435

See Privacy Policy, UBER, https://privacy.uber.com/policy (last updated Sept. 21, 2017).

436

See Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, supra note 402.

437

See id.

438 This list is derived from a ranking of apps for the first quarter of 2017. Oliver Yeh, Top
Apps of Q1 2017: Netflix Dominated Worldwide Revenue, Which Grew 63% YoY, SENSOR
TOWER (Apr. 17, 2017), https://sensortower.com/blog/top-apps-q1-2017.
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this link brings up the privacy policy of the associated website—none of them offers
a privacy policy that is specific to the app. As a result, the privacy policies for the apps
are about as uniform as those for websites discussed above:
x
x
x
x
x
x

All ten of the apps use cookies, and nine use web bugs to collect usage
information.
All ten of the apps collect a unique identifier attached to the user’s
mobile device.
All ten of the apps allow advertising networks to collect the user’s
information.
All ten of the apps collect the user’s location.
Nine out of ten apps share the user’s data with third parties for targeted
advertising.
All ten of the apps use collected data to send users targeted
advertisements for the app developer’s own products.

It is difficult to collect information about the privacy policies of IoT devices. Based
on my own sampling, most manufacturers of the devices do not make the device’s
privacy policy available on a website. Of the twenty-four IoT devices mentioned
above, only ten have a privacy policy available on the manufacturer’s website, and
several of these are only minimally informative. My sampling of IoT devices offered
on the shelves of my local Best Buy store did not turn up any devices that include the
privacy policy on the outside of the device’s box or on any nearby display. A practice
of disclosing the privacy policy of IoT devices pre-purchase may yet develop.
Regardless, whether the manufacturers will converge on a common set of privacy
terms remains to be seen.
The uniformity among privacy policies applying to websites, mobile apps, and
(perhaps) IoT devices calls to mind the uniformity among the sets of contract terms
posted by ecommerce websites.439 The mechanism in the two realms is similar and not
difficult to divine. Because, as discussed above, rational consumers do not read and
comprehend privacy policies any more than they do online contract terms, no business
has any incentive to implement (contract or privacy) terms that are more pro-consumer
if doing so entails any costs. And such terms generally do entail costs. For instance,
an online business that omits a mandatory arbitration clause from its Terms and
Conditions would incur greater litigation costs but would not get much more revenue
in return. That same business, should it pledge in its privacy policy not to use its
customers’ private information for targeted advertising, would lose a source of
revenue but would not gain much offsetting revenue from grateful customers.
The absence of any significant competition with respect to privacy policies shows
that the long-running debate between opt-in and opt-out choice mechanisms is a red
herring. Privacy advocates generally take the position that only opt-in choice reflects

439

See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 41–42 (2013). Radin supposes, reasonably enough, that the terms appearing in
contractual boilerplate resemble each other because the firms copy each other’s terms. Id. at 41.
In earlier times, similarity in contract terms proposed by competing sellers may have resulted
from the use of standardized paper contract forms. See O’Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith
Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ill. 1958) (Bristow, J., dissenting) (referencing clauses that
“were included in all form leases used by practically all landlords in urban areas”).
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a true exercise of the data subject’s choice, 440 on the ground that the failure to opt out
is an equivocal action. Failure to opt out may reflect the data subject’s decision to
allow the data collection in question; or it may simply mean that the data subject was
not aware of the opportunity to opt out because the notice did not reach her or she
chose not to invest the effort required to determine whether to allow the information
collection. Accordingly, many privacy advocates consider that choice exercised
through an opt-out mechanism is choice in name only—merely formal choice.
Entities that have an interest in collecting PII, on the other hand, generally favor
opt-out.441 They argue that most data subjects are indifferent about whether their PII
is collected and how it is used. Because of that indifference, few people will make the
effort to opt into a data collection. Therefore, the argument goes, inferring approval
from non-action more accurately reflects consumer preferences than inferring nonapproval.
But if no real choice exists, the difference between opt-in and opt-out evaporates.
Regardless of the choice mechanism, a consumer’s options are either to accept the
industry-standard privacy-invasive practices or stay off the Internet. To repurpose a
classic anecdote about a Hobson’s Choice, if all Model T automobiles are painted
black, the consumer’s choice of color is no more meaningful if exercised through an
opt-in mechanism (being required to check a box next to the color she wants, with the
only option being  Black) than an opt-out mechanism (if you don’t want black, leave
this dealership and don’t come back).442
Fourth, if the amount of utility that an individual can expect to gain by choosing a
vendor with a more favorable privacy policy is small compared to the possible loss
she would incur by obtaining the good or service from a different vendor with a more
favorable privacy policy, then investing in additional information is less likely to pay
off. The loss in this context could consist of purchasing the same good from a different
vendor at a higher price or making do with a vendor whose non-privacy-related
features are less desirable. The underlying idea is that the provider’s privacy policy is
a feature of the product that, like any of its physical attributes, will affect the
consumer’s evaluation of the product. In this respect, the seller’s privacy policy is
analogous to the warranty that the seller includes with the product; all else being equal,
a consumer will prefer a product with a longer or stronger warranty, and likewise will
440

See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center 15 (May 27, 2016),
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
WC Docket No. 16-106 (“[O]pt-out regimes make it difficult for consumers to exercise their
preference not to disclose personal information to others.”); Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy
& the First Amendment: An Opt-In Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 24–26
(2014); Letter from Advocacy Organizations to Senate Commerce Committee (Aug. 9, 2000),
https://epic.org/privacy/internet/NAI_group_letter.html (criticizing opt-out as “burdensome”).
441 The Digital Advertising Alliance principles provide only for opt-out control. See supra
text accompanying notes 316–17. However, they may support opt-in for sensitive information.
See Comment of American Association of Advertising Agencies et al. 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2016),
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
WC Docket No. 16-106 (supporting opt-in consent rule for sensitive information, opt-out for
“[a]ll other uses of web browsing history and application use history information”).
442 On Henry Ford’s own account, one day in 1909 he announced to his employees that in
the future the Ford Motor Company would produce only one model of car, the Model T, and
that “[a]ny customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black.”
HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922).
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prefer a product whose acquisition or use entails a lesser exposure of one’s personal
information.
Across a variety of categories of goods and services that consumers may obtain
using Internet-enabled data flows, there are major variations in the feature-sets of
products that different vendors offer. Some search engines work better than others.
Sources of news span a wide range of ideological orientations; if you want to get your
news from Fox News but do not like its privacy policy, MSNBC is not a good
substitute even if it has a better privacy policy.443 If you are looking for a free game to
play on your smartphone, Super Mario Run will not be a close substitute for Wheel of
Fortune. Some connected home security cameras have a well-designed interface;
others not so much. So, the decision to acquire a substitute product from a different
vendor as a means of reaping the benefits of a more favorable privacy policy may have
a high cost in terms of accepting less-desirable product features.
The expected gain from the more-favorable privacy policy, on the other hand, is
likely to be small. This follows from the great uncertainty inherent in determining
what impact dealing with a vendor with a particular privacy policy will have. As
discussed above, privacy policies are generally vague enough, data analytics are so
capable and inscrutable, and the privacy ecosystem is so complex that, in most cases,
it is impossible to know whether switching vendors to get a more-favorable privacy
policy will yield any tangible benefits whatsoever, let alone to come up with a
reasonably accurate estimate of its magnitude.
Fifth, if people do not in fact seek out additional information about the costs and
benefits of giving up their PII before deciding whether to disclose it, this is an
indication that it is rational to do so. If one assumes that people generally behave
rationally—and, as noted above, this is the premise of the notice-and-choice
paradigm444—then what most of them do is some evidence of what constitutes rational
behavior under the circumstances.
Personal experience, confirmed by survey evidence,445 establishes that few people
read privacy policies or change their behavior based on the content of those policies.
This is some evidence that, for a rational individual, the cost of learning about the
privacy practices of vendors that he is considering engaging with exceeds the expected
gain. The evidence is not conclusive—it could be that consumers invest an
inefficiently low amount of effort in reading privacy policies due to some
misapprehension of the attendant benefits or costs. But I know of no evidence
supporting that alternative interpretation.
The conclusion to which the above discussion leads is that a rational individual,
deciding ex ante how much effort to put toward availing himself of the opportunity to
promote his interests by making use of the tools that the notice-and-choice paradigm
offers, would conclude that very little of such effort would be cost effective. In terms
of the rubric introduced above, an individual who chooses not to read privacy policies
may well be rationally inattentive. This conclusion does not imply that a rational
443

See Pamela Engel, Here’s How Liberal or Conservative Major News Sources Really Are,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-your-preferred-newsoutlet-says-about-your-political-ideology-2014-10.
444

See supra text accompanying note 378.

445 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1884, 1884 n.14 (2013) (citing sources supporting the claim
that “[m]ost people do not read privacy notices on a regular basis”).
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individual must entirely ignore the privacy policies of companies with which she is
considering engaging. The idea underlying rational inattention is that investing in
acquiring information relevant to a decision may be welfare-enhancing up to a certain
point, but beyond that point the costs of expending additional effort to acquire more
information exceed the expected benefits. So it is worth considering under what
circumstances paying attention to privacy notices and choosing with whom to deal
based on those notices will be cost-justified. Based on the factors discussed above, to
get the most bang for his privacy-policy-reading buck, an individual should focus on
gathering information where (1) she can obtain the information at relatively low cost,
(2) the additional information will do a lot to reduce uncertainty about the impact of
revealing her PII, (3) alternative providers offer more favorable privacy policies, and
(4) the good or service is a commodity product whose features vary from one supplier
to another only in the supplier’s privacy practices and perhaps the price.
Thus, a rational individual might conclude that reading privacy policies is
worthwhile if the relevant policies are brief and clearly written; the individual has
reason to believe that there are multiple suppliers of the product, some but not all of
which state that the supplier will not share the information with any third party; the
supplier under consideration offers privacy choices, allowing the individual to opt-out
of certain uses of his PII; the supplier is not itself in the business of combining the
information the individual provides with other private information it obtains from
other sources and from which it draws inferences (i.e., not Google, Facebook,
Amazon, or other companies that function more like a platform than a vendor); and
the product is a commodity good rather than a complex service.
2. Notice-and-Choice Cannot Work in the Context of Internet-Enabled Data Flows
Because the Uniformity of Privacy Practices Leaves Little or No Room for the
Exercise of Choice
As discussed above,446 an analysis of the privacy policies of the most-visited
commercial websites, most-downloaded mobile apps, and a sampling of IoT devices
reveals that there is very little variation among them. Nearly all of them use both direct
and surreptitious means to collect PII from users, and nearly all release that PII into
the information ecosystem to be used by profit-maximizing entities, governments,
criminals, and others for purposes that most of us cannot fathom. 447
There is no reason to expect this situation to change. The obstacles to the
emergence of a market structure in which providers of goods and services via Internetenabled data flows compete for customers by battling to offer the most privacyprotective terms have proven insuperable at every phase of the development of the
online information ecosystem over the past twenty years.
In the absence of viable choices among privacy terms, notice-and-choice offers
only an illusion of control, not the real thing.
3. Notice of Privacy Policies Cannot Attain General Standards of Conspicuousness
As discussed above,448 the various statements of the FIPPs, and their
implementations in positive law and self-regulatory schemes, do not specify that the
446

See supra text accompanying notes 400–38.

447

See supra Tables 1 & 2.

448

See supra text accompanying notes 354–63.
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notice must be so designed that it is likely to come to the attention of the data subject
to whom it is addressed. Privacy notices accompanying websites, mobile apps, and
IoT devices typically will not come to the attention of a data subject who does not
actively seek them out.
This indifference to whether the message reaches the addressee is starkly at odds
with basic consumer protection law. The FTC’s position on how online advertising
disclosures should be conveyed states a functional criterion for “clear and
conspicuous” disclosures: the adequacy of a disclosure “is measured by its
performance—that is, how consumers actually perceive and understand the disclosure
within the context of the entire ad. . . . Simply making the disclosure available
somewhere in the ad, where some consumers might find it, does not meet the clear
and conspicuous standard.”449
Privacy notices are almost never presented to the data subject front-and-center. On
websites, the typical convention is to place a link on the bottom of the home page
labeled “Privacy Policy” (or something less informative, like “Terms of Use” or
“Legal”). Privacy policies accompanying mobile apps from the two major app
platforms are accessed from a link near the bottom of the app’s page. 450 IoT device
privacy notices are less uniformly placed, harder to find, and mostly not available at
all before purchase and installation of the device.451 This is precisely what the FTC
says advertisers may not do if they want to avoid being charged with false advertising:
place an important disclosure in a location “where some consumers might find it” but
very few actually will.452
Not only does this presentation of privacy policies fail to comport with consumer
protection law, it also fails to meet the level of conspicuousness necessary to support
a contract. In the terminology that has become standard in connection with online
contracting, the typical presentation of privacy policies is analogous to
“browsewrap.”453 This designates would-be contractual terms that are available
somewhere on a website—often by clicking on a link at the bottom of the website’s
home page labeled “Terms of Use” or the like—but are not brought to the attention of
the website visitor.454 Browsewrap terms are enforceable only if the user is on notice

449

FTC, .COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 163, at 6.

450

Lisa Gutermuth, How to Understand What Info Mobile Apps Are Collecting About You,
SLATE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/02/how_
to_understand_what_info_mobile_apps_collect_about_you.html.
451

See supra text accompanying paragraph preceding note 439.

452

FTC, .COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 163, at 6.

453 The most influential early treatment of browsewrap is in an opinion by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating
that under the circumstances presented, “a reference to the existence of license terms on a
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those
terms”).
454 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing a
typical browsewrap presentation, in which the purported terms are “posted on the website via a
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen” and the user is not required to take any affirmative action
indicating assent to the terms).
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of them—either actual or constructive.455 Courts will find that a user was on
“constructive notice” of browsewrap terms only if the hyperlink leading to the terms
is clearly and prominently presented.456 A link at the bottom of a web page labeled
“Privacy,” in small print, with no effort made to draw the user’s attention to it, does
not meet that standard.457
The analogy to consumer protection law and contract law is instructive because
those bodies of law reflect what regulators and judges have found essential to
conveying information to consumers: the presentation of the information must be such
that it is likely to come to the attention of a reasonable person.458 Privacy notices, as
they have been mandated by various formulations of the FIPPs, required by positive
law, and implemented voluntarily, do not satisfy that criterion.
If so, why not solve the problem by simply requiring privacy notices to be posted
“clearly and conspicuously,” as advertising disclosures and contract terms must be if
they are to have legal validity? A moment’s reflection will make evident the
infeasibility of such a rule.
First, this proliferation of notices would severely detract from the user experience.
Each time a user visited a website, accessed a mobile app, or set up an IoT device, she
would be presented with a privacy notice in a manner intrusive enough to qualify as
conspicuous. If the information being conveyed is complex, as is the case with privacy
policies, the FTC is willing to accept placement of the material such that the site visitor
must click on a hyperlink to view it.459 The adequacy of such an approach will depend
on “the placement and prominence of the hyperlink on the webpage or screen” as well
as how the hyperlink is labeled.460 This likely means that the link would have to
squarely confront the user from a location on the home page of the website—perhaps
via a banner that is plastered across the screen.461 Because users frequently access
455

Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In determining the
validity of browsewrap agreements, courts often consider whether a website user has actual or
constructive notice of the conditions.”).
456 Id. (“Clarity and conspicuousness of . . . terms are important in securing informed
assent.” (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 30)); id. (“[W]hen terms are linked in obscure sections of
a webpage that users are unlikely to see, courts will refuse to find constructive notice.”).
457 See, e.g., Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79 (no assent “where a website makes its terms of
use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides
no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent”);
Roller v. TV Guide Online Holdings, LLC, 2013 Ark. 285, 285 (2013) (no assent to terms
“accessible via hyperlink at the bottom of each page of the website”); Hines v. Overstock.com,
Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (no assent where user “could not even see the
link to [the terms] without scrolling down to the bottom of the screen”), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22
(2d Cir. 2010).
458

See supra notes 449, 453–57 and accompanying text.

459

FTC, .COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 163, at 10.

460

Id. at 10–11.

461

This is how certain privacy disclosures are typically made on websites within the
jurisdiction of European Union law. A 2009 directive requires website operators to obtain a site
visitor’s consent before placing a cookie on her computer. Directive 2009/136/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, art. 2(5), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11,
30. Many website operators in the EU have complied with this rule by slapping a banner along
the top or bottom of the website’s home page, with wording something like: “This website uses
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websites via a link from another website that takes them to an interior page rather than
the home page, the disclosure link would have to appear conspicuously on each page
of a website through which collection of a user’s information occurs. For a website
that a user views on the monitor of a laptop or desktop computer, this could be done
with some sacrifice to the design integrity of the site and the user experience.
However, for websites and mobile apps that a user views on a smartphone screen, the
sacrifice would be more severe, as a larger proportion of the home screen would be
taken up by the hyperlink.462
Second, if all websites, mobile apps, and IoT devices did implement clear and
conspicuous notice of the relevant privacy policies, the result would be staggeringly
useless. The proliferation of notices would soon fade into the background and be
completely ignored, a victim of the cognitive limitations that are a feature of humanity.
Notice everywhere is no notice at all. Beyond that, the nonstop, in-your-face notices
of the availability of privacy policies would likely not bring about a single additional
reading of a privacy policy. We ignore privacy policies because we are unable to
perceive any benefit in doing so; easier access to the notices would not change that
calculus.
Clear and conspicuous disclosure in advertisements and contracts works because
we engage with relatively few of them. We do not make purchases at anywhere near
the rate at which we click from one website to another or tap to open another mobile
app. When making a purchase involving a meaningful amount of money, we have
incentive to expend the effort needed to read and understand the advertising claims
and disclosures as well as the contract terms. The same system could not feasibly be
applied to all websites, mobile apps, and IoT devices that collect personal information.
4. Notice-and-Choice Amounts to Blanket Consent Due to the Non-Transactional
Nature of Privacy Interactions
The notice-and-choice procedure was designed for a transactional scenario that is
presently the exception rather than the rule in consumers’ interactions with websites,
mobile apps, and IoT devices. In the prototypical scenario, the data collector offers a
transaction and among the proposed terms is the privacy policy. The data subject
accepts the terms by engaging in the transaction, exercising her choice to allow use of
her PII as specified in the notice. Conceptually, the privacy policy is assimilated to a
contract term.
But most data collection situations using the facilities of Internet-enabled data
flows involve an ongoing relationship between the parties, with consent sought only
at the outset of the relationship. A website does not inquire in advance of each
collection of clickstream data whether the user consents to that collection, and neither
does a mobile app. An IoT device may collect personal information continuously for
years at a stretch.

cookies. By using this website and its offers and continuing navigating, you accept these
cookies. You can change them in your browser settings.” See, e.g., AUDI,
http://www.audi.com/en.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). Anybody who has viewed more than
a few of these websites has learned to ignore the cookies notification.
462 The FTC emphasizes that the disclosure method must be one that remains conspicuous
regardless of “the various programs and devices” that might be used to access the material. FTC,
.COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 163, at 12.
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Because of the ongoing nature of our engagement with websites, mobile apps, and
IoT devices, the consent a user provides through the notice-and-choice procedure
amounts to blanket consent: consent to whatever data collection and use the collector
decides to engage in, now and into the indefinite future, without a specification of each
such collection and use. Because the consequences of granting blanket consent to use
one’s PII cannot be known at the time the consent is granted, this mechanism does not
allow an individual to exercise meaningful control over disposition of his PII.
In other privacy-related contexts, blanket consent is disfavored, such as consent to
research uses of one’s DNA,463 general consent to medical procedures that is
interpreted as including consent to drug testing, 464 and consent to disclosure of
communications with one’s therapist.465 Blanket consent is contrary to the EU Data
Protection Directive.466
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998 generally prohibits a video tape provider
from disclosing its customers’ viewing habits absent the customer’s consent. 467 As
originally enacted, the statute banned blanket consent, requiring “the informed, written
consent of the consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought.”468 In 2013,
Congress amended the statute to allow a form of blanket consent but limited that
consent to a two-year period; consent may now be “given in advance for a set period
of time, not to exceed 2 years or until consent is withdrawn by the consumer,
whichever is sooner.”469 The original prohibition of blanket consent to disclosure of
private information, together with the two-year limitation in the amended provision,
indicates the controversial status of blanket consent in privacy contexts.
463 Julie A. Burger, What Is Owed Participants in Biotechnology Research?, 84 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 55, 61 (2009) (quoting COMMITTEE ON HUMAN GENOME DIVERSITY, NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, EVALUATING HUMAN GENETIC DIVERSITY 65 (1997)) (“‘It is not ethically or legally
acceptable to ask research participants to “consent” to future but yet-unknown uses of their
identifiable DNA samples.’”).
464 Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Punitive Policies: Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consensual
Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 469–70 (1995) (arguing that
a pregnant woman’s signing of a blanket consent upon admission to a hospital is inadequate to
justify testing her for illegal drugs).
465

Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/5(c) (2018) (indicating that a patient’s blanket consent to disclosure of her
communications with a mental health therapist is invalid).
466 The Directive’s definition of “consent” requires “specific” consent. Data Protection
Directive, supra note 151, art. 2(h). The Article 29 Working Party interprets this as forbidding
blanket consent: “To be valid, consent must be specific. In other words, blanket consent without
specifying the exact purpose of the processing is not acceptable.” Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent, 01197/11/EN, WP187 (July 13,
2011), at 17.
467

Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2018).

468
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, § 2(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 3195
(1988) (emphasis added).
469

Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (2018). Netflix
lobbied for passage of the amendment so that it could share its customers’ viewing selections
on Facebook. Kathryn Elizabeth McCabe, Just You and Me and Netflix Makes Three:
Implications for Allowing “Frictionless Sharing” of Personally Identifiable Information Under
the Video Privacy Protection Act, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 413, 416 (2013).
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Karl Llewellyn famously proposed “blanket assent” as a conceptual solution to the
dilemma inherent in standard-form contracting, where the purchaser has no
opportunity to bargain over the terms (other than, perhaps, the price) and yet is held
bound to them.470 His idea was that when an individual enters into a transaction, she
accepts all of the non-negotiable terms to the extent they are “not unreasonable or
indecent” or not “manifestly unreasonable and unfair.”471 But blanket assent has no
justification in a situation where nobody, neither the data subject who is deemed to
assent to collection and use of his PII nor the collector itself, can say ex ante what uses
will be made of the information and what impact those uses will have on the data
subject.
Because consent to the privacy terms adopted and disclosed by websites, mobile
apps, and IoT devices amounts to blanket consent, it cannot be regarded as effective
consent. Notice-and-choice cannot be justified as a fair information practice principle
in these contexts.
5. Notice-and-Choice Cannot Work When PII Is Transferred to a Third Party for
Uses that Are Not Disclosed and Could Not Be Disclosed Because Not Known to the
Transferor
The private-data ecosystem deviates from the transactional model in another way
as well. When a person uses a website, mobile app, or IoT device, she is dealing not
just with the operator of the website, the supplier of the mobile app, or the
manufacturer of the IoT device. Third parties are lurking in the shadows, in the form
of advertising networks that acquire clickstream information in real time and data
brokers that combine private with public information and perform analytics yielding
conclusions that have economic value.
The individuals involved do not receive adequate notice of the uses that these third
parties make of their private information. Few consumers are aware of the activities,
or even the existence, of these third parties.472 Website privacy policies commonly
disclose that the site visitor’s private information may be supplied to third parties. 473
But that sort of notice is not of much use to the individual because it does not disclose
what uses the third party will make of the information.
Even if a website operator wanted to provide site visitors with full disclosure about
the downstream uses of the information it collects from them, it could not. The website
operator will generally have no more idea of what happens to the data once it is passed
along to a third party than does the data subject himself. Both the vastness of the task,
and the impossibility of specifying what uses third parties may find for the data at
470

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).

471

Id. at 371.

472

Regarding data brokers, the FTC observes: “Because these companies generally never
interact with consumers, consumers are often unaware of their existence, much less the variety
of practices in which they engage.” FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 29, at i. The data brokers
that the FTC studied are Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius,
PeekYou, Rapleaf, and Recorded Future—not exactly household names. Id. at 8–9. The same
can be said of advertising networks. The Digital Advertising Alliance’s opt-out list currently
includes 133 companies, the alphabetically ordered list beginning with 12 Digit Marketing,
33Across, Accuen, ActionX, AcuityAds, etc. The full list may be viewed by following the
DAA’s opt-out procedure, starting from http://optout.aboutads.info.
473

See supra Table 1.
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some future date, would doom to failure any effort to assemble information about these
uses and present it to a user in an actionable form.
The notice-and-choice model was not designed for, and simply cannot effectively
deal with, the complexities of a data ecosystem that inscrutable third parties dominate.
6. Notice-and-Choice Cannot Work with Some Types of IoT Devices Because Third
Parties Cannot Consent
Some IoT devices collect personal information about data subjects whose only
connection to the device is being in range of it. Home surveillance cameras capture
the activities of visitors. Artificially intelligent interactive toys, like Hello Barbie, can
capture the speech of the owner’s playmates. 474 Video doorbells capture images of a
person approaching the front door. Regardless of whether the owner of the device has
consented to the collection and use of his own information, he cannot consent on
behalf of third parties, and seeking consent directly from those parties would be highly
impractical.
V. MOVING TO A NEW PARADIGM
If notice-and-choice cannot meet the goals of the fair information practice
principles when applied to websites, mobile apps, and IoT devices, what is the
alternative? I propose that the purely procedural approach of notice-and-choice should
be supplemented by one that takes into account the substance of a data collector’s
privacy rules.
A. Substantive Rules of Privacy in Legislation Are Not a Novelty
The dominant role that the FIPPs have come to play in our thinking about
information privacy, founded as they are on the proceduralist paradigm of notice-andchoice, tends to obscure the fact that substantive rules protecting privacy are not only
thinkable but are actually in use. While most privacy laws are strictly procedural,
allowing data collectors to do whatever they want with personal information as long
as (in some cases) they notify the data subject of those uses, some privacy laws do
include substantive limitations. For example:
x

x
x

The FTC’s regulation under COPPA prohibits the operator of a
website “from conditioning a child’s participation in a game, the
offering of a prize, or another activity on the child’s disclosing more
personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in
such activity.”475
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that a
telecommunications carrier may not use metadata it received from
another carrier to engage in marketing.476
The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides that a consumer credit
reporting agency may not include in a credit report the identity of a

474

Walker, supra note 98.

475

16 C.F.R. § 312.7 (2018).

476

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222(b) (2018).
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furnisher of medical information if doing so would identify the
provider of the medical service or its nature. 477
The FCC’s (invalidated) ISP privacy rules prohibit broadband Internet
access service providers “from conditioning the provision of
broadband service on a customer surrendering his or her privacy
rights” and “from terminating service or otherwise refusing to provide
[Internet access] due to a customer’s refusal to waive any such privacy
rights.”478
European Union law restricts a data processor from processing
designated categories of sensitive data.479

In addition, several prominent policy discussions of fair information practice
principles have advocated the deployment of certain substantive limitations on users
of private information. During the discussions of the committee that produced the
1973 HEW Report, several speakers thought that part of the solution was the
establishment of substantive privacy rules. 480 The 1995 IITF policy paper called for
the institution of basic privacy protections in certain situations.481 In its 2012 report,
the FTC proposed a substantive limitation on a business’s privacy practices: no matter
what procedures it follows, a company offering an important product or service
without many good substitutes may not engage in privacy-invading uses of a
customer’s data that are not germane to the transaction.482 Recent examinations of the
477

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6) (2018).

478

FCC, ISP Privacy Rules, supra note 294, ¶ 295.

479

The EU Data Protection Directive allows member states to forbid the processing of
sensitive data, even with the data subject’s consent. The general rule is: “Member States shall
prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life.” Data Protection Directive, supra note 151, art. 8(1). There is an
exception if the data subject gives “explicit consent,” but a member state may void that
exception making the prohibition non-waivable. Id. art. 8(2)(a). The EU’s new privacy
regulation has a similar rule, extending the categories of sensitive data to include genetic and
biometric data. GDPR, supra note 151, art. 9(1), 9(2)(a).
480 Transcript of Proceedings, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems 43 (May 19, 1972) (“I think we have to go beyond that and draw the line, difficult
as it may be, of the right of the employer to collect personal information and the right of the
employee to be free from undue invasion of his privacy.”) (Kenneth A. McLean); Transcript of
Proceedings, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems 44–45
(Sept. 30, 1972) (“The idea is to create or to recommend that legislation be instituted that would
define penalties for unreasonable use of information. . . . The idea would be to create legislation
which would include both criminal and civil penalties and probably one would be wise to make
it a class actionable offense, if institutions were to do certain things that we would define as
unreasonable use of information.”) (Willis H. Ware).
481

“[I]n certain cases—for example, if the individual lacks sufficient bargaining power—
purely contractual arrangements between individuals and information users may fail to respect
privacy adequately. In such instances, society should ensure privacy at some basic level in order
to satisfy the Information Privacy Principle.” NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra
note 193, ¶ 4.
482 FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 52 (noting that where there are
few alternative suppliers of Internet access, “the service provider should not condition the
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consequences of widespread processing of “big data” have suggested that privacy
rules should aim at controlling the practices of data users, rather than being limited to
the context of data collection.483
Thus, precedent exists for legislative bodies to prescribe substantive rules
protecting privacy based on public policy considerations.
B. The General Doctrines of Unfairness and Unconscionability Can Support
Substantive Privacy Rules
The common law developed doctrines, later codified, that allow courts and law
enforcement agencies to nullify practices that are inimical to consumer interests.
These doctrines—unfairness and unconscionability—have been deployed against
invasions of privacy and failure to maintain reasonable data security practices. They
could be used, either in case-specific situations or as the conceptual underpinnings of
legislative rules, to generate substantive privacy standards applicable to Internetenabled data flows.
1. Unfairness
Contrary to the everyday usage of the term, a determination that conduct is “unfair”
is not merely a moral judgment but rather a legal conclusion. The doctrine evolved
through common law methods and was later codified. Beginning in the mid-19th
century, the courts developed a federal common law of trade regulation. 484 Rules
prohibiting unfair competition were first applied in situations involving passing off
one’s goods as those of another and misappropriation.485 This was the background
against which Congress enacted the FTC Act.
As originally enacted in 1914, the Act forbade “unfair methods of competition in
commerce.”486 From the start, the FTC applied this language to both deceptive
advertising and misuse of concentrations of commercial power, considering both to be
“unfair” and to interfere with competition.487 In 1922, early in the life of the FTC Act,
Sears, Roebuck & Company sought to avoid a determination that its advertisements
were false and therefore amounted to “unfair methods of competition” on the ground
that the term was too indefinite to have any application beyond acts that the common
law had found unfair as of the 1914 enactment of the Act. The court held that the term,
even then, had a reasonably ascertainable meaning: the FTC commissioners “are to
exercise their common sense, as informed by their knowledge of the general idea of
provision of broadband on the customer’s agreeing to, for example, allow the service provider
to track all of the customer’s online activity for marketing purposes”).
483 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 56; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 380, at xii; Craig Mundie, Privacy Pragmatism: Focus
on Data Use, Not Data Collection, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 28, 29.
484 Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State “Laboratories” and
the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1363, 1381 (2005).
485

Id. at 1382. Unfair competition law was later codified as federal trademark law, the
current instantiation of which is the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2018).
486 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
487

HOOFNAGLE, supra note 378, at 3–4.
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unfair trade at common law, and stop all those trade practices that have a capacity or
a tendency to injure competitors directly or through deception of purchasers.” 488
In 1938, Congress amended the FTC Act by granting the Commission the authority
to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in addition to “[u]nfair methods of
competition.”489 The purpose of the amendment was to broaden the FTC’s authority
to control deceptive advertising by eliminating any need to prove harm to
competitors.490 When exercising its statutory authority to prevent unfairness in
consumer protection contexts, the FTC relies upon the “unfair . . . acts or practices”
language of this amendment.491
In 1994, adopting the FTC’s own formulation of what makes an act or practice
“unfair,” Congress codified the criterion in these terms:
The Commission shall have no authority . . . to declare unlawful an act or
practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which
is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining
whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary
basis for such determination.492
Thus, an “unfair” practice is one that (1) “causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers” (2) “which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves” and (3) “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”493 The determination may be informed by, but not based exclusively on,
“public policy considerations” untethered from the statutory text. 494
All of the states have laws, often called Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
(“UDAP”) laws or “Little FTC” acts, prohibiting “unfair” practices.495 Some but not

488

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919).

489

Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018)).
490

HOOFNAGLE, supra note 378, at 37; Menell, supra note 484, at 1383.

491

See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 17, In re Aaron’s, supra note 92.

492 Federal Trade Commission Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108
Stat. 1691, 1695 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). The amendment partially codified the
FTC’s 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness (appended to In re International Harvester Co., 104
F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984)).
493

15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018).

494
For a history and evaluation of the FTC’s unfairness authority, see J. Howard Beales,
The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authorityits-rise-fall-and-resurrection.
495 CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES (2009), www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. These laws vary
substantially in the scope and strength of their protections. Id. at 7–10.
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all of these state laws are interpreted according to the FTC’s unfairness standard. 496
Thus, an expansive body of law evaluates commercial practices to determine whether
they should be banned as “unfair.”
a. “Unfairness” Applied in Privacy Contexts
Precedent supports invoking statutory prohibitions of unfair commercial practices
to counter invasions of privacy. In recent years, 497 the FTC and state agencies have
applied their unfairness authority in a number of situations involving information
privacy or the related subject of information security. 498
In FTC v. VIZIO, Inc.,499 the FTC and the New Jersey Attorney General brought
an action against a manufacturer of Internet-connected television sets that, according
to the complaint, “continuously track what consumers are watching, and transmit that
information” back to VIZIO “on a second-by-second basis.”500 VIZIO provided the
information to third parties, which used it among other things “for the purpose of
targeting advertising to particular consumers on their other digital devices based on
their television viewing data.”501 VIZIO did not adequately disclose these practices to
purchasers of the televisions.502 The complaint charged that this undisclosed collection
and dissemination of personal data was unfair, reciting the three statutory elements of
an unfairness claim.503 Settling the case, the parties agreed to a stipulated order that
prohibits the collection of viewing data unless VIZIO provides notice and obtains the
consumer’s consent.504
496 Most of the state “unfairness” laws are interpreted according to a standard that the FTC
devised in 1964 but has since discarded. See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 197 (6th ed. 2004)
(discussing the “S&H” standard).
497

In its earlier cases dealing with online privacy, and in most of the more recent ones too,
the FTC charged the respondent with deception rather than unfairness. The first such case was
In re Geocities, No. C–3850 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 1999). Other cases in this vein include: In re
Goldenshores Technologies, LLC, No. C–4446 (F.T.C. Mar. 31, 2014) (flashlight app’s privacy
policy says that app will collect information related to app’s functioning; failure to disclose that
it also collects user’s location information and transmits it to advertisers alleged to be
deceptive); In re Facebook, Inc., No. C–4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) (deceptive statements about
privacy settings); and In re Google Inc., No. C–4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (deceptive
statements involving Google Buzz). A company’s privacy practices may be charged as
deceptive only if the company has made some representation that is false. The cases discussed
in this Section involved privacy-harming conduct that did not include any such representations
and thus could only be charged as unfair.
498 Both information privacy and information security are concerned with disclosures of
personal information. They differ in that the latter involves unauthorized access to the
information through inadequate security measures.
499

FTC. v. VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017).

500

Complaint ¶¶ 12–14, id.

501

Id. ¶ 16(c).

502

Id. ¶¶ 19–22.

503

Id. ¶¶ 32–34.

504 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 4–5, FTC v.
VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017). The order specifies that the notice must
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In In re Aaron’s, Inc.,505 the FTC charged Aaron’s, which operated a chain of stores
that rent household items to consumers, with unfairness in connection with its
installation and use of monitoring and geotracking software on the computers it rented.
According to the complaint, some of Aaron’s franchisees installed software called PC
Rental Agent on these computers.506 The software allowed Aaron’s employees to
“surreptitiously monitor the activities of computer users, including by logging
keystrokes, capturing screenshots, and using the computer’s webcam.” It also allowed
them to track the physical location of the computers. 507 Needless to say, this allowed
Aaron’s to collect highly sensitive information as well as “photographs of computer
users and anyone else within view of the camera.” 508 This occurred “[i]n numerous
instances” without notice to or consent from the consumers. 509 The complaint alleged
that this privacy-invading conduct by Aaron’s was unfair and violated the FTC Act.510
The consent order settling the action contained injunctive provisions that treat the
collection of information separately from the geotracking.511 The order prohibited
“[u]sing any monitoring technology to gather data or information from or about a
consumer from any computer rented to a consumer” except, with the consumer’s
consent, to provide technical assistance to the consumer.512 That is, the order flatly
prohibits Aaron’s use of monitoring technology to promote its own interests, even
with the consumer’s consent. Geotracking is forbidden unless Aaron’s first provides
“clear and prominent notice” to the consumer and obtains his “affirmative express
consent.”513
be “prominent[]” and “separate and apart from any ‘privacy policy,’ ‘terms of use’ page, or
other similar document.” Id. at 4. Consent must be opt-in, requiring “affirmative express
consent.” Id.
505

In re Aaron’s, Inc., No. C–4442 (F.T.C. Mar. 10, 2014).

506

Complaint ¶ 4, id.

507

Id.

508

Id. ¶ 5.

509

Id.

510

Id. ¶¶ 16–17.

511

Decision and Order at 4–6, id.

512

Id. at 4.

513

Id. at 4–5. The FTC also sued DesignerWare, the maker of the PC Rental Agent Software,
and Aspen Way Enterprises, one of the Aaron’s franchisees that used the software. The
injunctive provisions of the consent orders in those cases mirror those in the Aaron’s case. See
Decision and Order, In re DesignerWare, LLC, No. C–4390 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013); Decision
and Order, In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., No. C–4392 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013).
Other cases in which the FTC charged a privacy-harming practice as unfair include: FTC v.
Blue Global, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-02117-ESW (D. Ariz. July 3, 2017) (defendant negligently
transmitted consumers’ sensitive financial information, which they submitted seeking loans, to
third parties who were not lenders); In re Brittain, No. C–4564 (F.T.C. Dec. 28, 2015) (posting
nude photographs on a revenge-porn site; order bans posting without consent); FTC v.
Sitesearch Corp., No. CV-14-02750-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2015) (defendant collected
sensitive financial information from consumers seeking payday loans and deliberately sold the
loan applications to non-lenders; order prohibits transferring sensitive information without
consent); In re Facebook, Inc., No. C–4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) (making postings that users
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In these two cases, the injunctive relief takes two different forms. One form
prohibits privacy-invasive conduct, unless accompanied by robust notice-andconsent,514 while the other form flatly prohibits the conduct. 515 The former remedy
implies that the violation consisted of acquiring a person’s private information without
first notifying him of the collection and obtaining his consent—a violation of a
procedural rule. The latter is premised on a different sort of violation: collecting the
information at all. This is a violation of a substantive rule. The former remedy’s
premise is that notice-and-choice is capable of performing its function as one of the
fair information practice principles, as long as it is implemented correctly. The latter
recognizes that all the notice and choice in the world will not solve the problem.
VIZIO and Aaron’s are particularly inappropriate cases for the procedural remedy
that the FTC applied to some of the claims. Both cases involved the purchase (or
rental) of physical objects, rather than, say, access to a website or mobile app. Put
yourself in the place of the purchaser of a VIZIO sixty-five-inch-diagonal television
set. This is a large and heavy item. You might have struggled to get it into the back of
your car from the curbside of a Best Buy store or borrowed a friend’s truck for the
purpose because your car was too small. Or you might have bought the television
online from Overstock.com and received it in a delivery from UPS or FedEx. After
spending a fair amount of time extracting it from the box, assembling it, setting it up,
and getting it to work with your home network, the television presents you with a
prominent notice, requesting your consent to allow VIZIO to continuously track what
you watch, “on a second-by-second basis,”516 and to transmit that information to third
parties who will use it to target advertising through your other connected devices.
At this point, do you have a meaningful opportunity to exercise choice about
whether to share your personal information? If you click “I Disagree,” the television
set will politely inform you that you cannot use it and you should return the set to the
vendor.517 That will require you to fit the various components back into the box, seal
it up, and haul it back to the Best Buy or obtain a return authorization from
Overstock.com so the delivery service can pick it up. You may not get all of your

had designated as restricted publicly available; order prohibits doing so without the poster’s
consent); In re Vision I Properties, LLC, No. C–4135 (F.T.C. Apr. 19, 2005) (online shopping
cart provider sold consumer information to third parties; remedy allows continuation of conduct
if notice is supplied).
514 As in the VIZIO case, Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment
at 17–18, VIZIO, supra note 504, and the geotracking claim in Aaron’s, Decision and Order at
4–5, In re Aaron’s, Inc., No. C–4442 (F.T.C. Mar. 10, 2014).
515 As in the monitoring claim in Aaron’s. Decision and Order at 4, In re Aaron’s, supra
note 514.
516

See supra text accompanying note 500.

517

Actually, it might not. VIZIO’s current privacy policy says that you can turn off the
information-collection in the television set’s settings. How to Turn On or Off Video
ACR/Viewing Data Collection (Also Known as “Smart Interactivity”), VIZIO,
https://www.vizio.com/viewingdata (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). However, the FTC’s order does
not require the company to allow the user to keep the television while disabling the privacyinvasive functions. The point holds generally for IoT devices.
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money back; Best Buy charges a restocking fee on certain items, 518 and if you return
a box that has been opened, Overstock.com will only refund seventy percent of the
purchase price.519 You will probably also have to pay the return shipping fee.
Faced with all of this hassle and expense, will you still click “I Disagree”? Or will
you recognize ruefully that resistance is futile: you cannot know whether the harms
you will suffer from VIZIO’s collection of your viewing information and transmission
of it to unidentified third parties will exceed the costs of returning the television.
Besides, all other manufacturers of connected televisions probably are engaging in the
same privacy-invading conduct to maximize their revenues, so your only options are
to give up your data or do without a smart TV.
b. “Unfairness” Applied in Security Breach Contexts
The FTC has also used its unfairness authority against companies whose security
mechanisms and procedures, according to the agency, did not meet a reasonableness
standard. The most salient of these cases is the FTC’s action against LabMD, a rare
FTC case in which the defendant charged with a consumer protection violation chose
to litigate rather than agree to the entry of a consent order. LabMD was a medical
laboratory that performed tests on tissue samples and reported the results to the
referring physicians. In the course of its activities, LabMD collected sensitive personal
information on over 750,000 patients. In 2005, a LabMD employee installed
LimeWire, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program, on her office computer, using it to
download music from the Internet. In 2008, a forensic analyst working for a data
security company named Tiversa Holding Co. used LimeWire to access and download
from the employee’s computer a file that contained 1,718 pages of sensitive
information—including names, dates of birth, social security numbers, and
information about medical tests performed—belonging to 9,300 consumers. Tiversa
notified LabMD of the exposure of this file (referred to in the litigation as the “1718
file”) on its system and offered to sell LabMD its breach detection services. When
LabMD declined to retain its services, Tiversa informed the FTC about the exposure
of the file.520
In 2013, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against LabMD, alleging that
the company “failed to provide ‘reasonable and appropriate’ security for personal
information maintained on LabMD’s computer networks, and that this conduct
‘caused or is likely to cause’ substantial consumer injury.”521 The complaint charged
that this conduct was an unfair practice in violation of the FTC Act. After trial, the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in LabMD’s favor, finding that the FTC had
failed to establish that LabMD’s actions caused or were likely to cause “substantial

518 Returns & Exchanges, BESTBUY.COM (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.bestbuy.com/site/
help-topics/return-exchange-policy/pcmcat260800050014.c?id=pcmcat260800050014.
519

VIZIO M55-c2 55Ǝ 4k Ultra HD Smart TV LED LCD 120Hz 3840x2160 HDTV,
OVERSTOCK,
https://www.overstock.com/Electronics/VIZIO-M55-C2-55-4K-Ultra-HDSMART-TV-LED-LCD-120Hz-3840x2160-HDTV/15814274/product.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2018) (“We will issue a partial refund of up to 70 percent if returned items have been opened,
used, or returned late.”).
520

LabMD Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2016).

521

In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *2 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015).
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injury” to consumers, one of the elements of an unfairness claim.522 Complaint counsel
appealed the decision to the Commission, which reversed the ALJ, holding that the
disclosure of the 1718 file caused substantial harm and the other elements of an
unfairness violation were also satisfied.523
LabMD appealed the FTC’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit. In 2016, the court
granted LabMD’s motion for a stay of the FTC’s order pending appeal, having
determined that “a serious legal question” existed about the correctness of the FTC’s
determination that the exposure of the 1718 file caused, or was likely to cause,
substantial injury to consumers.524 The court reasoned that (1) it was not clear that the
statute’s “substantial injury” element could be met by subjective harms like emotional
impact,525 and (2) the FTC’s interpretation of the statute’s “likely to cause” criterion
to include “something that has a low likelihood” of occurrence is doubtful.526
Pending the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on the merits in LabMD, the only litigated
case testing the FTC’s application of its unfairness authority in a security breach
situation is FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.527 In that case, inadequate security of
data collected from hotel guests resulted in hackers getting access to the payment card
information of over 619,000 guests through three separate attacks from 2008 to 2009,
leading to over $10 million in fraudulent charges.528 Wyndham challenged the FTC’s
application of its unfairness authority in this situation on several grounds, but the Third
Circuit sided with the FTC. Among other things, the court rejected Wyndham’s
argument that application of the unfairness criterion violated its right to due process
because “the FTC failed to give fair notice of the specific cybersecurity standards the
company was required to follow.” 529 To the contrary, the court held that the FTC’s
published guidance on cybersecurity, and its numerous complaints against other
companies for cybersecurity failures, gave sufficient notice of what the FTC would
consider unreasonable security.530
The FTC has invoked its unfairness authority in numerous other cases involving
inadequate security of personal data, resolving them through consent decrees. 531
522 Id. at *9. The ALJ noted that no evidence indicated the 1718 file was downloaded by
anyone other than Tiversa and that Tiversa provided it only to the FTC and an expert who had
a working relationship with Tiversa. Id. at *46. Under these circumstances, the ALJ concluded,
there could be no likelihood of harm to consumers whose private information appeared in the
document. Id. at *46–53.
523

In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215, at *14–24 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016). In
the FTC’s view, the release of a person’s sensitive medical information is inherently injurious,
even “in the absence of proven economic or physical harm.” Id. at *14.
524

LabMD, 678 F. App’x at 821.

525

Id. at 820.

526

Id. at 821.

527

FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).

528

Id. at 241–42.

529

Id. at 249.

530

Id. at 256–58.

531

See FTC v. D-Link Sys., No. 3:17-CV-00039, 2017 WL 4150873 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2017) (failure to secure routers and IP cameras); FTC v. Ruby Corp., No. 1:16-cv-02438
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2016) (inadequate security of data collected by dating website); In re AsusTeK
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Courts have also applied state UDAP law to find privacy-invasive practices actionable
as unfair.532
Computer, Inc., No. C–4587 (F.T.C. July 18, 2016) (failure to secure routers); FTC v. Bayview
Solutions, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01830-RC (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2015) (operator and users of website
that facilitated transactions between buyers and sellers of debt posted personal information
without any access controls); FTC v. Cornerstone & Co., LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01479-RC (D.D.C.
Apr. 20, 2015) (same); In re GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., No. C-4482 (F.T.C. Aug. 14,
2014) (inadequate security of personal information in transcriptions of audio files); In re
GeneLink, Inc., Nos. C–4456, 4457 (F.T.C. May 8, 2014) (company maintained private
information in a way that allowed access by affiliates); In re Accretive Health, Inc., No. C–4432
(F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2014) (laptop containing medical information was left in a car and stolen); In re
TRENDnet, Inc., No. C–4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) (inadequate security for IP cameras); In re
HTC America, Inc., No. C–4406 (F.T.C. June 25, 2013) (security vulnerabilities introduced into
customized version of Android for mobile phones); In re Compete, Inc., No. C–4384 (F.T.C.
Feb. 20, 2013) (failure to protect information acquired from consumers using a browser
toolbar); In re EPN, Inc., No. C–4370 (F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2012) (debt collector’s employee installed
P2P filesharing software on her computer, resulting in security breach); In re Upromise, Inc.,
No. C–4351 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) (failure to protect information acquired from consumers
using a browser toolbar); In re SettlementOne Credit Corp., No. C–4330 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011)
(inadequate security on consumer reports resulting in breach); In re ACRAnet, Inc., No. C–
4331 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (same); In re Fajilan and Assocs., Inc., No. C–4332 (F.T.C. Aug.
17, 2011) (same); In re Lookout Servs., Inc., No. C–4326 (F.T.C. June 15, 2011) (inadequate
security on database of personal information resulting in breach); In re Ceridian Corp., No. C4325 (F.T.C. June 8, 2011) (inadequate security on database of personal information resulting
in breach); In re Rite Aid Corp., No. C–4308 (F.T.C. Nov. 12, 2010) (disposing of documents
containing sensitive medical information in unsecured dumpsters); In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc.,
No. C–4291 (F.T.C. May 20, 2010) (inadequate security of credit card information collected
from restaurant patrons); In re CVS Caremark Corp., No. C–4259 (F.T.C. June 18, 2009)
(disposing of documents containing sensitive medical information in unsecured dumpsters);
United States v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., No. 0:09-cv-00524 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2009)
(failure to implement reasonable procedures to assure that consumer reports are not provided to
unauthorized requestors); In re Reed Elsevier Inc., No. C–4226 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008)
(inadequate security of consumer information stored in databases); In re The TJX Cos., Inc.,
No. C–4227 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) (inadequate security of personal information collected from
retail customers); In re CardSystems Sols., Inc., No. C–4168 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006) (inadequate
security of information collected from credit card magnetic strips during authorizations); In re
DSW Inc., No. C–4157 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006) (inadequate security of credit card information
collected from retail customers); United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (inadequate security of personal information in consumer reports); In re BJ’s
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C–4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005) (inadequate security of credit card
information collected from retail customers).
532

See, e.g., In re Carrier IQ, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1115–17 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (plaintiffs
stated a claim for unfairness under California law against maker of software that was installed
on their phones and that allegedly intercepted private information generated through use of their
phones and transmitted it to wireless carriers and device manufacturers); In re iPhone
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1072–73 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (plaintiffs stated a claim
for unfairness under California law against Apple and others for allegedly allowing apps that
surreptitiously collected private information to run on their phones); see also Assurance of
Discontinuance, In re Copley Advert., supra note 56 (stating view of Massachusetts attorney
general that monitoring a phone user’s location and sending advertisement to the phone based
on its location is unfair under Massachusetts law); Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re
Adobe Sys. Inc. (Nov. 7, 2016) (stating view of attorneys general that failure to maintain
reasonable security measures is unfair under law of multiple states) (semble).
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c. The Upshot
The upshot of these cases is that substantial authority supports the proposition that
certain practices invading individual privacy, and the failure to institute reasonable
safeguards against unauthorized access to personal information in one’s possession,
are unfair under the FTC Act and state UDAP laws. Stated another way, legal rules
prohibiting unfair trade practices, at both the federal and state levels, are available to
challenge unfair privacy practices. If the goal is to establish fair information practice
principles, a ban on practices that are unfair is a good place to start.
2. Unconscionability
The rule that contracts may be invalidated as “unconscionable” has roots in the
common law, originating as a rule of equity.533 Article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform
Commercial Code has included an unconscionability provision, § 2-302, since the
original 1952 version of the Code.534 The current version of § 2-302 reads:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.535
The UCC does not define the term “unconscionable.” The Official Comment to § 2302 explains, not very helpfully: “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract.” 536 The concept has been
characterized as an “amorphous” one that is to be developed on a case-by-case basis
so as “to make realistic the assumption of the law that the agreement has resulted from
real bargaining between parties who had freedom of choice and understanding and
ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion.” 537 An influential gloss on the term as it
developed at common law states: “Unconscionability has generally been recognized
to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 538 Consistent
with this expression, some courts have operationalized the concept by applying a twopart criterion, requiring that a contract be both procedurally and substantively

533

See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:1 (4th ed. 2017).

534

U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1952).

535

U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).

536

Id. § 2-302, cmt. 1.

537

Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1971).

538

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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unconscionable.539 Other courts hold that one-sided substantive terms alone can
support a decision that the terms are unenforceable because unconscionable. 540
As developed in the common law and more recently as introduced into state law
by enactment of UCC § 2-302, the doctrine of unconscionability applies to contracts.
In view of the arguably contractual nature of privacy policies, 541 there is a solid basis
for applying unconscionability doctrine in this realm. In addition, unconscionability
provisions contained in state UDAP laws are applicable beyond the realm of contracts.
Some of these laws specifically prohibit “unconscionable practices,” while others treat
unconscionable acts as a subset of unfair ones.542
FTC v. VIZIO, discussed above, illustrates application of the unconscionability
doctrine in the privacy context.543 In that case, the Attorney General of New Jersey
was a co-plaintiff along with the FTC. The complaint alleged that VIZIO’s
undisclosed tracking of consumers’ viewing activity was not only unfair under the
FTC Act but also that it violated a provision of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
forbidding “any unconscionable commercial practice.” 544
C. Creating Substantive Standards
Legislatures, law enforcement bodies, and courts thus have the tools they need to
slip the limitations imposed by the procedural approach of notice-and-choice and
apply substantive limits to the practices of companies involved in the provision of
websites, mobile apps, and IoT devices.
This is not the place for a comprehensive application of these principles to Internetenabled data flows, which would be a major undertaking. I will content myself here to
539

E.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988). The
meaning of these two terms has been explained as: “Procedural or process unconscionability is
concerned with ‘unfair surprise,’ fine print clauses, mistakes or ignorance of important facts, or
other things that mean bargaining did not proceed as it should. Substantive unconscionability is
an unjust or ‘one-sided’ contract.” DAN B. DOBBS, 2 LAW OF REMEDIES 706 (2d ed. 1993).
540

E.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995).

541 Several courts have held that the promises contained in a privacy notice may become
terms of a contract between the parties to a transaction if all elements can be established. See
Svenson v. Google Inc., No. 13–cv–04080–BLF, 2015 WL 1503429 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015)
(plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of contract by violating privacy policy); Smith v. Trusted
Universal Standards in Electr. Transactions, Inc., No. 09–4567 (RBK/KMW), 2010 WL
1799456, at *10 (D.N.J. 2010) (no contract claim because plaintiff failed to allege damages
flowing from the breach); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 325–
27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (same); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ.04–126, 2004 WL
1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (no contract claim because plaintiffs failed to allege
several elements). Another court found that privacy policies are generally not contractual, since
“broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims.” Dyer v. Nw.
Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004).
542

See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW,
§ 3:15, at 107–08 (“Fourteen state consumer protection statutes prohibit ‘unconscionable’
practices. Most of the states that prohibit ‘unfair’ practices incorporate ‘unconscionable’ actions
as well.”).
543

See supra notes 499–504 and accompanying text.

544

Complaint ¶ 28, VIZIO, supra note 500 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8–2); id. ¶ 35
(charging VIZIO’s conduct as “an unconscionable commercial practice”).
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propose a single substantive limitation: There should be a prohibition against
conditioning the provision of some good or service on the consumer’s consent to the
collection and use of her private information that is not required for provision of the
good or service. At least this should be so where (a) the good is important to the
consumer, and (b) there is only one or only a few sources of the good. Consent to such
a practice may only be obtained by an opt-in mechanism including a clear and
conspicuous disclosure that consent is optional and that refusing consent results in no
penalty.
If this rule sounds familiar it is because we have encountered it already in the
discussion above of what I have termed “gun-to-the-head choice.” Several of the
policy discussions recommending implementation of the FIPPs have called for such a
limitation.545 Such a limitation was actually implemented in the 1998 COPPA and the
(invalidated) 2016 FCC ISP privacy rules. 546 The 2016 GDPR also referenced it
favorably.547 The rule even shows up in voluntary implementations of the FIPPS; for
instance, the rules of the Apple App Store prohibit apps from requiring users to submit
personal data not needed for the “core functionality” of the app.548
A privacy practice of this sort should be prohibited because it deprives the
consumer of any actual choice; the choice is merely nominal, masquerading as actual
choice. As such, the practice fails to satisfy the widely accepted foundational criterion
for what qualifies as a fair information practice. As an unfair practice, this practice
should be banned on the grounds of general principles prohibiting unfair and
unconscionable practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued for rejection of the orthodoxy of notice-and-choice:
the idea, enshrined in every version of the fair information practice principles, that the
societal interest in protection of information privacy can be vindicated by informing
consumers of the uses that a data collector intends to make of their private information
and allowing the consumers to choose, on that basis, whether to engage with the
information collector. Notice-and-choice could serve this function only in a world
where there was no scarcity of consumer time and attention—where rationality was
not bounded—and where there was robust competition on privacy terms among
suppliers of close substitute goods and services. We do not live in such a world. If we
mean to assure that truly fair information practices rule the information ecosystem,
rather than merely paying lip service to the notion, we need to move beyond the
proceduralist orientation of notice-and-choice and create substantive rules designed to
bring about an appropriate balance between the goals of protecting information
privacy and allowing societally beneficial uses of private information. Substantive
rules in this realm would not be a novelty; such rules exist already, and the principles

545 The 1973 HEW Report’s committee discussions, see supra notes 364–66 and
accompanying text; the 1977 PPSC report, see supra note 367 and accompanying text; the 1995
NTIA white paper, see supra text accompanying note 368; and the 2012 FTC report, see supra
text accompanying notes 370–74.
546

See supra text accompanying notes 475, 478.

547

See supra text accompanying note 377.

548

See supra text accompanying note 328.
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underlying the doctrines of unfairness and unconscionability can help us to develop
others.
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